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TAX AND THE “FAMILY” 
 
Professor Claire Young 
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University of British Columbia 

 SUMMARY 
 
 
 
In this paper the author analyses the taxation rules that recognise spousal and f amily 
relationships. She notes that even though we file income tax returns as individuals, the 
federal Income Tax Act recognises spousal and familial relationships for many different 
purposes, thereby undermining the integrity of the principle of the individual as the tax 
unit. She observes that Parliament has responded over the years to the ever-changing 
demographics of “family” life in Canada by  amending references in the Act to spousal 
and other family relationships. For example, the meaning of “spouse” has been 
expanded to become more inclusive. Most recently, with Bill C-23 the Act would be 
amended to treat lesbian and g ay couples in the same manner as heterosexual 
common-law couples. In spite of the many changes made, however, a fundamental 
policy question remains to be consider ed: is it  appropriate for income tax laws to be 
concerned with spousal and other family relationships? The author tackles this question 
by examining whether any of the rules that are based on spousal or familial relationships 
could be r emoved from the Act and w hether those that should r emain ought to be 
reconfigured to make them more fair in their application. 
 
Her enquiry takes into account the underlying purposes of the tax system and the basic 
tenets of tax policy enquiry, as w ell as ex amining the impact of the respective tax 
provisions on dif ferent taxpayers from an “ equality” perspective. The paper tracks the 
legislative history of some of the key tax rules involving spousal and family relationships. 
It classifies and critiques each rule by reference to the tax policy rationales behind the 
rule. Among the rules considered are the attribution rules, which are intended to stop 
iv 
income splitting between spouses and between adults and m inor children. The author 
concludes that more empirical research is needed on t he potential consequences of 
eliminating these rules before a recommendation to retain or repeal them can be made. 
The author does r ecommend the repeal of rules based on dependency , including the 
spousal tax credit and the ability to transfer unused tax credits to a spouse. Provisions 
based on economic mutuality are also assessed, both those that result in less or  more 
tax payable by the taxpayer. The author finds that some of these rules should be 
retained because t hey do ser ve valid objectives, however others such as t he 
inclusion/deduction system for spousal support payments are indefensible.  
 
This paper provides the first comprehensive review of the federal tax rules that take 
spousal and f amily relationships into account. Other scholarly analyses of tax rules 
related to spousal and family relationships have framed the issue in t erms of whether 
spouses should be t axed as individuals or as a joint unit. However, this paper explores 
the more fundamental question – whether it is appr opriate to recognise spousal and 
family relationships for any purpose in t he Act – and t he author finds that in many 
instances, but not all, rules taking these relationships into account cannot be justified 
and should be removed from the Act. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Taking account of taxpayers’ conjugal relationships in deter mining their tax 
liability reduces the effectiveness of the tax  system in ac hieving an appropriate 
distribution of society’s resources, misperceives the natur e of tax law, leads to 
serious horizontal inequities, hinders the ac hievement of gender equity, 
complicates the tax  system, intrudes into the privacy of intimate relationships, 
and furthers male dominance in the private realm.1 
 
In theory, because t he individual is t he unit of taxation in Canada it should make no 
difference whether or not a t axpayer is in a r elationship and, if so, whether that 
relationship is r ecognized by the state.2 In fact, even though we file tax returns as 
individuals, the Income Tax Act3 recognizes spousal and familial relationships4 for many 
different purposes.  I n some cases t his is an advantage for the spouses because the 
total tax liability of the couple is less than if the relationship was not recognized. In other 
cases there is the disadvantage of an incr eased tax burden. There are over 190 
references to child and over 400 r eferences to spouse in t he Act, and m any more 
                                                           
1  Neil Brooks, “The Irrelevance of Conjugal Relationships in Assessing Tax Liability” in Richard 
Krever and J ohn Head eds ., Tax Units and the T ax Rate Sc ale (Melbourne: Australian Tax 
Research Foundation, 1996) at 36. 
2  It  s hould  be  noted  that  the  Roy al  Com mission  on  Taxation  (the Carter Commission) 
recommended in 1966 that the f amily be the unit of taxation for all purposes. That 
recommendation was not incorporated in the new  Income Tax Act that was enacted effective 
January 1, 1972. See G overnment of Canada, Report of the Roy al Commission on Taxation 
(Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1966).  
3  Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, (5th. Supp.) c. I-5, as amended, hereinafter referred to as the Act. 
4  In this report the term “spousal relationship” refers to spouses as defined in section 252(4) of 
the Act.  That section defines a spouse of the taxpayer as a person of the opposite sex who 
cohabits with the taxpayer in a conjugal relationship and has so cohabited with the taxpayer for 
12 months or who cohabits in a c onjugal relationship with the tax payer and is  a par ent of a 
child of whom the taxpayer is also a parent. For the 2001 and s ubsequent taxation years, the 
reference to spouse will be changed to that of  common law partner and that ter m will include 
persons of the same-sex with the same requirements to be m et in ter ms of the natur e and 
duration of the relationship. The term “familial relationship” means, in the context of this report, 
the relationship between a parent and child. 
2 
references in the regulations.5 Until recently, the definition of spouse has been confined 
to those in het erosexual relationships. On April 11, 2000 Bill C-23, an omnibus 
legislation containing amendments to sixty-eight pieces of legislation, including 
amendments to the Act to treat lesbian and g ay couples in t he same manner as 
heterosexual common law couples, was passed by the House of Commons.6 The Bill is 
now before the Senate. In the context of this report it is important to note that such a 
change, while of benefit to some lesbians and g ay men,7 merely expands the definition 
of spouse t o make it more inclusive. The issue of  the appropriateness of recognizing 
spousal and familial relationships for tax purposes remains one for consideration. 
                                                           
5  See Appendix B for the list of all the provisions in the Act. It should be noted that with respect to 
the references to “child”, the report only considers those references that are to a child of the 
taxpayer. Therefore references to a per son under 18 years of age who is also a child for the 
purposes of the Act are not discussed. The reason is that the f ocus of this report is on family 
relationships and, while a person under 18 may be a c hild of the taxpayer, that is  not always 
the case. It is also important to note that the term “child” has different meanings depending on 
the context. For example, the “extended meaning” of child in section 252(1) of the Act states 
that a child of a tax payer includes a per son of whom the tax payer is the natur al parent, a 
person under 19 who is wholly dependent on the tax payer for support and in respect of whom 
the taxpayer has custody and control, a child of the taxpayer’s spouse, an adopted child of the 
taxpayer and a s pouse of a c hild of the tax payer. This section applies throughout the Act, 
except where it is expanded or limited by a particular definition for limited purposes. Therefore, 
for example, section 70(10) which applies to the r ollover of farm property to a child on a tax-
free basis defines a child for the purposes of that r ollover as also including a c hild of the 
taxpayer’s child, a child of the tax payer’s child’s child and a per son under 19 w ho was 
dependent on the tax payer for support and in r espect of whom the taxpayer had custody and 
control. As can be seen from these definitions, while a person under 19 who is dependent on 
the taxpayer for support and in r espect of whom the tax payer has custody and c ontrol is a 
child, the age of the child is not relevant in other circumstances. In this report, the focus is only 
on those relationships that include parents and their children, that is the family relationship. 
6  Bill C-23, The  Modernisation  of  Benefits  and O bligations Act, as passed by the Hous e of 
Commons on April 11, 2000.  
7  For an analysis of the impact of the inclusion of lesbians and gay men as spouses in the Act, 
see Claire Young, “Taxing Times for Lesbians and G ay Men”, (1994) 17 Dalhousie Law 
Journal 534. In fact the im pact of being treated as spouses varies depending on the level of  
income of each individual in the c ouple and the dis tribution of that income between the 
individuals. For example, the couple in which both par tners have low  incomes that ar e 
relatively equal in amount will pay more tax as a couple than they would as individuals because 
of the decrease in the am ount of their entitlement to the Goods and Services Tax credit which 
is based on “family” income. 
3 
The references to spousal and familial relationships are intended to accomplish a variety 
of tax policy objectives. For example, some of the rules are anti-avoidance rules that are 
intended to stop tax savings through income splitting and the consequent erosion of the 
tax base.8 Rules such as t he attribution rules ensure that income from property 
transferred in certain circumstances to a spouse or child is included in the income of the 
transferor not the transferee. There are other rules that also have a negative impact on 
spouses or families by basing entitlement to certain “tax subsides”, 9 such as the Goods 
and Services Tax Credit and the Canada Child T ax Benefit, on “ family income”. The 
consequence of these rules is t hat the spouses w ill receive less of  the subsidy as a 
couple than they would if they were treated as t wo separate individuals. The policy 
underlying these provisions recognizes that while two do not necessarily live as cheaply 
as one, there is a cer tain advantage based on economies of scale. The theory is that, 
unlike two individuals, the spouses require only one home, one washer and dryer and so 
on.10  Other rules give a tax advantage to those in spousal and family relationships. For 
example, the economic dependence of  one spouse on anot her is r ecognized with the 
provision of tax subsidies such as t he spousal tax credit. Other tax measures recognize 
the economic mutuality within spousal and f amily units by, for example, permitting 
certain properties to be transferred within the unit on a t ax-free basis and t hereby 
deferring any tax that would otherwise be pay able until the property is ult imately 
disposed of by the spouse or child. 
                                                           
8  Income splitting involves the diversion of income from a high rate taxpayer to a taxpayer who 
pays tax at a low er rate. This diversion of income frequently takes place between spouses or 
between parents and their children or grandchildren. 
9  The issue of what constitutes a tax subsidy is discussed in detail in Chapter One. 
10  As I shall discuss later, this argument is flawed, especially in an er a where more people than 
ever before are sharing accommodation and ther efore benefiting from economies of scale, 
even though they are not in a spousal relationship. 
4 
While the tax system continues to recognize spousal and f amilial relationships for a 
variety of purposes, the demographics of “family” life in Canada ar e changing. As I  
discuss in Chapter One, the traditional nuclear family is on the decline. Marriage rates 
are dropping, and divorce and separation are on the increase. The rate of childbirth has 
declined and many parents are having children later in life. There are more lone parent 
families than ever before, with women predominantly heading these families. The role of 
women in society is also changing. More women than ever before are participating in the 
paid labour force, although many of these women are employed on a par t time basis. 
Despite this change, women’s work in t he home remains undervalued and is not 
considered productive work. Yet some things remain the same. Women continue to be 
the primary caregivers of children and perform more household labour than men. In the 
labour force, women continue to earn less t han men and t hey are less w ealthy than 
men. All these social and economic factors must form the backdrop for any analysis of 
the rules that recognize spousal and familial relationships. 
 
This report will consider the issue of whether any of the rules that are based on spousal 
or familial relationships can be r emoved from the Act. The approach is as f ollows: 
Chapter One presents a brief overview of the tax system and discusses the purposes of 
the tax system in order to provide a policy background to the issue. This Chapter also 
considers the criteria by which we evaluate the fairness of our tax system and this 
analysis is t he foundation on w hich the later discussion of  the impact of the rules is 
based. Finally, Chapter One examines the changing demographics of the family in order 
to locate the subsequent discussion of  the need for the rules in the current social and 
5 
economic context. It also reviews the potential impact of the Modernization of Benefits 
and Obligations Act11 on the income tax system.  
 
Chapter Two sets the historical framework by tracing the evolution of the definition of 
spouse in the Income Tax Act. The intention is to follow the development of some of the 
most important rules and t hereby aid in t he understanding of why these rules were 
originally enacted and how they have changed over the years. Such an understanding 
will allow for an informed discussion about the relevance of the rules in the year 2000. 
Chapter Two also identifies and cat egorizes every rule in t he Act that applies t o 
“spouses”, “married persons” and “children”. (See Appendix A f or the complete list of 
these rules with a brief description of their application.) This taxonomy is the first step in 
the consideration of which rules should be retained and which might be eliminated and in 
determining how some of the rules might be reconfigured to make them fairer in their 
application. It is also t he most complete and com prehensive listing and description to 
date of these rules.12  
 
Chapter Three is an in dept h analysis and cr itique of all the rules identified and 
categorized in Chapter Two. The Chapter draws on the framework provided in Chapter 
                                                           
11  Supra note 6. 
12  Several other authors have provided a list and description of some of the tax rules that apply to 
spouses, but none have listed and described every single such provision, preferring to focus 
on the more important rules. See, for example, David Sherman, “Till Tax Do Us Part: The New 
Definition of ‘Spouse’”, 1992 Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian T ax Foundation, 1992) 
20:1; Maureen Maloney, “What is the Appr opriate Tax Unit f or the 1990s and Beyond?” in 
Allan Maslove ed., Issues in the T axation of Individuals (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 
and the Ontario Fair Tax Commission, 1994) 116; Kathleen Lahey, The Political Economies of 
Sex and Canadian Inc ome Tax Policy, presentation to the Canadian Bar  Association 
(Ontario), Lesbian and Gay Legal Issues Committee, 1998 (unpublished) and Albert Wakkary, 
“Assessing the Im pact of Changing Mar ital Rights and Obligations: Practical Considerations” 
(2000) 17 Canadian Journal of Family Law, 200. 
6 
One and consider s the pros and cons of  the various rules, taking into account the 
purposes of the tax system, the criteria by which we evaluate our tax system and the 
current demographics with respect to family relationships. The Chapter examines the 
policy underlying the various provisions, considers whether that policy remains valid 
today and makes recommendations about how to remove some of the problems inherent 
in the rules that apply to spousal and f amilial relationships. In some cases, such as the 
attribution rules, the report calls f or the collection of more empirical data before a 
recommendation can be made with respect to any amendment to, or repeal of, the rules. 
In other cases, the report calls for the repeal of the rule. For example, a detailed analysis 
of the rules that recognize dependency in spousal r elationships concludes w ith the 
recommendation that the spousal t ax credit and t he rules that permit an indiv idual to 
transfer unused t ax credits to a spouse should be repealed. Sometimes the report 
recommends reform of a r ule to make it operate in a f airer manner, such as t he 
recommendation that the child-care expense deduction be converted to a refundable tax 
credit. In each case the recommendation is preceded by a detailed analysis of the rule, 
the policy underlying it and a description of its operation. 
 
This report is t he first comprehensive review of the tax rules that take spousal and 
familial relationships into account. While there has been w ork done on t he impact on 
taxpayers of some of the individual rules that relate to spousal and familial relationships, 
that analysis has tended to take place in the context of consideration of the appropriate 
tax unit.13 The issue has been f ramed as one t hat looks to whether spouses should be 
                                                           
13  There has been some excellent critical work on the is sue of what is the appropriate tax unit 
and that literature has discussed many of the rules that are analysed in this report. See, for 
example, Neil Brooks, supra note 1, Maur een Maloney, Women and Income Tax Reform : A 
7 
treated as one unit for tax purposes and required to file a joint return. The context of this 
report is not  the issue of  the appropriate tax unit, but rather the issue of  whether it is 
appropriate to recognize spousal and family relationships for any purpose in the Act. The 
aim of this report is t o allow the reader to understand how the income tax system 
compromises the integrity of the individual as the unit of taxation, to demonstrate why 
this is problematic and to provide suggestions that will permit an informed discussion of 
the policy options available. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Background Paper (Ottawa: Canadian Advis ory Council on the Status  of Women, 1987); 
Kathleen Lahey, The Taxation of W omen in Canada, A Res earch Report (Faculty of Law, 
Queens University, 1988, unpublis hed report); Maureen Maloney, “What is the Appropriate 
Tax Unit f or the 1990s  and Bey ond?” ibid.; Ontario Fair Tax Commission, Women and 
Taxation  W orking Group, Women and Taxation (Toronto: Ontario Fair Tax Commission, 
1992) and Clair e Young, “Taxing Times for Women: Feminism Confronts Tax Policy” in 
Richard Krever ed. Tax Conversations (United Kingdom: Kluwer Law International, 1997). 

 CHAPTER ONE 
TAX POLICY ANALYSIS 
 
 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE TAX SYSTEM 
 
Income taxes are levied both by the federal government and by  the provincial and 
territorial governments. Income tax is payable on an individual’s world-wide income. The 
Income Tax Act  taxes on t he basis of  the source of that income with the result that 
different rules may apply in the computation of that income, depending on the source of 
the income. The main sources of income are employment income, business income, 
property income, other income and capit al gains. The Act requires that a t axpayer 
compute their net income by including certain amounts from each source in income and 
taking any allowable deductions. Taxable income is net  income less any other 
deductions such as losses car ried over from previous years. Federal tax payable is a 
percentage of taxable income. At present there are three federal rates of tax (17% on 
the first $29,590 of income, 26% on the amount of income in excess of $29,590 up to 
$59,180 and 29% on t he amount in excess of $59,180).14 Once federal tax payable has 
                                                           
14  These rates will be changed for the 2000 and subsequent taxation years. Subsection (4) of the 
Notice of Ways and Means Notice to Amend the Income Tax Act, dated February 28, 2000 and 
released as part of  the February 2000 budget provides as follows: 
That the calculation of an individual’s tax otherwise payable under Part 1 of the Act be 
modified to reduce the 26 per cent tax rate applicable to the portion of the individual’s 
taxable income in ex cess of $29,590 and less than $59,180 (those two threshold 
amounts being indexed) to 
a) 25 per cent for the 2000 taxation year, and 
b) 24 per cent for the 2001 and subsequent taxation years, 
such that the rate structure for the 2000 year be 
a) 17 per cent to taxable income up to $30,004 
b) 25 per cent of taxable income between $30,004 and $60,009, and 
c) 29 per cent of taxable income that exceeds $60,009. 
10 
been calculated the taxpayer may apply any non-refundable federal tax credits available. 
These will reduce the amount of tax payable. Examples of these tax credits include the 
personal tax credit, the marital (spousal) tax credit, the dependant tax credit, the 
charitable donations tax credit, and the political donations tax credit. The next step is to 
calculate the federal surtax which is 5 per  cent of basic t ax payable.15 Finally, tax is 
reduced by any refundable tax credits available and if taxable income is reduced to zero 
the credit can result in a refund to the taxpayer, even though no t ax was payable. 
Examples of refundable tax credits include the GST tax credit and the Canada Child Tax 
Benefit.  
 
The federal government and all provinces except Quebec have entered into agreements 
whereby the federal government collects income taxes for the provinces.16 Quebec 
imposes and collect s its own income taxes, applying a sy stem that is similar to the 
federal system in structure, although it is fully independent of the federal system. The 
provinces that have entered into tax collection agreements with the federal government 
levy an incom e tax that is a per centage of federal tax payable. The amount of the 
provincial income tax varies from province to province and for the 1999 taxation year the 
rates range between a high of 69% in Newfoundland (plus a surtax of 10% on provincial 
tax payable in excess of $10,000) to a low of  39.50% in Ontario. The agreements also 
permit the provinces to provide certain tax credits to taxpayers that are provincial in 
nature.  
 
                                                           
15  The  federal  surtax  is  to  be  reduced  to  4  per  cent  for  the  2001 and subsequent taxation 
years, and it will eventually be eliminated in by 2005. Ibid. at  subsection (5). 
16  Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-8. s.7. 
11 
In Quebec there are three rates of tax, 20 per cent on the first $25,000 of income, 23 per 
cent on income in excess of $25,000 up to $50,000 and 26 per  cent on the amount in 
excess of $50,000. While the structure of the Quebec tax system is similar to the federal 
system, there are differences in the specific provisions. In the context of this report the 
main difference that will be focused on relates to the child-care expense deduction. 
 
 
II. PURPOSES OF A TAX SYSTEM 
 
[T]axation depends on choices made collectively about what goods and services 
should be provided through government, what proportion of the income of society 
should be redistributed among its members, how the revenue needed to provide 
those goods and services should be raised, and how the tax  system should be 
used to influence the decisions of individuals.17 
 
An income tax system is a m ulti-faceted government program. Arguably, it is t he 
government’s most important policy instrument because it s impact is so f ar reaching, 
affecting all Canadians on a daily  basis in so m any different ways. Obviously one of its 
primary objectives is to raise revenue to be spent on government programs, but that is 
only part of its role. Our tax system is increasingly being used to achieve other goals, 
although which goals take precedence over others varies from time to time as t he 
political climate changes.18 Some of the other functions of a t ax system include 
redistributing economic resources when the private market fails in t his regard, 
redistributing income to reduce the inequalities between rich and poor, imposing 
                                                           
17 Ontario  Fair  Tax  Commission,  Fair  Tax  in a Changing World, A Report (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press in co-operation with the Ontario Fair Tax Commission, 1993) at 32. 
18 For an excellent analysis of the changing objectives of the tax system, see Neil Brooks, “The 
Changing Structure of the T ax System: Accommodating the Ric h”, (1993) 13 Osgoode Hall 
Law Journal 137.  
12 
additional costs in or der to fulfil a r egulatory function and st abilizing the economy. 
Different tools are used to achieve different goals. Therefore, for example, progressive 
marginal tax rates are intended to ensure that there is a more equal distribution of 
disposable income than there would be if  all t axpayers paid t ax at the same rate 
regardless of their income. It is important when considering the impact of any changes to 
the tax rules to recognise that a particular rule may fulfil more than one function and this 
study will identify the purposes of all the rules that relate to spouses and children. 
 
The tax system also fulfils a spending function. In 1973 Stanley Surrey wrote the classic 
text in w hich he dev eloped the tax expenditure concept.19 His t hesis was that any 
measures, such as income exclusions, deductions, deferrals or tax credits, which depart 
from a normative tax system are tax expenditures. That is, rather than funding a 
particular activity or program by way of a direct grant, the subsidy is delivered through 
the tax system. Tax expenditures are used f or a v ariety of purposes, including to 
redistribute income, to encourage certain economic behaviour and t o fund social and 
economic programs. 20 The concept has captured the imagination of many, including the 
federal government which incorporates tax expenditure analysis in the budget process 
                                                           
19 Stanley Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973). 
20 In a fascinating review of Stanley Surrey and Paul McDaniel’s 1984 text Tax Expenditures, Neil 
Brooks makes the point that while Surrey and McDaniel did coin the phrase “tax expenditures”, 
the concept of the tax system as a spending tool was not a novel concept. Brooks traces the 
evolution of the concept back to 1863 and an attac k by William Gladstone on the inc ome tax 
exemption for charities. The arguments made by Gladstone bear an uncanny resemblance to 
many of the arguments currently made for not funding social and economic programs through 
the tax system. For example, Gladstone said of the tax exemption, “here we maintain from year 
to year and from generation to generation what we are pleased to term an exemption, that is to 
say a public grant, but a public  grant which we never investigate, and never weigh. We plume 
ourselves in liberality; we leave this great expenditure in the dark.” Gladstone continued, “If we 
have a right to give public money we have no right to give it in the dark. We are bound to give it 
with discrimination: bound to give it with supervision” as quoted in Neil Br ooks, “Review of 
Surrey and McDaniel Tax Expenditures” (1986)  34:3 Canadian Tax Journal at 684. 
13 
and publishes annual account s which list the cost of every tax expenditure.21 The 
insights provided by this theoretical framework are many, including a r ecognition that 
because the tax measures are part of a spending program, their effectiveness should be 
measured by criteria other than the traditional tax policy evaluative methods discussed 
below such as equity, neutrality, economic efficiency and simplicity. Budgetary criteria, 
such as w hether the measure is t arget efficient, should play  a g reater role in our 
evaluation of tax expenditures. I would submit that equality is also a k ey issue f or 
consideration in the evaluation of a par ticular measure. Given that the allocation of a 
significant amount of money is at stake it is important to identify who benefits from the 
expenditure and, of course, who does not. 
 
 
III. FAIRNESS OF A TAX SYSTEM 
 
The achievement of a f air tax system in a dem ocracy is rightly regarded as a 
matter of high economic and social importance.22 
 
Traditional tax policy analysis has j udged the effect of tax measures and, to a cer tain 
degree, their fairness by reference to three particular factors, namely, horizontal and 
vertical equity, neutrality and sim plicity. Underpinning these criteria are the normative 
values of income taxation based on ability to pay, which recognises that some are more 
easily able to contribute than others, and taxation as a tool for income redistribution. The 
hallmark of taxation based on abilit y to pay is t he progressivity of the tax system. A 
                                                           
21 See,  f or  ex ample, the  m ost  r ecent  tax   ex penditure  account,  Tax  Expenditures  1999 
<http://www.fin.gc.ca/taxexp/taxexp99_le.html>. 
22 John Head, “Tax Fairness Principles” in Allan Mas love ed., Fairness in Taxation: Exploring the 
Principles (Toronto: University of Toronto Press in co-operation with the Fair Tax Commission 
of Ontario, 1993) at 4. 
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progressive system is one that imposes graduated rates of tax with the result that those 
with higher incomes pay tax at a higher rate on that higher amount of income. 
 
Horizontal equity is defined as the requirement that equals be treated equally. That is, all 
persons in the same circumstances should be treated in the same manner. Therefore, 
for example, one can argue that two people with the same amount of income should pay 
the same tax. But horizontal equity is an increasingly difficult concept to pin down. The 
key issue when deciding whether this criterion is being adhered to is determining which 
individuals are “similarly situated”. For example, as Neil Br ooks has point ed out, the 
long-standing tax policy view that two individuals with the same amount of income 
should pay the same amount of tax is being challenged in the name of lower taxes for 
the rich.23 The argument is t hat such a point  of comparison means that the return on 
individuals’ savings is included in incom e and that is unfair to the person who is thriftier 
in their habits. Thus the call is being  made for the point of comparison not to be t he 
amount of income each individual earns but rather the value of their consumption. This 
kind of analysis leads to regressive taxation and undermines the basic tenet of taxation 
based on ability to pay.  
 
Vertical equity requires that persons in differing situations be treated in an appropriately 
different manner. Again this criterion is closely  connected to the principle of taxation 
based on ability to pay. One can argue that adherence to the principle of vertical equity 
has been eroded over time, especially since the 1987 “tax reform” process. At that time 
the number of tax rates was reduced from ten to three and the top federal rate was 
                                                           
23 Neil Brooks, supra note 18 at 181-184. 
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reduced from 34 per cent to 29 per cent. Even though we have seen an increase in top 
tax rates because of surtaxes, the system is not  as progressive as it  was prior to the 
1987 reform.24 In addition, the introduction of the Goods and Services Tax, a f lat rate 
consumption tax has meant a further decrease in the progressivity of the tax system.25 
Furthermore, there are frequent calls f rom many quarters, including several provincial 
governments, for a general lowering of tax rates. Such a move could well further detract 
from the progressivity of the system, thus further eroding the vertical equity of the tax 
system. 
 
The criterion of neutrality requires that the tax system does not distort taxpayers’ social 
and economic choices. For example, the decision w hether or not to work in t he paid 
labour force or the decision to spend money rather than save should not be influenced 
by the workings of the tax system. Underlying this concept of neutrality is the concern 
that distortion of economic choices may result in a m isallocation of resources because 
taxpayers may choose t o direct money into activities that receive preferential tax 
treatment, rather than those that do not. But it is not only economic choices that should 
not be distorted by the tax system. In the context of this study, social choices such as 
the choice to marry or to live in a common law relationship or to remain single should not 
be made as a conseq uence of any preferential tax treatment that would ensue f rom 
choosing one life style over another. 
                                                           
24  Indeed, the income tax rate structure has steadily become less progressive. The earlier major 
tax reform in 1972 s aw a r eduction in the num ber of tax rates from fourteen to ten w ith a 
lowering of the top federal rate to 47 per cent. 
25  An income tax credit with respect to the GST was implemented when the tax was introduced in 
an attempt to reduce some of the regressive effects of the f lat rate tax (section 122.5 of  the 
Act.) Nevertheless, the c redit does not m itigate entirely the regressive effect of the tax, see, 
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While the phrase “a simple tax system” may appear to be somewhat of an oxymoron, it 
is clear that most people would support the idea that a tax system should be as simple 
as possible. It is important that taxpayers understand the impact of the tax rules on them 
and their activities. It is also im portant that the taxing authorities are able to administer 
the system, something that becomes more difficult as t he system becomes more 
complex. Thus, simplicity is another criteria by which we judge the effectiveness of the 
tax system.  
 
While the principles discussed above are an im portant foundation of our tax system, 
recently some authors have commented on how traditional tax policy analysis has, in the 
past, omitted a v ery important element, that is eq uality among particular groups in 
society.26 Maureen Maloney, for example, has pointed out that “[w]hile current 
interpretations of equity, both vertical and horizontal, may catch class biases, they do not 
go far enough because the need for equity is generally recognised with respect only to 
the distribution of income.”27 Evaluation of the tax system by reference to equality is not 
as limited in scope as som e of the approaches discussed abov e. It requires an 
examination of the impact of the rules on particular groups in society to determine if they 
are treated in a prejudicial manner. In this study the focus is consideration of whether the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Neil Brooks, Searching for an Alternative to the GST (Discussion Paper 90 C.1) (Ottawa: The 
Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1990). 
26  In Canada, the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status  of Women first noted this omission. 
See Maureen Maloney, Women and Income Tax Reform: A Bac kground Paper (Ottawa: 
Canadian Advisory Committee on the Status of Women, 1987) at 2. 
27  Maureen Maloney, “What  is   the Appr opriate Tax Unit f or the 1990s and Beyond?” in Allan 
Maslove ed., Issues in the Taxation of Individuals (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) 
116 at 118. 
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current rules that distinguish between taxpayers who are in spousal r elationships and 
those who are not result in unequal treatment for any particular group. 
 
Any analysis of the equal application of income tax rules must take into account that 
equality does not  merely mean formal equality. Rather, the analysis must also 
encompass the concept of substantive equality. An approach based on f ormal equality 
would treat all individuals the same regardless of the differences between them. It has 
been said that this approach “is inadequate to the task of creating real equality because 
it does not encompass or even acknowledge inequality of condition. Substantive equality 
recognizes that in or der to achieve equality, different groups in society may require 
different treatment.”28 It has been put this way by the Supreme Court of Canada: 
In fact, the interests of true equality may well require differentiation in treatment. 
In simple terms, then, it m ay be s aid that a law  which treats all identic ally and 
which provides equality of treatment between "A" and "B" m ight well cause 
inequality for "C", depending on the dif ferences in per sonal characteristics and 
situations. To approach the ideal of full equality before and under the law - and in 
human affairs an approach is all that can be expected - the main consideration 
must be the impact of the law on the indiv idual or group concerned. [emphasis 
added]29  
 
An example of formal equality in the tax context is the gender neutrality of tax legislation. 
Each provision applies to both men and women and yet, as I  have discussed in ot her 
work30, women suffer significant substantive inequalities when compared to men in 
terms of the impact of the system on them. 
                                                           
28  Gwen  Brodsky  and  Shelagh  Day , Canadian Charter Equality Rights for Women: One Step 
Forward or Two Steps Back? (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status  of Women, 
1989) at 150. 
29  Andrews v. The Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 at 165 per McIntyre J. 
30  See, f or example, Claire Young, “(In)visible Inequalities: Women, Tax and Poverty” (1995) 27 
Ottawa Law Rev iew, 99 and Clair e Young, “Taxing Times for Women: Feminism Confronts 
Tax Policy” in R. Kr ever ed., Tax Conversations (United Kingdom: Kluwer Law International, 
1997). 
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IV. CHANGING DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE FAMILY 
 
In Canada, as  in a num ber of industrialized countries, domestic and family 
behaviours have become much more diversified in the pas t thirty years. One 
aspect of this diversification is that new forms of unions have appeared, and the 
unions formed have become less stable. Another is that sequences of transitions 
in the family life course have proliferated.31 
 
It is clear  that the demographics of the family have changed considerably since the 
introduction of the income tax system. In the 1940s and 1950s the dominant picture was 
that of the nuclear family comprised of a married couple with children where the husband 
worked outside the home and the wife worked in the home raising the children and doing 
the housework.32  Slowly, however, the picture changed. In 1966, 92 per cent of families 
comprised of a husband and wife but by 1976 that figure had decreased to 90 per cent.33 
In addition to a decr ease in t he number of marriages, changes also occurred in the 
demographics of the labour force. One significant change was that more women began 
to work outside the home. In 1966, 27 per  cent of married women worked outside the 
home. By 1976 t hat figure had incr eased to 44 per  cent and by 1989 to 62 per cent 
signaling a huge change in the work patterns within the family.34 It is important to note, 
however, that while there are more dual earner families than ever before, one reason for 
this demographic change is economic necessity. It has been est imated that, for 
example, in 1991 t he percentage of couples living below the poverty line in dual earner 
                                                           
31  Pierre  T urcotte  and  Alain  Belanger , The Dynamics of Formation and Dis solution of F irst 
Common-Law Unions in Canada, (Statistics Canada: 
 <http://www.statcan.ca/english/research/other9.htm> at 1. 
32  See John F. Conway, The Canadian Family in Crisis (James Lorimer: Toronto, 1993) at 14. He 
notes that in 1941 only 4.5% of married women worked outside the home and while that figure 
did increase during the Sec ond World War, it f ell back again in the pos t-war years before 
increasing significantly in late 1950s and early 1960s. 
33  Ibid. at 18. 
34  Ibid. at 18 and 21. 
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families would have been 17. 9% instead of 4.6% if women did not  work in t he paid 
labour force.35  
 
These changes in labour force participation have been accompanied by a decrease in 
the number of people living in the nuclear family. Marriage rates continue to decline with 
the proportion of married couples falling in every province between 1991 and 199636 and 
while heterosexual couples are increasingly choosing common law status over marriage, 
the number of individuals living in eit her a m arriage or a het erosexual common law 
relationship declined bet ween 1991 and 1996. 37 At the same time the number of lone 
parent families in Canada is on t he increase with women predominantly heading these 
families.38 Indeed lone parent families headed by women outnumber those headed by 
men by more than four to one.39 Aboriginal women and women of colour are more likely 
to be lone par ents than white women.40 Single mothers with children are 
disproportionately represented among the poor.41 More women than ever before are 
living alone and fewer women are living in relationships with men.42 Finally, the state has 
                                                           
35  See, Statistics Canada, Characteristics of Dual-Earner Families 1993, Catalogue 13-215, 
(Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1995) at 8. 
36  See, Statistics Canada, “1996 Census: Marital Status, Common-law Unions and Families” The 
Daily, Catalogue 11-00IE (October 14, 1997) at 4. 
37  Ibid. at 8. 
38  Ibid. at 2.  
39  Ibid. 
40  For example, almost 15 per cent of all Aboriginal women over the age of 15 and almost 18 per 
cent of all women of colour over the age of 15 are lone parents in contrast to 7 per cent of all 
white women over the age of  15. See, Statis tics Canada, Lone-Parent Families in Canada , 
Catalogue 89-522E, December 1992, Table 1.9. 
41  In 1997 56 per  cent of female headed lone parent families lived in pover ty, Statistics Canada, 
Income Distributions by Size in Canada, 1997  (Catalogue 13-207-XPB, July 1999) at 34- 35 
and Text Table IV. See also p. 187 and Table 67. 
42  Statistics Canada, supra note 36 at 2 and 6. 
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recently begun to recognize lesbian and gay relationships, as evidenced by the passage 
through the House of Commons of the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act.43 
That legislation extends to lesbian and gay couples the application of legal benefits and 
obligations of heterosexual common law spouses in six ty-eight statutes, including the 
Income Tax Act.  
 
Taken together, the changing demographics described above raise the important issue 
of whether it remains appropriate to recognize relationships based on m arriage and 
common law status in the tax system. Underlying this issue is t he dissonance between 
the view of women as dependent  on men for their financial well-being as espoused in 
the Act and the socio-economic realities of women’s lives which increasingly see them 
as single and participating in the paid labour force. This report will explore these matters 
in detail and endeavour to put forward some suggestions for change to the Act that will 
alleviate some of the problems posed by outdated tax policies in the new millennium. 
                                                           
43  Bill C -23, The  Modernization  of  Benefits   and  O bligations  Act,  as passed by the House of 
Commons on April 11, 2000. 
 CHAPTER TWO 
TAX RECOGNITION OF SPOUSAL AND 
FAMILIAL RELATIONSHIPS 
 
 
This Chapter sets the scene f or the detailed analysis of the tax rules that recognize 
spousal and f amilial relationships. The intention is t o provide a background to, and a 
context for, the rules that will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three. To that end, 
this Chapter opens with a review of the short-lived proposal of the Royal Commission on 
Taxation (the Carter Commission) to change the unit of taxation to the family unit. 44  The 
Chapter then moves to a det ailed legislative history of some of the more important 
provisions that take spousal and f amilial relationships into account. In particular, the 
historical analysis traces the evolution of key provisions such as t he spousal tax credit, 
the attribution rules, the definition of spouse, the rollover of certain properties to a 
spouse or child and t he principal residence exemption.45 The statutory provisions on 
which this legislative history is based are contained in Appendix B to this report. 
 
                                                           
44  Government of Canada, Report of the Roy al Commission on Taxation, (Ottawa: Government 
of Canada, 1966) . The family unit pr oposed by the Car ter Commission was to c onsist of 
husband and w ife and, if  there were dependent c hildren, they would also form part of the 
family unit. 
45  The term “rollover” applies to the transfer of property on a tax-free basis. In effect, even though 
the transfer might give rise to a tax able capital gain, the pr oceeds of disposition in respect of 
the transfer are deemed to be an amount equal to the or iginal cost of the pr operty to the 
transferor. The transferee acquires the property with a cost equal to the same amount. The 
result is that tax  on any  accrued gain pr ior to the transfer is deferred until the transferee 
disposes of the pr operty. The Act provides for the r ollover of certain properties between 
spouses and between a taxpayer and their child. 
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The second part of this Chapter outlines and explains the method of classification of the 
rules that relate to “spouse”, “married person” and “ child”. (See Appendix A f or the 
classification of every provision that relates to spouse, married person or child in t he 
Act.) Obviously any such classif ication is somewhat arbitrary but the analysis sets out 
the rationale underlying the grouping of the various provisions. The classification of the 
rules is key to the analysis and critique of the rules that form the basis of Chapter Three.   
 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
As already mentioned, the individual has always been t he unit of taxation in Canada,  
although the integrity of that policy has been under mined by the rules that look to 
spousal and f amilial relationships. In 1966 t he Carter Commission published it s 
comprehensive Report on Taxation and recommended that the individual be abandoned 
as the tax unit and replaced by the family. It also recommended a joint system of filing 
for aggregated family income that would be subject to special rates. The Commission 
justified these recommendations on sev eral grounds. For example, the Report states 
that  
the family is today, as it has been for many centuries, the basic economic unit in 
society. Although few marriages are entered into for purely financial reasons, it is 
the continued income and f inancial position of the f amily which is ordinarily of 
primary concern, not the income and financial position of the individual members. 
Thus, the married couple itself adopts the economic concept of the family as the 
income unit from the outset.46 
 
Another reason given for recommending this dramatic change to the family as the unit of 
taxation was the perceived  economies of scale that arise when  two people (presumably  
                                                           
46  Carter Commission, supra note 44, Volume 3 at 123. 
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only those in t he same family) live together and t herefore share expenses. The 
Commission took the view that the tax burden should be higher for the family unit than it 
is for two individuals because the members of a family living together do not spend as 
much as two separate individuals on household goods and other related expenses. The 
Commission also justified the recommendation on the basis of  equity considerations. It 
was concerned that horizontal equity is offended by taxation based on the individual as 
the tax unit. This inequity arises when progressive tax rates (such as those which we 
have in Canada) are applied in com puting the tax liability. Two families with the same 
total amount of income may have very different tax burdens depending on how  the 
income of each family is split between the family members. The family in which both 
spouses have relatively equal incomes will pay less tax than a family with the same total 
amount of income but in which the income is earned by only one spouse. The reason is 
that the spouse who earns all the income will be taxed at a higher marginal tax rate than 
the two lower income spouses. Other reasons given for favouring the family as the unit 
of taxation were that the tax system would be simpler and easier  to administer.  I f the 
family was the tax unit there would be no need f or attribution rules and the tax system 
would be indifferent to transfers of property between spouses, obviating the need for the 
rollover provisions. Several commentators have pointed out that in m aking these 
recommendations the Commission totally ignored the impact of such m easures on 
women47 and that the recommendations were based on a “feudal” notion of economic 
relations within the family.48 
                                                           
47  Kathleen Lahey, The Taxation of Women in Canada, A  Res earch  Repor t  (Faculty of Law, 
Queens University, 1988, unpublished report) at 53 and Neil Br ooks, “The Irrelevance of 
Conjugal Relationships in Assessing Tax Liability” in Richard Krever and John Head eds., Tax 
Units and the Tax Rate Scale (Melbourne: Australian Tax Research Foundation, 1996) at 40. 
48   Lahey, ibid. at 56. 
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In fact, the recommendations of the Carter Commission on this issue were not adopted 
by the government and the 1972 tax reform did not change the unit of taxation from the 
individual to the family. One reason given by the government for not adopting the family 
unit was that such a system would have imposed a “marriage tax” because two spouses 
would pay more tax than two individuals with the same amount of income.  The 
“marriage” tax would arise because in a sy stem with progressive marginal tax rates 
aggregation of family income would often mean that the income of the family would be 
taxed at a higher marginal rate than it would be without the aggregation. It is, however, 
important to note that even though the 1972 tax reform did not change the tax unit to the 
family, it did retain all the rules that had previously treated spouses as one f or several 
purposes and added some new rules in this regard.49 Over the years most of these rules 
have been retained, although a few of the less important rules that look to the spousal 
unit have been repealed.50  
 
Underlying the debate about the relevance of spousal relationships to the imposition of 
tax liability, is the issue of  whether one takes the view that individuals should be taxed 
on the income that they control or the income from which they benefit. If you believe that 
individuals should be t axed on the income from which they benefit, then a corollary to 
that belief is that where an individual has a sharing relationship with another, the value of 
                                                           
49  Sections  70(6)  and  73(1)  were  added  to  the  Act,  effective  January  1, 1972.  These rules 
provide for a rollover of capital property to a spouse and became necessary because in 1972 
capital gains became subject to tax  for the f irst time in Canada w ith the introduction of a 
provision that required half of any capital gain to be included in income. 
50  The  rules  that  have  been  r epealed  include  the  pr ohibition  on  the deduc tion of a salary 
expenses paid by one spouse to another, the ministerial discretion to allocate all or part of the 
income of a partnership of spouses to one or  the other of the spouses and the application of 
the attribution rules to transfers between spouses that tak e place at f air market value. See, 
Jack London, “ The Impact of Changing Per ceptions of Social Equity on T ax Policy: The 
Marital Tax Unit”, (1988) 26 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 287 at 297-298. 
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the economic resources from which the individual benefits through the sharing should be 
included in t heir income. When this theory is transposed to spousal relationships, the 
conclusion is t hat because spouses shar e their economic resources (a significant 
assumption), their incomes should be aggregated (and then divided between them) to 
determine their individual tax liability. Such a m easure would be j oint taxation of 
spouses. While we do not have joint taxation of spouses in Canada, the rules that look to 
spousal relationships are based on an underlying theory that spouses do shar e 
economic resources and that there is an economic mutuality to the relationship. Such 
rules are based on t he benefit theory. The weakness of the benefit theory is t hat it 
assumes that there is pooling within the spousal relationship of income and wealth. As I 
discuss in Chapter Three, this assumption is highly flawed.  
 
Meanwhile those who subscribe to the control theory would argue that the tax system 
should impose tax on the individual who controls the income, and therefore spousal or 
other relationships are irrelevant. The individual is and should r emain the tax unit. As 
Neil Brooks has said  
Individuals should be taxed on the income they control, whether they share it with 
another or not. T hus taxpayers’ conjugal, or any other sharing relationships, 
should be ignored in assessing their tax liability.51 
 
The importance of the control theory of taxation is discussed lat er in Chapt er Three 
when those provisions that are based on and assum e an economic mutuality within a 
spousal or familial relationship are considered. 
                                                           
51  Brooks, supra note 47 at 47. 
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II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
RECOGNITION OF SPOUSAL 
RELATIONSHIPS 
 
A. Introduction 
 
From the date of its inception in 1917,  the Canadian incom e tax system has always 
taken account of certain aspects of spousal and f amilial relationships. While the nature 
of the relationship that is r ecognized by the Act, and t he rules that apply to related 
persons, such as spouses, have changed over the years, the system has always treated 
married persons in a different manner than single persons. This Chapter will trace the 
legislative history of some of the most important provisions that currently apply to 
spouses. The purpose of this attention to history is to set the scene for the detailed 
classification and analysis of all the rules that apply to spouses.  
 
The Income War Tax Act52 (the predecessor of the current Act) provided a different tax 
threshold for married persons than it did for single persons. In particular, it imposed a 4 
per cent tax on all incom e exceeding $1,500 for “unmarried persons and widows or 
widowers without dependent children”.53 For all ot her persons the 4 per  cent tax was 
only payable on income exceeding $3,000. Therefore, from the very beginning, while the 
tax unit was the individual, married persons received preferential tax treatment by way of 
                                                           
52  Income War Tax Act, 1917, 7-8 Geo. V, c. 28. 
53  Ibid., section 4(1)(a). It should be noted that in 1919, the pr ovision was amended to change 
the amount of  the ex emption and the r ange of persons to w hom it applied. T he tax was 
imposed on income exceeding $1,000 but les s than $6,000 f or unmarried persons, widows 
and widowers without dependent children, and persons not supporting dependent brothers or 
sisters or sisters under the age of  18 or  a dependent par ent or grandparent. For all other  
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an exemption from tax. In fact, as Kat hleen Lahey has demonstrated this policy 
“effectively exempted working class men--- single or married--- from income taxation.54 
The original tax legislation also included an at tribution rule that was intended to stop 
income splitting between husband and w ife. The broad rule55 provided that where a 
person transferred any property to their husband or  wife or to any member of their 
husband or wife’s family, the person would be t axed as if  the transfer had not been 
made, unless the Minister was satisfied that the transfer was not made for the purpose 
of evading tax. These two rules were the only provisions in the original income tax 
legislation that departed from the policy of the individual as the unit of taxation, but they 
laid the groundwork for the myriad of rules that take spousal relationships into account in 
the current income tax system. 
 
B. Spousal exemption \ tax credit 
 
The exemption from tax for married persons is now formulated as a spousal tax credit, 
although the policy underlying the rule is the same as that which underlay the original 
exemption from tax for married persons. Both the exemption from tax and the current 
spousal tax credit recognize economic dependence in a r elationship. In 1917, it was 
highly unlikely that women would work outside the home and in m ost instances they 
were dependent on men, whether their husbands or  their fathers, for their economic 
security. At the same time husband and w ife were viewed as one per son with an 
underlying assumption that the husband would support the wife. While the role of women 
                                                                                                                                                                             
persons, the tax was imposed on income over $2,000 but not ex ceeding $6,000. See, An Act 
to Amend the Income War Tax Act, S.C. 1919, c.55, section 3. 
54   Lahey, supra note 47 at 378. 
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in society has changed over the years with more women than ever working outside the 
home, the current spousal t ax credit remains based on econom ic dependence and is 
only available to taxpayers who support a spouse who is economically dependent upon 
the taxpayer.  
 
By 1926, there was concern that while the exemption for married persons was intended 
to recognize economic dependence, it did not specifically state that it was only available 
where one spouse was economically dependent on the other. Consequently, the Income 
War Tax Act  was amended to provide that the marriage exemption could only  be 
claimed by a taxpayer whose spouse had incom e of less than $1,500 in the year.56 By 
1942, the amount that could be earned by the economically dependent husband or wife 
had dropped to $660. In 1942, the government removed the limitation on t he amount 
that could be earned and provided that “a husband shall not  lose his r ight to be taxed 
under Rule One of this section by reason of his wife being employed and receiving any 
income.”57 What is especially interesting about this amendment is t hat it was clearly 
designed to encourage women to participate in the paid labour  force. They could now 
earn income without affecting their husband’s ent itlement to the married persons 
exemption. The removal of the limit on earnings was a gender specific measure because 
it only removed the limit on ear nings and t he dependency requirement in r espect of 
wives. But this state of affairs did not last long. The next year the earnings limit was re-
                                                                                                                                                                             
55  Supra note 52, section 4(4). 
56  An Act to Amend the Income War Tax Act, 1917, S.C. 1926, c.10, section 4, adding subsection 
(1B). For a fascinating analysis of the bac kground to the c hange to the m arried person’s 
exemption, see Lahey, supra note 47 at 381-383. 
57  An  Act  to  Amend  the  Inc ome  War  Tax  Act,  1917, S.C. 1942, c.28, section 1 which added 
section 1, Rule 3 to the Act.  
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instated at the lower amount of $250.58 The next major change to the married person’s 
exemption was its conversion to a t ax credit in 1988.59 The conversion to a tax credit 
means that the value of the credit no long er depends on t he marginal tax rate of the 
taxpayer. Instead the credit is worth the same to all taxpayers regardless of their level of 
income. 
 
C. Attribution rules 
 
The inclusion of anti-avoidance rules, such as the original attribution rule, is a policy that 
has been continued and developed over the years. The 1917 attribution rule recognized 
that there was an incent ive to split income and r educe the overall tax liability within 
relationships. At that time, this incentive arose where one spouse paid tax and the other 
did not pay tax. It was determined that the consequent tax advantage gained by the 
couple who transferred income to the spouse who did not pay tax was inappropriate. By 
the time of the 1972 tax reform, the rules had evolved into a more detailed series of rules 
that applied to all transfers of income producing property by taxpayers to their spouses 
or their minor children. The rules with respect to spouses attributed income and capital 
gains from property transferred to a spouse while the rules that applied to minor children 
only attributed income from the property. Over the years questions of interpretation 
concerning the application of the rules were resolved not by legislative amendment but 
                                                           
58  For a detailed analy sis of the reasons for these changes, see Lahey, supra note 47 at 383-
388. She theorizes that the re-instatement of the dependency requirement and its consequent 
disincentives to women’s participation in the paid labour force was a deliberate policy intended 
to free up jobs for soldiers returning from war. 
59  Section 92(1) of An Act to Amend the Income Tax Act, S.C. 1988, c. 55. 
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by the courts.60 Effective May, 1985 significant changes were made to the attribution 
rules which extended their application to all minors who did not deal at arm’s length with 
the transferor and m inor nieces and nephew s. The new rules also ex panded the 
application of the rules to interest-free or low-interest loans of  property to a spouse or  
minor. In short, the previous more general rules were replaced with a detailed statutory 
code of application. The current rules, while based on the same premise as the original 
attribution rules, are significantly more complex than their predecessors and are 
discussed in detail in Chapter Three. 
 
D. Definition of spouse 
 
The Act has nev er defined the terms “married person”, “husband” and “wife”. In the 
1980s and early 1990s those terms were phased out of the Act and replaced with the 
word “spouse”.  Again, however, the Act did not define that term,61 although it did include 
an extended definition of spouse that provided that “spouse” or “former spouse” included 
a party to a voidable or void marriage.62 It was not until 1990 that heterosexual “common 
law” spouses w ere included in t he Act and t hat inclusion w as only for very limited 
                                                           
60  See, f or example, Estate  of  Dav id  Fasken  v.  M.N.R. [1948] CTC 265 which held that a 
divestiture of property by the tr ansferor and a ves ting of the pr operty in a tr ansferee was a 
transfer and Sachs v. The Queen [1980] CTC 358 w hich held that pr operty includes a 
contingent interest in a trust. 
61  See, David Sherman, “Till Tax Do Us Part: The New Definition of ‘Spouse’”, 1992 Conference 
Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1992) at 20:2 where he states that spouse “takes 
on the meaning that it has  at law  generally: either of a hus band and w ife who has gone 
through a legal marriage ceremony performed by an authorized clergyman (sic) or official and 
permitted by the jurisdiction in which it takes place, and who have not been divorced.” 
62  Section 252(3) of the Act was added by S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c.140, section 130(1), applicable 
after 1981. 
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purposes related to Registered Retirement Savings Plans.63 It was the 1992 budget that 
proposed the expansion of the concept of spouse to include heterosexual common law 
spouses and ef fective January 1, 1993 sect ion 252(4) was added t o the Act.64  Put 
simply, a spouse of  a taxpayer is a per son of the opposite sex who has cohabited with 
the taxpayer in a conj ugal relationship for at least 12 months or who cohabits with the 
taxpayer in a conjugal relationship and who is a parent of a child of whom the taxpayer is 
also a parent. It is important to note that when this change was made, one consequence 
was a tax windfall of $985 million for the federal government over the five-year period 
following the change.65  The main reason for this result was the decreased entitlement 
                                                           
63  Section 13(6) of An Act to Amend the Income Tax Act, S.C. 1990, c.35 added section 146(1.1) 
to the Act. Section 146(1.1) provided that a s pouse of an individual inc luded a person of the 
opposite sex married to the individual or who was cohabiting with the individual in a c onjugal 
relationship and had so cohabited for at least one year or who is the parent of a child of whom 
the individual was also a parent. The section only applied for the purpose of certain definitions 
related to RRSPs although it did not, f or example permit the establishment of spousal RRSPs 
for common law spouses. Rather the rules related to the ability to pass RRSP contributions of 
a deceased taxpayer to their  common law spouse on a tax -free basis provided the spouse 
transferred the contributions to their own RRSP. 
64  Section 252(4) of the Act currently reads as follows: 
In this Act, 
(a) words referring to a spouse at any  time of a tax payer include the person of the 
opposite sex who cohabits at that time w ith the taxpayer in a conjugal relationship 
and  
(i) has so cohabited with the taxpayer throughout a 12 month period ending before 
that time, or 
(ii) would be a parent of a child of w hom the taxpayer would be a parent, if this Act 
were read without reference to paragraph (1)(e) and subparagraph (2)(a)(iii) 
and for the purposes of this paragraph, where at any time a taxpayer and the person 
cohabit in a conjugal relationship, they  shall, at any particular time after that time, be 
deemed to be cohabiting in a conjugal relationship unless they were not cohabiting at 
the particular time for a period of at least 90 days that includes the particular time 
because of a breakdown of their conjugal relationship: 
(b) references to marriage shall be read as if a conjugal relationship between 2 
individuals who are, because of paragraph (a), spouses of each other w ere a 
marriage; 
(c) provisions that apply to a person who is married apply to a person who is, because of 
paragraph (a), a spouse of the taxpayer; and 
(d) provisions that apply to a person w ho is unmarried do not apply  to a person w ho is, 
because of paragraph (a), a spouse of the taxpayer. 
65  Sherman, supra, note 61 at 20:7. 
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for many individuals to the GST tax credit and t he Child T ax Credit by reason of the 
combination of the individuals’ income because t he entitlement to and the amount of 
these tax credits is based on “family” income. 
 
Historically, the Act has alw ays excluded same-sex couples f rom the definition of 
spouse. A major breakthrough in this regard occurred in 1998 when the Ontario Court of 
Appeal held in Rosenberg v. Canada (Attorney General)66 that the definition of spouse in 
the Act, as it  applied to occupational pension plans, discriminated against lesbians and 
gay men on the basis of  sexual orientation in cont ravention of section 15(1) of the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The court also held that the discrimination could not be 
justified under section 1 of the Charter. The remedy granted by the court was to read the 
words “or the same sex” into the definition of spouse in section 252(4) of the Act, for the 
purposes of the registration of occupational pension plans.  This ruling effectively 
extended entitlement to survivor benefits under occupational pension plans to the 
partners of lesbians and g ay men who died w hile covered by the pension plan. The 
decision, however, did not  affect the definition of spouse as it  applied f or any other 
purpose of the Act.  
 
The federal government did not appeal the Rosenberg decision, signaling that the 
inclusion of lesbians and gay couples as spouses under  the Act was imminent. In 
February 2000, the federal government introduced Bill C-23, The Modernization of 
Benefits and O bligations Act. That Bill, which proposed amendments to the Act that 
would include same-sex couples as spouses for all purposes under the Act, was passed 
                                                           
66  (1998), 98 D.T.C. 6286 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter Rosenberg]. 
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by the House of Commons on Apr il 11, 2000 and is now  before the Senate. It is 
important to note that this change also results in the repeal of the current definition of 
“spouse” in the Act and its replacement by a new definition of “common-law partner”.67 
There is a conseq uential provision that changes every reference in the Act to “spouse” 
or “spouses” to “spouse or common-law partner” and “spouses and common-law 
partners”.68 The consequence of these changes is t hat “spouse” will now refer only to 
married persons (as it did prior to the inclusion of  common-law couples as spouses in 
1993) and het erosexual common-law couples w ill be included in a separ ate category 
along with same-sex couples as com mon-law partners. To date, there is no indication 
that further amendments will be made which would result in a different application of the 
tax rules to married persons than to common-law spouses, but certainly the framework 
to make such changes is in place.  
 
E. Rollover provisions 
 
Prior to the 1972 tax reform, capital gains arising on disposition of capital property were 
not subject to income tax. As a result of the recommendations of the Carter Commission 
                                                           
67  Section 138 of  the Modernization of Benefits  and Obligations Act repeals section 252(4) (the 
current definition of spouse) and adds the following to section 248(1) of the Act: 
“common-law partner”, w ith respect to a tax payer at any  time, means a person who 
cohabits at that time in a conjugal relationship with the taxpayer and 
(a) has so cohabited with the taxpayer for a continuous period of at least one year, or 
(b) would be the parent of a child of w hom the taxpayer is a parent, if this Act were read 
without reference to paragraphs 252(1)(c) and (e) and subparagraph 252(2)(a)(iii), 
and, for the purposes of this definition, w here at any  time the taxpayer and the person 
cohabit in a conjugal relationship, they are, at any particular time after that time, deemed 
to be cohabiting at a particular time for a period of at least 90 days that includes the 
particular time because of the breakdown of their conjugal relationship.  
A definition of “common-law partnership” being a relationship between two persons who are 
common-law partners of each other is also added to the Act. 
68  Ibid., Schedule 2, section 142. 
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and the tax reform process, effective January 1, 1972 one-half of a capital gain was 
required to be included in incom e of a taxpayer. At that time capital gains arising from 
several transactions were excluded from this requirement, including transactions in 
respect of capital property transferred by husbands and w ives to each other. Sections 
70(6) and 73(1) provided that a transfer of capital property by a taxpayer to their spouse 
either on death or on an inter vivos basis would effectively take place on a tax-free basis. 
The taxpayer would be deemed to dispose of the property and r eceive proceeds of 
disposition equal to their original cost of the property and the spouse would receive the 
property with a cost  equal to the deemed proceeds of disposition. The result of these 
rules was a deferral of tax until the spouse disposed of the capital property. 
 
It is important to note that had the Carter Commission recommendation that the family 
be the unit of taxation been adopt ed, there would have been no need f or the rollover 
rules because a tax system with the family as the unit of taxation is indif ferent to intra-
family transfers of property. 
 
 
III. CLASSIFICATION OF PROVISIONS THAT 
REFER TO “SPOUSE”, “MARRIED PERSON” 
AND “CHILD” 
 
In their analysis of the tax rules that relate to spouses and familial relationships, several 
authors have divided the rules that relate to spouses into two categories, that is those 
rules which favour the spouses by giving them a reduced tax liability and those rules that 
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are unfavourable to the spouses because t hey increase their overall tax liability.69 Such 
an approach is, for the purposes of this report, not appropriate. It is far too simplistic and 
does not allow for a f ull analysis of the policy underlying the various provisions. One 
cannot judge the fairness of, or indeed t he need f or, a par ticular measure solely by 
criteria that look only at whether the taxpayer has an increased or a diminished tax 
burden. The rules that relate to spousal and familial relationships must be considered as 
part of a t ax system that, as discussed in the previous Chapter, has many different 
purposes and goals.  Any analysis of the rules must be situated both in the social and 
economic context in w hich the rules operate and it  must take an appr oach that 
recognizes the importance of ensuring that the rules operate fairly. Fairness, as 
mentioned in the previous Chapter, encompasses the tenets of traditional tax policy 
analysis as well as the concept of equality.  
 
Some authors have taken a more sophisticated approach in theorizing about the impact 
of, and need f or, special r ules that apply to spouses. For example Maureen Maloney 
uses five categories in her analysis for the Ontario Fair Tax Commission of “provisions 
that recognize a marital unit”.70  Her first category is affirmative-action provisions, that is 
those provisions that help to address the discrimination that men and women encounter 
in certain situations such as their ability to participate in the paid labour force. The child-
care expense  deduction  is an  example of an  affirmative-action  provision  because it is  
 
                                                           
69  For example, see Sherman, supra note 61 at 20:9 to 20:23 and Alber t Wakkary, “Assessing 
the Impact of Changing Marital Rights and O bligations: Practical Considerations” (2000) 17 
Canadian Journal of Family Law, 200. 
70  Maureen Maloney, “What  is  the  Appropriate  Tax  Unit  for  the  1990s and Beyond?” in Allan 
Maslove ed., Issues in the T axation of Indiv iduals (Toronto: University of Toronto Press and 
the Ontario Fair Tax Commission, 1994) at 133-142. 
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intended to assist women with children entering the paid labour  force. Secondly are 
those provisions that “reflect a popular image of ‘family’ in which the woman (typically) is 
dependent upon the man” such as the spousal tax credit.71 Thirdly, Maloney categorizes 
several provisions, including the rules that allow the rollover of capital property from 
taxpayers to their spouses, as the “economic mutuality provisions”. The fourth category 
is comprised of anti-avoidance rules such as the attribution rules. Finally, Maloney 
places several rules such as the child t ax credit in a cat egory that she descr ibes as  
“welfare measures”, that is those measures which can be viewed as an extension of the 
welfare system.72  
 
Neil Brooks takes a dif ferent and per haps more irreverent approach. He has t wo 
categories for the provisions that look to spousal r elationships in t he Act. The first 
category is those rules that “Perniciously Deny the Autonomy of Women, Treat Them as 
Dependents, Assume They Always Share the Economic Interests of Their Husbands, 
Ignore their Social Realities, and Reinforce Their Role of Caregivers”73 and the second is 
those rules that “Justifiably Recognize Some Commingling of Affairs Between Spouses, 
Some Pooling of Economic Resources, and Som e Joint Decision-making”.74  W hile 
Brooks’ first category is indeed r eflective of the impact of the rules that he discusses, 
and his second category acknowledges the policy underlying certain provisions, the 
approach that I take in t his report is m ore closely allied t o that of Maloney. Unlike 
Brooks, my classification is not based directly on the impact of the rule but rather it looks 
                                                           
71  Ibid. at 135. 
72  Ibid. at 140. 
73  Brooks, supra note 47 at 72. 
74  Ibid. at 76. 
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at the many different tax policy rationales that have underlain the various provisions from 
their inception. In other words, my classification is based on t he answer to the question 
“why was this provision enacted?” 
 
Consequently the provisions listed in Appendix A are classified in the following manner: 
• Anti-avoidance rules that are intended to stop or dissuade t axpayers from 
reducing the amount of tax payable within the family or spousal unit by measures 
such as income splitting 
• Administrative provisions that deal with issues such as the filing of tax returns 
• Definitional provisions that define relevant terms 
• Provisions that recognize economic dependency within the spousal or family unit, 
such as t he spousal t ax credit which provides a subsidy  to an individual 
supporting a person who is economically dependent on the individual 
• Provisions that recognize economies of scale that arise from two persons sharing 
expenses and that reduce entitlement to certain tax subsidies com puted by 
reference to family or spousal income  
• Provisions that are based on an assum ption of economic mutuality, that provide 
a tax advantage and that are in respect of 
a) employment 
b) the family farm or family corporation 
c) corporations and business partnerships 
d) the family home 
e) the death of the taxpayer 
f) inter vivos transfers of property 
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g) health and education 
h) retirement and pensions 
i) divorce or separation 
j) miscellaneous 
• Provisions that are based on an assum ption of economic mutuality, that operate 
to the disadvantage of the spouse because t hey result in an incr ease in t ax 
liability and which are in respect of 
a) corporations and business activity 
b) the family home 
c) the disposition of capital property 
d) divorce or separation 
e) retirement and pensions 
f) miscellaneous 
• Provisions that impose a joint liability on spouses,  such as m aking them jointly 
and severally liable for tax owing in respect of property transferred between them 
• Provisions that relate to spousal trusts 
• Provisions that are consequential to other spousal and family provisions. 
 
 CHAPTER THREE 
TAX RULES THAT APPLY TO SPOUSAL AND 
FAMILIAL RELATIONSHIPS 
 
 
Income tax legislation should not interfere in social relationships. For the state to 
enter the r ealm of marital or family units has underlying it a per petuation of 
patriarchal values which are anachronistic and untenable in a s ociety that is  
heading, somewhat hesitantly, into an era of equality.75 
 
The purpose of this Chapter is to consider the role that the provisions of the Income Tax 
Act identified in Appendix A play, and to reflect on whether some of the rules should be 
removed from the Act because t hey operate unfairly or are no long er appropriate or 
necessary. The approach is as f ollows. First, I shall discuss,  in detail, the operation of 
selected rules from the main classifications identified in Chapter Two. Space does not 
permit an examination of every provision included in the Act, although there is a shor t 
description of every such r ule in Appendix  A. Consequently, I have chosen t hose 
provisions that are representative of the provisions in t he category in w hich they are 
included. In addition, the focus is on those provisions that have been the subject of most 
comment and debate in the literature. Secondly, I shall analyze the operation and impact 
of the selected provisions. There is no doubt  that some of the strongest critiques of tax 
rules that apply to spousal relationships have come from the feminist literature.76 I shall 
draw on that literature as well as other Canadian tax policy literature, including work by 
                                                           
75  Maureen Maloney, “Women  and  the  Income  Tax  Act:  Marriage,  Motherhood, and Divorce” 
(1989) 3(1) Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 182 at 187. 
76  For a complete bibliography of feminist literature on taxation between 1980-1998 (in French) 
and 1988 to 1998 (in English), see Josée Bouchard, Susan B. Boyd and Elizabeth Sheehy, 
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the Ontario Fair Tax Commission. Following the analysis and critique, I make 
suggestions for change. The purpose of this report is to permit an informed discussion of 
the policy options available with respect to the rules that take spousal and familial 
relationships into account. 
 
 
I. ANTI AVOIDANCE RULES 
 
As long as income is subj ect to progressive tax rates, there will be an adv antage to 
taxpayers to split income. This is because a t axpayer can reduce tax payable by 
assigning income or transferring income producing property to a person who pays tax at 
a lower marginal rate than the taxpayer does.  Furthermore, because the tax unit is the 
individual and there is no ag gregation of the income of spouses or  families, the 
assignment of income or the transfer or loan of  income producing property within the 
spousal or family unit is an at tractive method of income splitting because control of the 
income of income-producing property is retained within the unit. The attribution rules are 
designed to stop this splitting of unearned or investment income by a taxpayer with a 
spouse or minor with whom the taxpayer does not deal at arm’s length (including nieces 
and nephews).77  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Canadian Feminist Literature on Law: An Annotated Bibliography  (Ottawa: Canadian Journal 
of Women and the Law and the University of Toronto Press, 1999) at  499-507. 
77  Some of the material in this section is drawn from Claire Young “The Attribution Rules: Their 
Uncertain Future in Light of  Current Problems” (1987) 35 Canadian Tax Journal 275. In f act, 
despite the title of  this article, the rules continue to exist very much as they were at the time 
the article was written. Evidently, their future was not as uncertain as the author considered it 
to be! 
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As mentioned in t he previous Chapter, income attribution rules have been included in 
Canadian income tax legislation since the introduction of income tax in 1917. At that time 
the rules applied to transfers of property or assignments of income to a spouse or  any 
other family member and they included a t est of application that looked not only to the 
form of the transaction but also its purpose. Over the years the rules have evolved in a 
manner that has resulted in t he very detailed current rules that attempt to anticipate 
every particular income splitting transaction that might be em ployed by taxpayers. 
Therefore the current rules are significantly more complicated than their predecessors, 
although their general intent remains the same.  
 
Section 74.1 provides that income or loss f rom property transferred or loaned by  an 
individual, either directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of that individual’s spouse or a 
minor78 is attributed to the individual and is not  included in the income of the spouse or 
minor. Taxable capital gains and allowable capital losses realized on the disposition of 
property transferred or loaned by  an indiv idual to the individual’s spouse are also 
attributed to the individual, and not included in the computation of the spouse’s income.79 
In each case, attribution applies to income, gains or losses from the original property or 
substituted property. There is no at tribution once t he individual transferor or lender 
ceases to be a resident of Canada or is no longer alive. In the case of a transfer or loan 
to a spouse, there is no attribution of income or loss once the spouses are separated or 
divorced and no at tribution of capital gains or losses r ealized after the separation or 
                                                           
78  In this context minor refers to a minor with whom the taxpayer does not deal at ar m’s length 
and also includes nieces and nephews. Because this report focuses on references to “spouse” 
and “child”, the m aterial on the attr ibution rules will consider the impact of the rules as they 
apply to those two groups only. 
79  Section 74.2 of the Act. 
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divorce if a joint election is made by the transferor or lender and the spouse or former 
spouse.80 There are two significant exceptions to the rules. The first is in respect of loans 
that bear a commercial rate of interest. If interest is charged at a rate not less than the 
rate prescribed by regulation or the rate to which arm’s length parties would have agreed 
and if that interest is paid within 30 days after the end of each year, the attribution rules 
do not apply to the income, gains or losses.81 The second exception is for transfers to a 
spouse or minor which are made at fair market value, although in order for this exception 
to apply the spouses w ould have to elect out of the automatic rollover under section 
73(1) of the Act. 
 
The attribution rules contain a myriad of provisions that are intended to make sure that 
they apply to every transaction that is considered inappropriate income splitting and tax 
avoidance. These transactions include the use of back-to-back loans, guarantees, trusts 
and other devices to circumvent the ambit of the rules. It should also be not ed that the 
rules described above are part of a comprehensive set of provisions that apply to income 
splitting and tax avoidance generally. Therefore there are other more general attribution 
rules that also apply to spouses, although their application is broader than the attribution 
rules described above because they apply to a broader range of persons. Rules such as 
those contained in section 56(2) and (4) would apply to the diversion of income to a 
spouse or child, because they apply to the diversion of income to any person and to a 
non-arm’s length person respectively. Section 56(4.1) applies to an interest-free or low 
interest loan made to a non-arm’s length person. Because these rules do not include a 
                                                           
80  Section 74.5(3) of the Act. 
81  Section 74.5(2) of the Act. 
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direct reference to “spouse” or “child”, they are not discussed in this report. Finally 
section 75.1 is an attribution rule intended to prevent the diversion of gains in respect of 
farm property transferred to a child on a t ax-free basis under section 73. This rule 
attributes any gain on t he disposition of the property to the transferor if the child 
disposes of the property before attaining 18 years of age. 
 
An important issue is whether the attribution rules operate in a fair and effective manner 
and, if not, what are the problems that need to be addressed. Underlying these issues is 
the question of whether they should be r epealed.  Cer tainly there are complications 
when one tries to locate the attribution rules in the general scheme of all rules that apply 
to spouses. In their application to intra-spousal transactions, these rules appear to be in 
conflict with the policy underlying the rules that permit the transfer of property between 
spouses on a t ax-free basis. As alr eady mentioned, section 73(1) provides for the 
automatic rollover of capital property from one spouse to another at cost, thereby 
resulting in no capital gain or loss for the transferor and a deferral of tax on any gain until 
the transferee disposes of the property. The only way to avoid the automatic rollover is 
for the transferor to elect that subsection 73(1) will not apply to the transaction. The 
rollover rules treat spouses as one t ax unit with respect to property transfers between 
them. Yet, if on a subsequent disposition of that property by the transferee, a capital gain 
or loss arises, it is not taxed jointly to both spouses as would be consistent with a policy 
that treats the spouses as one unit. Rather the gain or loss is attributed to the transferor 
on the basis that the individual is the tax unit and cannot rearrange their affairs within the 
spousal unit to reduce their tax burden.  
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There is a second issue t hat arises as a r esult of the interaction of the section 73(1) 
rollover to a spouse and the attribution rules. In order for the attribution rules not to apply 
to income generated by capital property transferred to a spouse or a capital gain on 
disposition of the capital property, the property must be transferred at fair market value. 
Such a rule means that the transferor must elect out of section 73(1) and thereby lose 
the advantage of the rollover. Consequently the rule in section 73(1) and the attribution 
rules appear to deliver rather inconsistent messages. Section 73 encour ages the 
transfer of capital property to a spouse by permitting the transfer to take place on a tax-
free basis w hile the attribution rules discourage the transfer unless it is made at fair 
market value, meaning that the spouse acquiring the property needs to secure the funds 
to pay for the property. 
 
There is another inconsistency in the application of the attribution rules. The splitting of 
property income with an adult child or indeed a related adult, other than one’s spouse, is 
acceptable. What is not acceptable is splitting property income within the family unit with 
a spouse or child. If one assumes that the rules denying the benefits of income splitting 
exist to preserve the individual as the tax unit and to eliminate any advantage from the 
diversion of income, then the attribution rules cannot be j ustified on t his basis alone.  
They apply in lim ited circumstances and can be justified only on more pragmatic 
grounds. That is, it is undesir able to allow the splitting of property income within the 
relationship where it is most likely to occur, the family. Furthermore, they apply only to 
two relationships within the family, that between an adult  and a m inor child and that 
between spouses. It is therefore very difficult to justify the existence of the attribution 
rules by reference to tax policy criteria such as equity. 
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Another critique of the attribution rules is that “the rule fails to recognise the autonomy of 
the spouse receiving the property (usually the wife)”.82 This problem arises because the 
income is treated as if it were the income of the other spouse. A related issue is whether 
these rules act as a deterrent to the transfer of property between spouses and,  in 
particular, by a more well off spouse to a spouse with little or no property or income. This 
is a gender issue given that men tend to own more property and have greater incomes 
than women, and the attribution rules are encouraging them not to transfer their property 
or after-tax income to their spouses. This problem hinders the redistribution of wealth 
and income between men and w omen. The issue of  whether, in the absence of the 
attribution rules, men would transfer more property to their spouses is an em pirical one 
on which there is no data. Maureen Maloney has speculated that repeal of the attribution 
rules might have the effect of encouraging transfers of property between spouses. She 
points out that before the rules were amended in 1981 to “restrict the principal residence 
capital gains exemption to one house per  family, many second homes were transferred 
to the sole ownership of the wife”.83 
The attribution rules play a unique role in the legislative attack on income splitting. They 
are the only rules that have always been directed primarily at income splitting within the 
family. As such,  they are based on t he assumption that individuals who have spouses 
with little or no incom e will choose t o transfer property to those spouses in order to 
reduce the tax payable on incom e or capital gains generated by that property. 
                                                           
82  Neil Br ooks, “The Irrelevance of Conjugal Relationships in Assessing Tax Liability” in Richard 
Krever and J ohn Head eds ., Tax Units and the T ax Rate Sc ale (Melbourne: Australian Tax 
Research Foundation, 1996) at 74. 
83  Maureen Maloney, Women and Tax Reform: Background Paper (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory 
Council on the Status of Women, 1987) at 16. It s hould be noted, how ever, that no s tatistics 
about the increase in these transfers are included to support Maloney’s assertion. 
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Unfortunately there is no empirical evidence that tells us whether this transfer of property 
is in f act happening in spousal r elationships. Indeed one can speculate that given 
women’s increased participation in the paid labour force and the increase in the number 
of two family earners, there is less oppor tunity for taxpayers to benefit from income 
splitting between spouses. Even if one spouse has a slig htly higher income than the 
other and therefore there is, in t heory, an adv antage to be g ained from transferring 
property to the lower income spouse, the transfer of that income generating property 
may mean that the lower income spouse’s increase in income moves her to a higher tax 
bracket, thereby defeating the purpose of the transaction. 
 
What is the cost, both in dollars and in t erms of the damage to the integrity of the tax 
system, of repealing the attribution rules and thereby permitting the splitting of property 
income with a spouse or minor by way of loans or transfers of property? It was estimated 
in 1986 t hat the maximum tax saving achieved by a top marginal rate taxpayer from 
transferring income-producing property to a spouse with no ot her income was about 
$9,500 a year.84 That figure included both federal and provincial taxes and was based on 
the transfer or loan of  property generating income of $68,000 a y ear. In the case of 
income splitting with a minor, the tax saving may be a lit tle more if the minor is a 
dependent because t he amount of any dependent tax credit lost by the transferor or 
lender as a result of the increase in the minor’s income is less t han the amount of the 
spousal tax credit lost by reason of an increase in the spouse’s income. Given that both 
the  number  of  tax brackets  and the tax rates have dropped since this  calculation  was  
 
                                                           
84  Robert Dart and David Smith, “Estate Planning: A New Era” (1986) 34 Canadian Tax Journal 1 
at 8-27. 
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made in 1986,  one can assum e that the saving today would be considerably less. 
Although the maximum potential tax saving for a taxpayer can be estimated, the number 
of taxpayers who, in t he absence of  rules designed to stop income splitting, would 
organize their affairs to take advantage of these tax savings is difficult to estimate. One 
cannot assume, for example, that all spousal couples in a financial position to benefit 
from income splitting would actually do so. 85 Non-tax factors, such as leg al and ot her 
costs of transferring property or lending funds, the stability of the relationship, and any 
anticipated changes in t he relative income of the spouses, may well deter many 
taxpayers from income splitting. Furthermore, many of those who would stand to benefit 
might not be aware of the advantages to be gained from the transfer or loan of income 
producing property. It is int eresting to note that when the attribution rules were the 
subject of a major overhaul in 1985 that extended their application to loans among other 
transactions, the government did not give loss of  revenue as a r eason for their 
extension.86 
 
The strongest argument in f avour of retaining the attribution rules is t hat they play an 
important role in ensuring that our tax system is vertically equitable. As mentioned at the 
outset of this report, vertical equity means treating differently situated persons in 
appropriately different ways. One tool by which vertical equity is accom plished is t he 
                                                           
85  The  issue  of  the  potential  lik elihood  of  persons  to  income  split  was  addressed  in  Alan 
MacNaughton and Thomas Matthews, “Is the Income Splitting Tax Needed? Some Empirical 
Evidence” (1999) 47 Canadian Tax Journal 1164. In this  article the author s evaluate the 
potential impact of the new “kiddie” tax, a series of rules introduced in the 1999 budget that 
propose that certain types of dividend and business income received by minors under 18 be 
taxed at the top m arginal rate. They conclude that “[I]ncome splitting behaviour seems to be 
confined to a small segment of the population. In 1996, only  0.49 per  cent of all individuals  
under age 20 reported dividend income and only 0.19 per cent reported net business income” 
at 1179. 
86  Young, supra note 77 at 298. 
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retention of progressive tax rates based on abilit y to pay. If the attribution rules are 
repealed it is those with the highest incomes who will benefit because they will be able to 
save tax by transferring income producing property to a spouse with little or no income. 
Neil Brooks deals w ith the tension between the benefit of a repeal to those with high 
incomes and the negative impact of the rules for many women this way: 
Changing this rule and r ecognising bona f ide transfers of property between 
spouses would benefit only middle- or high- income families with property. 
Nevertheless, recognising the autonomy of women for tax purposes is important, 
regardless of the distributive consequences across income classes.87 
 
In conclusion, it is int eresting to note that the issue of  whether the attribution rules 
should be retained is not one that has received much discussion recently. There seems 
to be an assum ption that because t hey have been par t of the tax system since its 
inception, they should r emain. For example, the Ontario Fair Tax Commission in its 
mammoth report on “Fair Taxation in a Chang ing World” did not discuss the attribution 
rules and neither did the Women and Tax Working Group of that Commission.88 Given 
the problems discussed above and, in par ticular, the negative consequences for many 
women, it is time that these rules were reconsidered. The only strong argument for their 
retention is that they discourage income splitting by those with high incomes and 
therefore their repeal would only benefit that group. Without any empirical data, it is 
difficult to determine whether there would be a significant increase in income splitting in 
the absence of  the rules. A related question is whether there would be a concomitant 
increase  in the transfer of  property by men to women  that would have the advantage of  
                                                           
87  Brooks, supra note 82 at 74. 
88  See  Ontario  Fair  Tax  Commission,  Fair  Tax  in  a  Changing  W orld,  A  Repor t  (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press in co-operation with the Ontario Fair Tax Commission, 1993) and 
Ontario Fair Tax Commission, Women and T axation Working Group, Women and T axation 
(Toronto: Ontario Fair Tax Commission, 1992). 
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addressing women’s lack of income and wealth relative to men. Clearly more empirical 
research needs to be done before an inf ormed decision about  the consequences of 
repealing the attribution rules can be made. 
 
 
II. ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS 
 
The administrative provisions listed in Appendix A r elate to the substantive rules that 
apply to spousal and familial relationships. Whether these rules should be r etained or 
repealed depends on t he fate of the substantive rules to which the administrative 
provisions relate. Nevertheless, it is important to include the administrative provisions in 
Appendix A in or der to present a comprehensive and complete list of all provisions that 
apply to spousal and familial relationships. 
 
 
III. DEFINITIONAL PROVISIONS 
 
The definitions listed in Appendix  A ar e used in m any of the provisions that relate to 
spousal and f amilial relationships. The most important definitions are the extended 
definition of “spouse”, the extended definition of “child” and t he definition of “related 
persons”. It is important that the broad ambit of these definitions is r ecognized when 
considering the impact of the substantive rules to which they relate. 
 
As already mentioned, section 252(4) of the Act defines a spouse to include a person of 
the opposite sex cohabiting in a conj ugal relationship with another person where they 
have cohabited for a 12- month period or where they are the parents of a child.  That 
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definition will include same-sex relationships for the 2001 and subseq uent taxation 
years.89 Section 252(3) of the Act extends the definition of “spouse” and “former spouse” 
to include a party to a void or voidable marriage. But the extended definition of spouse 
has an impact that reaches even further. Section 252(2) of the Act provides that a parent 
of the taxpayer includes the parent of the taxpayer’s spouse. A reference to a brother of 
the taxpayer includes a per son who is t he brother of the taxpayer’s spouse or  the 
spouse of the taxpayer’s sister. Similarly, a reference to a sister of a taxpayer includes a 
person who is the sister of the taxpayer’s spouse or  the spouse of  the taxpayer’s 
brother. The section also provides that a grandparent of the taxpayer includes a person 
who is the grandparent of the taxpayer’s spouse or  the spouse of  the taxpayer’s 
grandparent. These rules effectively ensure that “in-law” relationships are caught, 
thereby extending the network of relationships that are relevant for tax purposes. At the 
same time the Act also has r eferences to married persons, a r elic of the time when 
common-law spouses were not recognized by the Act. Section 252(4) provides that 
provisions that apply to a person who is married apply to a person who is the spouse of 
the taxpayer. Finally section 251(2) of the Act provides that related persons (a term used 
frequently in the Act) are persons connected by blood, marriage or adoption and 
subsection (6) provides that persons are connected by marriage if one is married to the 
other or to a person who is connected by blood relationship to the other. It is beyond the 
scope of this report to discuss all the provisions that apply to related persons but it must 
be noted that the term includes spouses and their “in-laws”. 
 
                                                           
89  It s hould be noted that Bill C- 23, the Modernization of Benefits and  O bligations  Ac t  also 
provides that persons in s ame-sex relationships who qualify as spouses under the new  
legislation may choose to be treated as spouses for the 1998, 1999 and 2000 taxation years. 
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Section 252(1) provides that a reference in the Act to “child” includes a per son who is 
the natural born child of the taxpayer or an adopted child of the taxpayer. It also includes 
a person who is wholly dependent on the taxpayer for support and of whom the taxpayer 
has, before the individual attained 19 y ears of age, obtained custody or control. 
Therefore a child of  a t axpayer is not  limited to a per son under 18 if that person is 
dependent on the taxpayer for their support and in the custody or control of the taxpayer. 
A child also includes a child of  the taxpayer’s spouse and t he spouse of a child of the 
taxpayer. Thus, all spouses of taxpayer’s children are considered to be a child of  the 
taxpayer, thereby extending considerably the familial relationship. 
 
The extended meanings of “spouse”, “child” and “ related persons” must be taken into 
account when considering the discussion in t his report of the ambit of the rules that 
apply to spousal and familial relationships. 
 
 
IV. PROVISIONS THAT RECOGNIZE 
DEPENDENCY 
 
As I shall discuss,  it is t hose provisions that are based on one person’s economic 
dependence on another in a spousal or familial relationship that have been the subject of 
more critique in recent years than other rules that take spousal or familial relationships 
into account. The tax rules that look to economic dependency by one spouse on another 
that I discuss in this part include the spousal tax credit and the ability to pass unused tax 
credits to a spouse.  I then turn to a discussion of those rules that provide a benefit in 
respect of a dependent child and my primary focus is the Canada Child Tax Benefit. My 
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conclusion is t hat rules that look to economic dependence in spousal relationships 
should be repealed, while those that apply in respect of dependent children should be 
removed from the Act and replaced by a direct grant system that would deliver the tax 
subsidy in a more equitable manner. 
 
A. Spouses 
 
Section 118(1)(a) of the Act provides the spousal t ax credit which is available to a 
taxpayer who supports a spouse.  The maximum amount of the credit is $915 (17 per 
cent of the spousal am ount of $5,380), and t hat spousal am ount is r educed by the 
excess of the spouse’s net  income over $538. This reduction has t he effect of 
eliminating entitlement to the credit when the spouse’s income exceeds $5,918, meaning 
that if the spouse w orks in t he paid labour  force entitlement to the credit is lost  very 
quickly. Related to the spousal credit are rules that an individual who is unable t o use 
certain tax credits may transfer them to their spouse who may then apply them to reduce 
their tax payable. Credits eligible for this transfer include any  unused por tion of the 
tuition tax credit, the education tax credit, the age credit, the pension credit and the 
disability tax credit.90 While neither the spousal tax credit nor the ability to pass unused 
tax credits to a spouse r efer to “dependency”, the provisions only apply when one 
person is economically dependent on the other. The spousal tax credit is available to a 
person who “supports” their spouse and ent itlement to the credit disappears when the 
spouse earns a small amount of money. Similarly, the ability to transfer unused t ax 
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credits is dependent on one spouse having little or no income to which they can apply 
the tax credits. 
 
There is a gendered impact to these rules. More women than men work in the home and 
not in the paid labour force and therefore it is men who predominantly claim the spousal 
tax credit.91 Furthermore, more than four times as many men use tax credits transferred 
from their spouse than women do.92 Several issues arise when one considers the impact 
on women of provisions such as t he spousal t ax credit and t he transfer of unused 
credits. The first issue is t hat provisions based on dependency  are a disincent ive to 
women’s participation in the paid labour force. The theory is that when the tax costs (in 
this case the loss of the spousal credit and the inability to transfer unused credits to a 
spouse) are taken into account, there is a r eal disincentive to women in spousal 
relationships entering the paid labour  force. This disincentive is exacerbated by other 
costs incurred by women who choose t o work outside the home, such as child car e 
costs, travel costs, clothing and the monetary and non-monetary costs associated with 
replacing the household labour. Furthermore, studies show that women’s participation in 
the paid labour  force is m ore elastic than that of men.93 In other words, women as 
secondary earners tend to be m ore sensitive to any extra costs imposed on t hem (or 
their spouse), such as the costs associated with the loss of  entitlement to the spousal 
                                                           
91  Unfortunately, tax statistics only show the gender  breakdown of the amount received for the 
spousal tax credit and the equivalent to s pousal tax credit as one calculation. The equivalent 
to spousal tax credit is given in r espect of dependants such as children and therefore may 
likely be taken by more women than men, given that more women head lone parent families 
than men. Nevertheless, statistics for the 1996 taxation year show that more men than women 
claimed these two credits. See G overnment of Canada, Income Statistics, 1998 (Ottawa: 
Department of National Revenue, 1998) at 103. 
92  See Government of Canada, ibid. 
93  Joseph Stiglitz, Economics of the Public Sector (New York: Norton, 1988). 
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tax credit. 94  Fur thermore, when one consider s that many women are the secondary 
earners in t heir relationships, and t hat they work for relatively low wages, the 
combination of these factors and t he tax disincentives have a par ticularly detrimental 
effect on women’s choice to work outside the home. 
 
Despite the disincentives to women’s participation in t he paid labour  force and t he 
elasticity of their participation, more women than ever are working outside the home.95 
The main reason appears to be economic necessity. In 1991 the percentage of couples 
living below the poverty line in dual ear ner families would have been 17.9% instead of 
4.6% if women did not work in the paid labour force.96 Women are not, however, earning 
what men are and they are more likely to be engaged in casual or  part time work which 
often means that they continue to be t he secondary earners in t heir relationships. In 
1995, for example, the average total income for all Canadian w omen over 15 w as 
roughly $16,600 while the corresponding figure for men was $29,600.97  In 1997, women 
working full time earned an average of 72.5% of the earnings of men employed full-time 
for a year.98 Women predominate in the part-time labour force. For example, between 
1976 and 1991 women consistently represented at least 70% of part time workers.99 In 
                                                           
94  On  this  issue  see,  S. Crompton  and  L. Geran,  “Women  as  Main  Wage-Earners”  (1995) 
Perspectives, 26-29. 
95  In 1991, 56 per cent of married Canadian women were employed compared to 47 per  cent in 
1981, Nancy Ghalam, Women in the Workplace (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1993). 
96  See, Statistics Canada, Characteristics of Dual-Earner Families 1993, Catalogue 13-215, 
(Ottawa:Statistics Canada, 1995) at  8. 
97  Status of Women Canada, Economic Gender Equality Indicators (Catalogue SW21-17/1997E, 
October 1997) at 13. 
98  Monica Townson, A Report Card on Women and Poverty (Toronto: Canadian Centre for Policy 
Alternatives, 2000) at 4. 
99  Statis tics  Canada,  Women  in  Canada:  A Statis tical  Repor t, 3rd ed. (Ottawa: Minister of 
Industry, 1995) at 73. 
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1994 women held 69 per cent of all part time jobs and 26 per cent of employed women 
worked part time.100 While some women cite personal and family responsibilities as the 
reason for working part time,101 over one-third of women working part time are seeking 
full time work.102 Therefore any added penalty to women’s participation in the paid labour 
force is unacceptable.  
 
Another important critique of dependency provisions is t hat rules like the spousal t ax 
credit affirm that a w oman’s dependency on m an deserves tax relief. Again, this 
undermines the autonomy of women and it results in a cer tain privatisation of economic 
responsibility for dependent persons. Tax policy has r esponded to women’s lack of 
economic power by leaving it to the family (the private sector) to assume responsibility 
for women’s lack of resources. Furthermore, in the case of the spousal tax credit, the tax 
subsidy is delivered to the economically dominant person in the relationship and not the 
‘dependent’ person who needs it .103 This manner of delivery assumes that income is 
pooled and wealth distributed equally within the relationship. However, as I shall discuss 
in greater detail in the next section of this Chapter considering the impact of those 
provisions based on economic mutuality, studies show that this assumption is sim ply 
false. In reality, such pooling and redistribution of wealth does not occur in the majority 
                                                           
100 Statistics Canada, The Daily <http://www.StatCan.ca/Daily/English/980317/d980317.htm> at  
9. 
101 Statistics Canada, supra note 99 at 74. 
102 Canadian Labour Congress, Women’s Work: A Report (Toronto: Canadian Labour Congress, 
1997) at 25. See also, Townson supra note 98 at 5. 
103 On this issue see, Maloney “What is the Appropriate Tax Unit for the 1990s and Beyond?” in 
Allan Maslove ed., Issues in the T axation of Individuals (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 
and the Ontario Fair Tax Commission, 1994) at 137. 
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of relationships.104 Many women do not have access to or control over income earned by 
their spouse and predicating tax policies on the assumption that they do is unfair. 
 
It is interesting to note that the spousal tax credit is a m easure that can be v iewed as 
one that gives public recognition to the work done by women in the home. Indeed it is 
the only measure (tax or otherwise) that places a “value” on household labour. But if it is 
intended to recognise the contribution made by those who work in the home then, as 
mentioned above, the tax credit should go to the person who performs that labour and 
not the person who benefits from it. Further, viewing the tax credit as a measure that 
values household labour is problematic. Because the “value” placed on the labour is so 
low, the measure can only  be consider ed to reinforce the perception that household 
labour, including child-care has little value. That in turn contributes to the under-valuation 
of work such as child-care, even when it is performed in the open market, as evidenced 
by the low salaries paid to child-care workers. 
 
There is also clear  evidence that the living arrangements of taxpayers have changed 
considerably since t he introduction of provisions such as t he spousal tax credit. The 
number of people living in traditional nuclear families is declining, more women than ever 
are living alone or  with their children and t he vast majority of lone-parent families are 
headed by women. Indeed lone parent families headed by  women outnumber those 
                                                           
104 Harold Alderman, “Unitary Collective Models of the Household: Is it Time to Shift the Burden” 
World Bank Research Observer  (1995) vol. 10 at 1, Neil Brooks, supra note 82 at 63, Marjorie 
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headed by men by more than four to one.105 As the Working Group of the Ontario Fair 
Tax Commission says “the concept of a couple as a lif e-long economic unit with joint 
income, wealth, and ex penses may no long er be appropriate given changing family 
structures, increasing divorce rates, and falling marriage rates”.106 These changes must 
be taken into account when considering the future of measures such as the spousal tax 
credit and the ability to transfer unused credits to a spouse. 
 
As discussed in t he historical analysis of the spousal t ax credit in Chapt er Two, the 
policy underlying this provision is the recognition of the reduced ability to pay tax of an 
individual who is supporting a person economically dependent on the individual. But this 
argument is not a persuasive justification for retention of the spousal tax credit and other 
tax preferences that reward economic dependence. As Neil Brooks has stated 
there is no reason why a person who voluntarily undertakes to support a spouse 
at home should be c onsidered to have a r educed ability to pay. Certainly the 
control theory on income would suggest that this is an inappropriate deduction in 
terms of tax principles.107 
 
Another problem with this rationale is that it ignores the benefit that accrues to the 
individual from work performed in the home, such as housew ork and child-care, by the 
person whom they support. Indeed this home labour may well increase the ability to pay 
of the individual because there is no need to have recourse to the private market in order 
to obtain the services provided in t he home by the spouse w ho is suppor ted by the 
individual. This point was not lost on the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in 
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106 Ontario Fair Tax Commission, Women and Taxation Working Group, supra note 88 at 9. 
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1970 when it rejected the Carter Commission recommendation that the family be the unit 
of taxation. At that time the Royal Commission on the Status of Women noted that:  
In most cases the wife who works at home as a housekeeper, far from being a 
dependent, performs essential services worth at least as much to her  as to her  
husband as the cost of food, shelter and clothing that he provides for her”.108  
 
The demeaning view of women’s work in t he home as non- productive work and t he 
stigma attached to that work was one of the reasons that the Royal Commission on the 
Status of Women recommended that the amount of the spousal exemption (as it then 
was) be reduced considerably. 
 
What measures might redress the problems discussed above? A f irst step would be to 
reconsider the general issue of providing tax subsidies such as the spousal tax credit to 
those in spousal r elationships. For example, in t he United States, economist Julie 
Nelson suggests that spousal st atus should not  be t he determinant of which 
relationships are relevant for the purposes of tax subsidies. She sug gests the term 
should be expanded to include “individuals-in-relation” which would include the taxpayer 
and his or her dependant. A dependant  would include a per son unable t o support 
himself or herself and t he connection to the individual may or may not be a familial 
one.109 The individual would claim the tax credit in r espect of their support of the 
dependant. While this suggestion would factor in different kinds of living relationships, it 
would not address directly the problems of the disincentive to women’s participation in 
the paid labour  force, nor the fact that the subsidy is delivered to the economically 
dominant person in the relationship. More radical change is required. 
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The Ontario Fair Tax Commission struggled with this issue. The Women and T ax 
Working Group was split in t he approach to be taken. Some members recommended 
that the spousal t ax credit and t he rules respecting the transfer of unused credits be 
repealed.110 In its final report, the Commission recommended that “[i]deally the marital 
credit should be removed at both the federal and provincial level” and the surplus funds 
redirected through a r eformed credit process.111 This approach is one t hat is also 
favoured by Maureen Maloney. She said: 
Dependency provisions should be elim inated. These provisions undermine the 
important contribution that w omen working in the hom e make to the ec onomy. 
Equally important, they raise the c osts of entering the workforce, thereby 
distorting their choices and undermining their autonomy.112 
 
Given the problems discussed above, I believe that the spousal tax credit and the rules 
that permit the transfer of unused tax credits to a spouse should be repealed. 
 
B. Children 
 
The most important measure that recognises the economic dependency of children on 
their parents and t hat the support of children should be subsidised through the tax 
system is the Canada Child Tax Benefit. In 1945 the Family Allowances Act,113 Canada’s 
first universal welfare payment program, was enacted.114 The espoused purpose of the 
                                                           
110 Ontario Fair Tax Commission, Women and Tax Working Group, supra note 88 at III. T hose 
members of the Women and Tax Working Group who did not favour repeal of these provisions 
did argue for the c onversion of the s pousal credit to a r efundable tax credit that s hould be 
delivered to the spouse with the low er income. Such a m easure would ensure that the 
economically dependent person in the relationship received the subsidy. 
111 Ontario Fair Tax Commission, supra note 88 at 271. 
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113 S.C. 1944-45, c.40. 
114 For detailed analyses of the family allowance program see, Dennis Guest, The Emergence of 
Social Security in Canada , 3rd ed. ( Vancouver: UBC Pr ess, 1997) and J ane Ursel, Private 
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program was to help redress the inadequacy of post-war wages by providing economic 
support to families with children. As Jane Ur sel has com mented “[f]amily allowances 
represented the compromise between capital and labour  in it s most naked form—
subsidizing a w age system designed to ignore reproductive costs, only to perpetuate 
it”.115 In 1973 t he Income Tax Act was amended to require the inclusion of  family 
allowances in incom e.116 While this measure was enacted in or der to introduce some 
progressivity to the family allowance because indiv iduals would be t axed at their 
marginal rate on amounts received, it also heralded the future demise of the universality 
of family allowances. Even though all taxpayers would receive the family allowance, the 
net after-tax value would vary depending on the taxpayer’s marginal rate. In 1979 the 
federal refundable child tax credit was introduced, a measure that was intended, in part, 
to replace family allowance payments.117 The child tax credit was tied to family income 
and the amount of the credit was reduced by 5% of the amount by which the income of 
the individual and t he supporting person (usually the parents of the child) exceeded 
$18,000. The universality of the family allowances was extinguished in 1989 when the 
tax-back of family allowances was introduced. From 1989 unt il the family allowance 
system was abolished in 1992, a tax-back rate of 15% applied to taxpayers’ net incomes 
over $50,000 and in two parent families, the tax-back was applied to the income of the 
taxpayer with the higher income in the relationship.118  
                                                                                                                                                                             
Lives, Public Policy, 100 Years of State Intervention in the F amily (Toronto: Women’s Press, 
1992). 
115 Ursel, ibid. at 198. F or an excellent analysis of the his tory of the f amily allowance, including 
the policies underlying its introduction, see Ursel at 190-198. 
116 The Family Allowances Act,  S.C. 1973, c.44. 
117 An Act to Amend the Inc ome Tax Act to Pr ovide for a Child Tax Credit and to amend the 
Family Allowances Act, 1973 S.C. 1978-1979, c. 5. 
118 Family Allowances were repealed by S.C. 1992, c.48, s.31. 
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The original child tax benefit provided a basic benef it of $1,020 for each child w hich 
represented the amount of the maximum family allowance and the refundable child tax 
credit. There were supplements for families with more than two children and the full 
amount of the benefit was paid to families with income up to $25,921, and the amount of 
the benefit was gradually reduced for families with incomes above that amount. In 
addition there was an earned income supplement as an added incentive to low-income 
working families. There is no doubt  that the child t ax benefit was the subject of much 
criticism by social policy  organisations and childr en’s advocates. This critique was 
encapsulated by Ken Battle who said “ [t]heir major criticisms concerned the new 
scheme’s lack of protection from inflation, weak impact on family poverty, differential 
treatment of welfare and unemployed families, and lack of responsiveness to changes in 
family income, as well as its formal abolition of universal child benefits”.119 
 
The 1997 federal budget proposed changes to the child tax benefit and, effective July1, 
1998, it was reincarnated as t he Canada Child T ax Benefit (CCTB).120 The CCTB 
includes a basic benefit and the National Child Benefit, which is a supplement for lower-
income families (formerly the working income supplement). The CCTB is pay able 
monthly to the parent who is the primary caregiver of the child and t he amount of the 
payment is r educed and ev entually eliminated as annual “family” income increases 
beyond a threshold limit, which for the 1999 taxation year is set at $27,750 and for the 
2000 taxation year at $29,590. There is also a r ebuttable presumption that the primary 
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caregiver of the child is t he “female parent”, as the Act describes it.121 From July 1999 
onwards the amount of the basic benef it is $1,020 for the first child, supplemented by 
$785 per year for each child under  7 in r espect of whom no child- care expenses are 
deducted under section 63 of  the Act. For the year 2000 and on, the supplement 
increases to $955 for the first child. If child-care expenses are deducted, the amount of 
the supplemental amount is r educed by 25 per  cent of the expenses deducted under 
section 63.  
 
Much has been written about the inadequacies of the Canada Child Tax Benefit122 and I 
would suggest that these inadequacies have a particularly detrimental impact on women 
who are presumed by the Act to be the primary caregivers of children and therefore the 
persons entitled to receive the tax credit. The importance of the CCTB for women is 
evidenced by the fact that more women than men head lone par ent families and t he 
number of lone parent families is increasing.123 Aboriginal women and women of colour 
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Gordon Ternowetsky eds., Child and F amily Policies (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1997) 
and Douglas Durst ed., Canada’s National Child Benefit, Phoenix  or Fizzle?  ( Halifax: 
Fernwood Publishing, 1999). 
123 Figures from the 1996 c ensus show that lone parent families headed by women outnumber 
those headed by men by more than four to one. See Statis tics Canada “1996 Census: Marital 
Status, Common-law Unions and Families” The Daily Catalogue 11-00IE (October 14, 1997)  
at 2. 
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are more likely to be lone parents than white women124 and single mothers with children 
are the poorest of the poor.125 Women and children’s poverty are inextricably linked. Any 
evaluation of the CCTB must take place in a m anner that recognises the role of women 
as the primary caregivers of children and t he link between women’s poverty and their 
children’s poverty.  
 
One of the major weaknesses of the CCTB is its limited application. The CCTB, and in 
particular the National Child Benef it portion of the program, is t argeted at the working 
poor.  The 1997 chang es did not  address directly the needs of  those women with 
children who receive social assistance. As Ken Battle has pointed out “the National Child 
Tax Benefit will not increase child benef its for welfare families and w ill augment child 
benefits only for low-income families not on welfare (i.e., working poor and low-income 
employment insurance families)”.126 Women’s ability to participate fully in the paid labour 
force is adversely affected by their primary care-giving role for their children. The result 
is that there are many women who cannot “afford” to participate in the paid labour force. 
Women who cannot participate in the paid labour  force receive less of  a benef it than 
their counterparts who do participate in the paid labour force. Yet, in many instances it is 
women on social assist ance who are most in need of  financial assistance. Statistics 
                                                           
124 Statistics Canada, Lone-Parent Families in Canada , Catalogue 89- 522E, (December 1992), 
Table 1.9. 
125 Using statistics from 1996, Ken Battle has  stated that “ six in ten children (61.9 per cent) in 
single-parent families led by women lived on low incomes at last count compared with one in 
seven (13 per cent) children in tw o parent families”, Battle, “ The National Child Benef it” in 
Durst, supra note 122 at 39.  In 1997 56 per  cent of female headed lone parent families lived 
in poverty, Statistics Canada, Income Distributions by Size in Canada, 1997  (Catalogue 13-
207-XPB, July 1999) at 34-35 and Text Table IV. See also p. 187 and Table 67. 
126 Battle, ibid. at 48. 
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show that women predominate those who receive social assistance.127 There is another 
dimension to this issue. Women with disabilities are particularly disadvantaged by the 
linking of the CTTB to workforce participation. Statistics show that women with 
disabilities who have dependent children have a very low rate of participation in the paid 
labour force. In 1991, for example, only 48% of women with disabilities were in the paid 
labour force and women with disabilities with dependent children were less likely than 
non-disabled women with children to be employed.128 The problem is that by tying the 
amount of the CCTB received to work status, the poverty of many women and t heir 
children is further entrenched. 
 
The reduction in the amount of the CCTB received for each child under 7 by 25 per cent 
of any child care expenses deducted under section 63 of the Act is an added burden for 
those women who need child care to participate in the paid labour force. Given the lack 
of affordable child care and the inadequate amount of the deduction under section 63, 
any extra cost, such as losing part of the child care expense deduction in order to claim 
the full amount of the CCTB, is unfair. 
 
A key issue with respect to a refundable tax credit such as the CCTB is that its success 
as a social program depends on individuals claiming the tax credit. Because the program 
is delivered as a r efundable tax credit, payment depends on an individual filing a tax 
return and claiming the credit. In the case of  an indiv idual with a spouse,  the spouse 
                                                           
127 In 1997, for example, statistics showed that while 27 per cent of single mothers were on social 
assistance, only 3 per cent of single fathers received social assistance. See National Council 
of Welfare, Profiles of W elfare: Myths and Realities (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and 
Government Services, 1998) at 8. 
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must also f ile a return because the amount of the CTTB is based on a calculation that 
takes “family” income into account. Unfortunately many women are not claiming benefits 
to which they are entitled. In 1998, Revenue Canada confirmed that 5 per cent of women 
who had a baby in 1995 or 1996 did not claim the child tax benefit (the forerunner of the 
CTTB) and almost 10 per cent of potential child tax benefit claimants had their benefits 
interrupted or did not receive benefits to which they were entitled because they or their 
spouses did not file income tax returns on time.129 These figures are unacceptable, given 
the importance of the CCTB to women and children. In addition, there is a class aspect 
to this problem. It is very likely that those who do not claim the CCTB are those women 
who need it  most, that is low -income women. Because t heir income is so low these 
women do not pay tax and therefore are less likely to complete a tax return. There are 
also many women, especially those on social assist ance, who do not  have a f ixed 
address at which to receive the payments and they too may not receive the amount to 
which they are entitled. 
 
The fundamental issue when considering the effectiveness of the CCTB is whether the 
tax system is t he appropriate tool by which to deliver the program. What makes this 
issue so per tinent is t hat it is only  relatively recently that the tax system began to be 
used to deliver this subsidy. Up until 1992, the family allowance was a direct grant made 
to the mothers of all childr en under the age of 18. The tax system was not used to 
deliver the subsidy, although as discussed above, it was used to limit the amount of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
128 Gail Fawcett, Living  with  Dis ability  in  Canada: An Ec onomic Portrait (Ottawa: Office for 
Disability Issues, Human Resources Canada, 1996) at 24 and 159-159. 
129 Minister of Revenue, 1996-97 Benefit Pr ograms Report (Ottawa: Revenue Canada, 1998)  
<http://www.rc.gc.ca/E/pub/tg/3940b1ed/README.html>. 
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subsidy. Has the integration of the family allowance into the tax system contributed to a 
better targeted subsidy and improved its delivery? I would suggest, given the problems 
outlined above, that the answer is no.  Consideration should be g iven to removing the 
family allowance portion of the CCTB from the tax system and delivering it by way of a 
direct grant. 
 
 
V. PROVISIONS THAT RECOGNIZE ECONOMIES 
OF SCALE IN SPOUSAL RELATIONSHIPS 
 
Several tax measures can be said t o take into account the economies of scale that are 
assumed to arise from spouses living together and sharing the cost of certain items such 
as rent, household expenses, including major purchases such as f urniture and ot her 
associated costs. Economies of scale, the argument goes, increase a taxpayer’s ability 
to pay. Therefore the spousal unit  (which benefits from these economies of scale 
because the spouses live together) should pay more tax than two separate individuals 
with the same total income. Some of the tax rules that take the savings associated with 
economies of scale int o account include, for example, rules that require certain tax 
deductions to be t aken by the spouse w ith the lower income such as the child care 
expense deduction. This rule frequently means that more taxes are paid, or to put it 
another way, less of a tax subsidy is received, than would be if  the rule did not  apply. 
The reason for the reduced tax subsidy is that the person required to take the deduction 
pays tax at a low er marginal rate than their spouse by  reason of that person’s lower 
income.  
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Another set of rules that are designed to take economies of scale generated by persons 
living together into account are those rules that reduce entitlement to a tax credit as 
income increases and, when income reaches a certain level, eliminate entitlement to the 
credit. The GST tax credit and the Canada Child T ax Benefit both include income tests 
of this nature. In each case it is the income of the spouses that is aggregated, meaning 
that entitlement to the credit is reduced more quickly for the spousal unit than it would be 
if each spouse w ere treated as a separ ate individual for the purposes of calculation of 
the credit. 
 
There are several problems with taking economies of scale into account in determining 
the amount of and ent itlement to tax subsidies. Even the strongest proponents of joint 
taxation of spouses do not  rely on the benefits from economies of scale to support their 
position.130 One reason is that the role of the tax system is not  to redistribute benefits 
based on economies of scale. As discussed in Chapt er One, the tax system is intended 
to redistribute income, and to a lesser extent wealth, but it does not include any benefits 
gained from economies of scale in a t axpayer’s income. For example, the benefits 
gained by purchasing items in bulk  (an economy of scale) rather than singly are not 
taxed. There is anot her aspect to this issue. While there may be a benefit from the 
economies of scale enjoyed by spouses living together in terms of shared expenditures, 
                                                           
130 Michael McIntryre, a noted U.S. tax  academic, is one of the strongest proponents of the joint 
taxation of spouses. Despite this position, he agrees that economies of scale that arise from 
living together are irrelevant in as sessing tax liability. See Mic hael McIntyre, “Implications of 
Family Sharing for the Des ign of an Ideal Per sonal Tax System” in Richard Bird and Sijbren 
Cnossen eds., The Personal Income Tax: Phoenix from the As hes (Amsterdam: North 
Holland, 1990) at 197-198.  
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there is also a cost . The items purchased and which give rise to the economies of scale 
must be shared between the spouses. 131 
 
Perhaps the strongest argument against taking economies of scale into account when 
considering how spouses should be t axed is t hat there are economies of scale t o be 
enjoyed in many other relationships. For example, two students who share an apartment 
save expenses through their shared accommodation and lif estyle together but the tax 
system does not  treat them in t he same manner as spouses for the purposes of 
provisions that aggregate income, such as the GST tax credit and the Canada Child Tax 
Benefit. I now turn to a discussion of three provisions based on economies of scale, the 
child care expense deduction, the GST tax credit and the Canada Child Tax Benefit. 
 
A.  The child-care expense deduction 
 
Section 63 of the Act permits a deduct ion in t he computation of income for child-care 
expenses paid w ith respect to an elig ible child. Allowable child car e expenses include 
amounts paid f or babysitting services, day nursery services and boarding school and 
camp fees, although there are weekly maximum amounts prescribed for the latter two 
expenses. The child care expense must have been incur red to enable the taxpayer or 
supporting person who resided with the child to perform the duties of employment, carry 
on a business, carry on g rant-funded research or attend a desig nated educational 
institution or secondary school, subject to certain conditions.132 
                                                           
131 Brooks, supra note 82 at 49. 
132 Full time students are eligible to c laim the child care expense deduction and the 1998 budget 
proposed that part time students also be eligible f or the deduc tion. It s hould be noted that 
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Section 63 defines an eligible child as a child of  the taxpayer or taxpayer’s spouse, or a 
child dependent on the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s spouse and w hose income does not 
exceed $7,044 for the 1999 taxation year.133 In addition the child must be under 16 or a 
child in respect of whom the disability tax credit is claim ed.  For  the 1999 and 
subsequent taxation years the amount of the child care expense deduction is $7000 for 
each child under seven or a child in respect of whom the disability tax credit is claimed, 
and $4000 for each child aged seven to fifteen or a child who is not eligible for the $7000 
deduction but who has a mental or physical infirmity.134 The deductible amount is limited 
to the lesser of the amounts described and two-thirds of the taxpayer’s earned income 
for the year. In two parent families the deduction must be claimed by the person earning 
the lower income, except where he or she is a f ull-time student, in prison, incapable of  
caring for the children, or living apart from the other person for at least ninety days by 
reason of the breakdown of their relationship. A recent change to the rules introduced in 
the 1996 budg et means that single parents or couples st udying full time (including at 
high school) are now permitted to deduct child-care expenses against all types of 
income. This change is t o be welcomed as it  allows women who may be retraining to 
return to work to take advantage of the deduction. 
 
There is no q uestion that the amount of the deduction is inadequate and that the 
problems presented by the monetary limitations on t he amount that may be deducted 
                                                                                                                                                                             
none of the changes proposed in the 1998 budget have y et been enacted, although legislation 
implementing them is expected to be passed soon. 
133 This amount is the total of  the basic personal amount ($6,456) under section 118(1) and the 
supplementary credit ($500) under section 118(1)B(b.1). The supplementary credit was 
proposed by the 1998 budget. 
134 These  amounts  were  introduced  in  the  1998  budget  but  have not y et been enacted. Prior 
to the 1998 change the amounts were $5000 and $3000 respectively. 
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are further exacerbated by the rule requiring the spouse with the lower income to take 
the deduction in most cases. As mentioned earlier, this problem arises because the rule 
requires that the deduction be applied t o reduce income that may be taxed at a lower 
rate, thereby resulting in less taxes saved than would have been t he case if  the 
deduction were taken by the high rate taxpayer. The maximum amount deductible under 
section 63 is only  $7000 a year for a child under  7. This translates to a subsidy of only 
$3,500 a year for an individual who pays tax at a high rate of 50 per cent. If, however, 
that individual has a spouse who pays tax at a lower rate such as 20 per cent, the couple 
will only receive a subsidy  of $1,400, thus losing entitlement to the $2,100 subsidy to 
which they would have been entitled, but for the rule requiring the deduction to be taken 
by the spouse with the lower income. Given the high cost of child-care in Canada, any 
rule that limits the amount of the subsidy is inappropriate. As well, the limitation on who 
may claim the deduction has an ar bitrary impact that is dependent on the marginal tax 
rates of the spouses, not on their child-care needs. The cost of child-care varies from 
province to province and is also af fected by the nature of the care, that is whether it is 
provided in the home or in a child-care facility. In 1988 the Canadian National Child Care 
Study estimated the cost of regulated child-care at $7,188 a year for infants and $5,361 
for pre-schoolers.135 Since t hat time the costs have risen considerably with estimates 
running at a high of $9,396 for infants and almost $6,000 for pre-schoolers.136 
 
                                                           
135 Alan Penc e, ed., Canadian National Child Car e Study: Child Car e in Contex t: Perspectives 
from the Provinces and Territories (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1992) at 396. 
136 See Child Care Canada, Fact Sheet 3, at 
<http://www.childcarecanada.org/resources/CRRUpubs/>. 
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The inadequacy of the amount of the section 63 deduct ion is exacerbated by the fact 
that section 63 provides a deduction from income, which ties the value of the deduction 
to the taxpayer’s tax rate. This means that an indiv idual paying tax at a high rate 
receives a larger tax subsidy than an individual paying at a lower rate. Such a sy stem 
establishes a hierarchy of taxpayers that is in inv erse relation to their ability to pay for 
child-care. At the top are those with the highest incomes. Below them, in declining order, 
are taxpayers with lower incomes. At the bottom are taxpayers to whom the deduction is 
worthless because they have little or no income to which to apply the deduction. This 
problem is exacerbated by the fact that those with higher incomes tend to claim a 
greater amount as the child-care expense deduction than those with lower incomes.  
 
In addition to the concern about the benefits from the economies of scale, other reasons 
for requiring the deduction to be t aken by the lower income earning spouse include 
reducing the cost of the tax expenditure and ensur ing that the subsidy is delivered to 
women, who tend to be the lower income earners in spousal relationships. This targeting 
of women is, in turn, designed to remove some of the barriers to women’s participation in 
the paid labour force by delivering a subsidy to defray some of the costs of child-care. 
But the problem is t hat the current rule requiring the spouse with the lower income to 
take the deduction is contradictory in effect. While it does deliver the subsidy to many 
more women than men, it also reduces significantly the amount of the subsidy that 
women receive. 
 
Various suggestions for improvement to the child-care expense deduction have been 
made, including converting the deduction into a tax credit. Such a measure would mean 
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that the income level of the recipient would be ir relevant in determining the amount of 
the subsidy because a t ax credit is worth the same in terms of tax dollars saved to all 
taxpayers regardless of the rate at which they pay tax. Furthermore the credit could be 
made refundable, meaning that women who do not have taxable income could also 
receive a subsidy. Converting the deduction to a r efundable tax credit is not  a nov el 
suggestion and has been suggested by many groups, including the National Council of 
Welfare,137 the National Association of Women and the Law (NAWL)138 and the Ontario 
Fair Tax Commission, Women and Taxation Working Group.139  Such a refundable tax 
credit could be m odeled on t he GST tax credit and pr ovided by way of a quarterly 
payment. Providing the benefit up f ront and on a r egular basis inst ead of delaying 
“payment” until a t ax return is f iled would recognize the recurring nature of child-care 
costs.  
 
It is important to note that Quebec has taken a very different approach to the issue of 
funding child-care. In 1997 the Quebec government created the Ministry of Family and 
Children (le Ministère de la Famille et de l’Enfance) and introduced a new “family” policy. 
Part of that policy included the establishment of optional full-time kindergarten for all 5 
year old children. Concurrently, in Sept ember 1997 Ear ly Childhood Cent res were 
created to provide children under 5 years old with early childhood educat ion and child-
care services. Since that time the Quebec government has moved forward with its $5 a 
day child-care program. Under this program, which is t o be ex tended to all childr en 
                                                           
137 National Counc il of Welfare, Child Care: A Better  Alternative (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 
1988) at 20. 
138 National  As sociation  of   W omen  and  the  Law ,  Background  Paper  in  Suppor t  of  T ax 
Resolutions (Ottawa: National Association of Women and the Law, 1991) at 6. 
139 Ontario Fair Tax Commission, supra note 88 at 31. 
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under 5 by the year 2000, parents pay $5 a child f or child-care at an Ear ly Childhood 
Centre. Those parents who do not  have access t o those centres receive the Quebec 
refundable child care tax credit under the Quebec Taxation Act.140 From 1998 onwards 
the tax credit is based on t he excess net family income over a threshold of $26,000.141 
The main difference, however between the federal child-care expense deduction and the 
Quebec tax measure is that the latter is a r efundable tax credit not a deduction in the 
computation of income. Thus Quebec has embarked on a policy  that is m oving away 
from using tax subsidies to fund child-care to a recognition that a better approach is to 
fund child-care directly.142 
 
The Quebec experience raises the issue of  whether the tax system should be used t o 
fund child-care or whether the government should move towards a system that provides 
state funded child-care centres for young children. That is an issue for further debate. At 
present the major source of federal funding for child-care is provided by the tax system 
and therefore it makes sense t o ensure that the current rules operate fairly. The 
requirement that the spouse w ith the lower income take the deduction for child-care 
expenses imposes a hardship on many couples because t he amount received is of ten 
less than that amount that would be r eceived if spousal st atus were not taken into 
account. For the reasons outlined above, justifying this limitation on the basis that the 
couple enjoys economies of scale w ith respect to their purchases is not  a per suasive 
argument. As long as the tax system is used t o deliver this subsidy, thought should be 
                                                           
140 Taxation Act, R.S.Q., c.I-3, sections 1029.8.67 to 1029.8.82 and 1086.5 to 1086.8. 
141 Taxation Act, R.S.Q., c. I-3, sections 1029.8.67 to 1029.8.82 and 1086.5 to 1086.8. 
142  For an excellent analysis of the Quebec approach to funding child care see, Jocylene Tougas, 
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given to making the child-care expense deduction fairer by ensuring that its value is not 
tied to the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate. The obvious way to make the deduction fairer is 
to convert it to a refundable tax credit and not take family income into account. Such a 
measure would redress the current inequality experienced by those in spousal 
relationships when compared to single persons. It would ensure that both a taxpayer’s 
spousal status and their marginal tax rate would be irrelevant in determining the amount 
of the subsidy that they receive for their child-care expenses. 
 
B. The Goods and Services tax credit and the Canada  
Child Tax Benefit 
 
The GST tax credit and t he Canada Child T ax Benefit both take aggregated “family” 
income into account in determining entitlement to the respective tax credits. The result of 
this aggregation is that the amount received by the spouses is of ten less t han the 
amount that they would receive if their spousal st atus were not taken into account. A 
related point is that because entitlement to the subsidy diminishes as income increases, 
the aggregation of the spouses’ income means that they will lose access to the subsidy 
more quickly than two individuals with the same total amount of income. The rules in 
respect of the CCTB have been discussed in det ail earlier in this Chapter. The GST tax 
credit provides a benef it of up to $199 for each adult and an additional supplement of 
$105 for single adults. The credit is reduced by 5 per cent of family net income in excess 
of $25,921. Family net income is the income of the individual and their spouse.143 The 
following point illustrates how effective these two provisions are in terms of restricting 
both access to these tax subsidies and t he amount received. The recent change to the 
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definition of spouse t o include lesbians and g ay men will result in a sig nificant tax 
windfall for the government, rather than a tax cost. The reason is that the aggregation of 
“family” income will reduce access to these subsidies for many couples who will now be 
considered to be spouses under  the Act, thereby producing increased tax revenues for 
the government. The amount of the increase in tax revenues will be significantly greater 
than any tax costs arising from the impact of those provisions that provide a tax saving 
to spouses.144 
 
The rationale underlying the income testing by reference to family income of these two 
tax subsidies is t hat subsidies delivered by way of a direct grant, such as, for example, 
social assistance payments are also incom e tested. Such a com parison has led one 
commentator to argue that the provisions should remain as they are. She argues that  
Family income is used to prevent tax leakage by ensuring that only one of  two 
people with low incomes can claim the benef its. Not to do s o would be 
enormously expensive and, in the c urrent economic and politic al climate, not 
feasible without drastic cuts being made to the size of programs or the amount of 
the benefits.145 
 
Neil Brooks has argued that there is no inconsistency in having the individual as the tax 
unit but basing transfer payments such as t he GST tax credit and the CCTB or those 
payments delivered by way of direct grants on the aggregated income of spouses.146 As 
he notes “[t]ransfer payments in order to rel ieve poverty should quite sensibly be based 
on some function of consumption instead of control of income.”147 There is anot her 
                                                                                                                                                                             
143 Section 122.5(1) of the Act. 
144 On this issue see, Albert Wakkary, “Assessing the Im pact of Changing Mar ital Rights and 
Obligations: Practical Obligations”, (2000) 17 Canadian Journal of Family Law 201 at 209. 
145 Maloney, supra note 103 at 147. 
146 Brooks, supra note 82 at 78. 
147 Ibid. 
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dimension to these two tax credits. Not only do they assume that there are economies of 
scale to be gained from living in spousal r elationships, they also assum e that income 
and wealth are pooled in t hese relationships, and especially  where the income of the 
spouses is relatively low. This issue is discussed in detail in the next part of this Chapter 
that examines provisions based on an assum ption of economic mutuality. As discussed 
in that part, that assumption is problematic for several reasons. The issue is a com plex 
one and this is reflected in the report of the Ontario Fair Tax Commission, Women and 
Taxation Working Group. That group was divided on whether income aggregation should 
remain part of these tax credits. Some members believed that the individual should be 
the unit of taxation for tax delivered assistance in or der to protect the autonomy of 
women while other members took the view that such a posit ion might undermine the 
integrity of these programs and give rise to unacceptable cost implications. 148  I suggest 
that as long as income aggregation remains part of the social assistance system, then it 
should remain a part of the two tax subsidies that are of a similar nature. To remove the 
aggregation of income inherent in the GST tax credit and the CCTB would fly in the face 
of the intent of the provisions which is to provide subsidies to those with low incomes. 
 
VI. PROVISIONS THAT ARE BASED ON AN 
ASSUMPTION OF ECONOMIC MUTUALITY 
 
A. Introduction 
 
As Appendix A dem onstrates the majority of the provisions that recognize spousal 
relationships are based on an assum ption of economic mutuality. Some of these rules 
                                                           
148 See, Ontario Fair Tax Commission, Women and Tax Working Group, supra note 88 at 16. 
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benefit taxpayers by, for example, permitting the deferral to a future time of taxes that 
would otherwise be payable. Other rules disadvantage taxpayers by either reducing the 
amount of a tax subsidy or increasing the amount of taxes payable. The discussion of 
the rules proceeds as f ollows. First, I shall analy ze the assumption underlying these 
provisions which is that spouses tend to share or pool their income and wealth. Then I 
shall turn to a description and analysis of some of the more important rules based on an 
assumption of economic mutuality within spousal r elationships that benefit those in 
spousal (and familial) relationships in com parison to individual taxpayers. Only after a 
detailed description of the policy underlying the rules and t heir operation, can any 
suggestions be made with respect to the future of these rules. A sim ilar analysis is 
applied to those rules based on econom ic mutuality which operate to disadvantage 
those in spousal (and familial) relationships in comparison to individual taxpayers. 
 
B. Is there a sharing and pooling of income and wealth in  
spousal relationships? 
 
The answer to this question is dif ficult to determine. As has been noted by many who 
have written about this issue, there is a dear th of empirical data about sharing and 
pooling of income and wealth.149 Therefore much of the information is extrapolated from 
data not directly on point , but from which one can draw some conclusions about the 
                                                           
149 See, for example, Brooks supra note 82 at 62-63, Maloney supra note 103 at 128, Ontario Fair 
Tax Commission, Women and T ax Working Group, supra note 88 at 7, Mic hael McIntyre, 
“Marital Income Splitting in the Moder n World: Lessons for Australia from the Am erican 
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issue. The position one takes on this issue is inf luenced by whether one subscr ibes to 
the control theory of taxation or the benefit theory.150 If you believe that taxpayers should 
be taxed on income from which they benefit, then you would argue that a key concern is 
how those in spousal r elationships spend t heir income and w ho benefits from that 
spending. You would assume that if spouses are sharing expenses they are also pooling 
their income and, therefore, argue that they should be treated differently than two 
individuals. If you subscribe to the control theory and believe that individuals should be 
taxed on t he income that they control, then how couples spend their money is not as 
relevant to your analysis. Rather, the key issue is w ho controls the savings and 
accumulated capital of the couple. If there is t rue equal control of these amounts, only 
then can an ar gument be made to treat spouses dif ferently from individuals. It is clear  
that, with the exception of Michael McIntyre,151 most of those writing on this issue 
subscribe to the control theory. Consequently, the issue can be f ramed as one t hat is 
about shared wealth and pooled income rather than shared expenses. 
 
Most commentators believe that there is not  much sharing or pooling in spousal 
relationships of retained income or assets. As Neil Brooks states “there is not anywhere 
near full sharing in m any households, let alone shar ing of control that would indicate 
both spouses value family assets”.152 The Women and Taxation Working Group of the 
Ontario Fair Tax Commission agrees and m akes the point that it is men who tend to 
control income and capital,153 a point that is reiterated by the Fair Tax Commission in its 
                                                           
150 See the discussion of this issue in Chapter Two. 
151 McIntyre, supra note 149. 
152 Brooks, supra note 82 at 63. 
153 Ontario Fair Tax Commission, Women and Taxation Working Group, supra note 88 at 7. 
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final report.154 Louise Dulude has a more nuanced analysis that takes class into account. 
She concludes that couples with relatively low and equal incomes tend to share more 
than other couples. She states that “with the single exception of the very poor, the 
earnings and asset s of couples ar e generally controlled and managed by the spouse 
who has legal title to them”.155 Given that men are wealthier and own more capital than 
women,156 we can conclude that the control generally remains with them.  
 
There are other situations where one can speculat e that income and capit al is not 
shared or pooled in a relationship. For example, relationships in which there is violence 
are not likely to be ones in w hich there is shar ing and pooling  of income and wealth. 
Finally, intuition suggests that true sharing of income and assets is most likely to take 
place when the incomes of the spouses are relatively equal. But the tax rules that are 
based on an assumption of spousal sharing are not designed to target those couples in 
particular. Indeed, many of the rules that give a tax advantage to spouses on the basis 
that there is an econom ic mutuality are designed to redistribute wealth within the 
relationship. Rules such as the rollover provisions that permit the transfer of capital 
property between spouses on a tax-free basis with a deferral of tax until the property is 
ultimately disposed of assume a cer tain inequality with respect to the distribution of 
wealth and income in the relationship. Their intent is to facilitate the amelioration of that 
inequality by permitting capital property to be transferred within the relationship without 
any tax consequences.  
                                                           
154 Ontario Fair Tax Commission, supra note 88 at 262. 
155 Dulude, supra note 149 at 89. 
156 On this issue see, Lisa Philipps, “Tax Policy and the Gendered Distribution of Wealth” in 
Isabella Bakker ed., Rethinking Restructuring: Gender and Change in Canada  (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1996)  141 at 142-150. 
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Opinion among tax policy analysts is divided on whether provisions based on economic 
mutuality should be repealed. The most vigorous proponent of repeal is M aureen 
Maloney. In a book chapter prepared for the Ontario Fair Tax Commission, she argued 
that these provisions be repealed because they  
provide preferential treatment on the bas is of joint living. J oint living alr eady 
results in considerable economic and imputed savings, so it is difficult to see why 
the income tax system should compound the tax advantages.157 
 
It is im portant to note, however, that Maloney’s list of provisions that are based on 
economic mutuality was brief and only  included t hose provisions that gave a t ax 
advantage to the spouses. Her recommendation was not adopted by the Fair Tax 
Commission, which was agnostic on the issue. Meanwhile Neil Brooks’ conclusion was 
that most of these provisions do “ justifiably recognize some commingling of affairs 
between spouses, some pooling of economic resources, and som e joint decision-
making.”158 
 
I contend that given the numerous rules that are based on an econom ic mutuality 
between spouses the best approach is t o do a r ule-by-rule analysis of the most 
important rules. Such an appr oach allows for a m ore in-depth consideration of the 
provisions that can also t ake into account any subsidiary policies underlying the 
particular rules. I also suggest that whether the rule operates to the advantage or to the 
disadvantage of the spouses is a r elevant factor in determining whether the rule should 
be retained. Many of the rules that are to the advantage of the spouses are designed to 
                                                           
157 Maloney, supra note 103 at 147. 
158 Brooks, supra note 74 at 36. It should be noted that Br ooks did not em bark on an analysis of 
all these rules, but rather focussed on a few of the more significant ones. 
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redistribute wealth and income in the relationship and, given women’s lack of access to 
wealth, that is a laudable policy. 
 
C. Provisions based on economic mutuality  between spouses 
and that are of advantage to the taxpayer 
 
Space does not permit an in-depth analysis of all the provisions listed in Appendix A that 
are based on econom ic mutuality between spouses and t hat are of advantage to the 
taxpayer. Therefore, the focus in t his part is on t hose provisions that have been the 
subject of most comment. They include the rollover provisions that allow the transfer of 
capital property, including the family farm, on a tax-free basis to a spouse or child. Some 
of these provisions operate on an inter vivos basis and others on death of the taxpayer. 
Other provisions considered are the rules that apply to retirement savings and pensions, 
including the rules that relate to spousal registered retirement savings plans and spousal 
survivor benefits under a registered pension plan. 
 
1. Transfer on a tax-free basis of capital property on an inter 
vivos basis to a spouse, a former spouse or a spouse trust 
 
The Act contains numerous provisions that permit the “rollover” of capital property to a 
spouse, a former spouse in set tlement of rights arising from the marriage or a spouse 
trust. Generally, when a per son disposes of  capital property and the property has 
appreciated in value and thereby generated a capital gain, three-quarters of that gain is 
included in income.159 Conversely, if the property has lost value the taxpayer may deduct 
three-quarters of that loss as an allow able capital loss in many circumstances. Section 
                                                           
159 The 2000 budget proposes that for gains realised after February 27, 2000 the por tion of the 
gain that is required to be included in income decreases to two-thirds.  
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73(1) provides that in the case of an inter vivos transfer of capital property to a spouse, a 
former spouse in set tlement of rights arising from the marriage or a spouse t rust by an 
individual, the proceeds of disposition of the individual is the cost of the property to that 
individual.160 The result is that the transfer takes place on a t ax-free basis and t he tax 
consequences of any gain or loss w ith respect to the property are deferred until the 
spouse, former spouse or spouse trust ultimately disposes of the property.  
 
The policy underlying the inter vivos transfer of capital property to a spouse, former 
spouse or spouse t rust is m ulti-faceted. First, these rules serve an adm inistrative 
purpose. If transfers between spouses w ere taxable events, Revenue Canada would 
need to trace all such transactions in order to ensure that any tax owing was paid. Such 
a task would be almost impossible given the informal context in which these transactions 
take place. The rollover rules mean that no such t racing is necessar y. Secondly, the 
rules encourage the redistribution of property within a spousal relationship, although it is 
important to note that if the capital property is income producing, then the transfer must 
be at fair market value in order to avoid the attribution rules. But to the extent that the 
property is non- income producing and has appr eciated in value since it  was acquired, 
the rollover removes any disincentive to the transfer that would otherwise arise by 
reason of the tax liability that would ensue as a r esult of the disposition. The rules that 
allow the transfer of capital property on a tax-free basis to a former spouse in settlement 
of rights arising out of their marriage are intended to facilitate the transfer of capital 
                                                           
160 Section 73(1) of the Act provides that in the c ase of non-depreciable property the proceeds of 
disposition are the cost of the property and in the case of depreciable property the proceeds of 
disposition are the undepreciated capital cost that can be attributed to the property. 
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property on breakdown of spousal relationships. 161 Kathleen Lahey has commented on 
how this rule came into being in the 1970s in t he wake of family law reform “to ensure 
that when husbands were… ordered to transfer family property on divorce, for example, 
those transfers did not  trigger ‘unintended’ tax liability on the part of the husbands”.162 
There is also a pr actical aspect to the rules that allow tax-free transfers of capital 
property within spousal relationships. Without these rules tax would be payable in those 
instances where the capital property had appr eciated in v alue. The problem is that 
transactions between spouses do not  take place in t he open m arket and this fact 
presents a liquidity problem. There may be no f unds with which to pay the taxes owing 
as a result of the disposition of the property. 
 
The rollover to a spouse t rust has been t he subject of some criticism. Section 73(1) 
provides that capital property can be transferred on a tax-free basis by an individual to a 
trust of which the individual’s spouse is the beneficiary, provided certain conditions are 
met. Those conditions include the requirement that no one ot her than the spouse may 
obtain any of the income or capital while the spouse is alive and that the spouse must be 
entitled to receive all of  the income of the trust during her lifetime. The critique of this 
rule is t hat it allows the transferor to determine who the ultimate beneficiary of the 
                                                           
161 It should be noted that the r eference to  “ marriage”  inc ludes  c ommon-law  r elationships. 
Property division on br eakdown of marriage is a matter of provincial jurisdiction. Provincial 
legislation only applies to pr operty division on br eakdown of marriage and not to pr operty 
division on breakdown of a common-law relationship. Nevertheless, section 73(1) of the Act is 
relevant in thos e situations where there was a transfer of property on breakdown of a 
common-law relationship and the property division was either the result of a constructive trust 
or a contract between the common-law spouses. 
162 Kathleen Lahey , The  Political  Economies  of  Sex   and  Canadian  Inc ome  T ax  Polic y, 
presentation to the Canadian Bar  Association (Ontario), Lesbian and G ay Legal Is sues 
Committee, 1998 (unpublished) at 15. 
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property will be. Further, the spouse has no leg al control over the property but rather 
only a beneficial interest by reason of being a beneficiary of the trust.163 
 
Can the rollover rules be j ustified? To date only one commentator has called f or their 
repeal, and that call was subject to the caveat that if “there is real economic mutuality 
that could be show n to exist between the couple, these provisions might be 
appropriate.”164 My view is that the best argument for the retention of these rules is that 
they are intended to facilitate the redistribution of capital property and w ealth within 
spousal relationships and, in par ticular, from men to women. There is, however, a 
serious issue about whether this redistribution of wealth is a matter for the private family 
or whether the state should do more than merely facilitate intra-family transfers. 
Speaking of the rollover rule Lisa Philipps has commented that: 
It assumes and accepts a relation of support and dependency between husbands 
and wives, of which property transfers are a par t. This relation is treated as 
natural, in the s ense that it pr ecedes the state and should not be disrupted by it. 
At the s ame time as it of fers immediate financial relief for some women, the 
spousal exemption [the rollover rule] declares the s tate’s unwillingness to tak e 
responsibility for the distribution of resources within the pr ivate world of the 
heterosexual family. As in so many other areas of the law, it simply gives women 
the right to keep whatever they manage to obtain from men privately.165 
 
If an argument is to be made for the repeal of the rollover rules, then that argument must 
be accompanied by a call f or more state responsibility for the redistribution of wealth 
from men to women in Canada. While the tax rules are flawed for the reasons discussed 
above, they are currently one of  very few measures that attempt to attain some 
redistribution of wealth between men and women. The key question is, how effective are  
                                                           
163 See Brooks, supra note 82 at 77. 
164 Maloney, supra note 103 at 147. 
165 Philipps, supra note 156 at 153. 
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the rules in accomplishing that end? Cur rently there is not  enough data to allow us to 
answer that question. I submit that before consideration is g iven to a r epeal of or 
amendment to these rules, empirical data be collect ed in or der to determine whether 
these transfers of capital property by men to women are actually taking place. If not, 
more direct state intervention designed to encourage redistribution of wealth between 
men and women may be appropriate. 
 
2. Transfer on a tax-free basis of certain property  on death of a 
taxpayer to a spouse or spouse trust 
 
Section 70(6) provides for a tax-free transfer of capital property to a spouse or  spouse 
trust on the death of a taxpayer in a similar manner to the inter vivos transfer discussed 
above. The rollover is aut omatic, unless t he deceased t axpayer’s legal representative 
elects out of the rollover, in w hich case t here is a deemed disposition of the capital 
property at fair market value.166 Section 70(5.2) provides for the potential rollover of 
resource properties and land inventories on death of a taxpayer to a spouse or  spouse 
trust. In each case, absent the rollover there would be a deem ed disposition of the 
property on the death of the taxpayer and any appreciation in value from the time the 
property was acquired by the taxpayer to the time of the taxpayer’s death would be fully 
included in incom e.167 It should be noted that section 70(5.2) operates in a dif ferent 
                                                           
166 Section 70(6.2) of the Ac t provides for an elec tion that the 70( 6) rollover not apply. This 
election would be m ade in c ircumstances where, for example, the tax payer had unus ed net 
capital losses that could be used to of fset any capital gain on the deem ed disposition of the 
property at fair market value. The result would be no tax for the deceased in the terminal year 
in respect of the disposition and a step up in the cost base of the property for the spouse who 
would take it with a c ost equal to f air market value ( in the c ase of non-depreciable capital 
property). 
167 While only three-quarters (soon to be tw o-thirds) of any gain on c apital property is included 
income, all the gain on r esource properties and land inventor ies is included in income, unless 
the rollover is available. 
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manner than the rollover for capital property because it allows the legal representative of 
the deceased taxpayer to elect that the proceeds of disposition of the property that is 
transferred to a spouse or spouse trust be any amount between the original cost of the 
property and its fair market value. This concession allow s the legal representative to 
choose to have a full rollover of the property to the spouse or spouse trust or to realize 
all or part of the gain in the deceased’s terminal year. Again, the choice of which course 
to take would depend on t he tax position of the deceased and, to a limited extent, 
whether the spouse planned t o retain the property for some time or dispose of it 
relatively soon after acquisition. What is interesting is that this election in made by the 
legal representative of the deceased taxpayer and the spouse’s consent to the election 
is not required. Consequently, the spouse has no cont rol over the tax consequences 
relating to the deemed disposition of the resource property or land inventory on death of 
the taxpayer, consequences that affect her directly in terms of her own future tax liability. 
I suggest that this election should be a j oint election by the legal representative of the 
deceased taxpayer and the spouse. 
 
The policy underlying the rules that provide for the potential transfer of certain properties 
on death of a t axpayer to a spouse or  spouse t rust on a tax-free basis has several 
objectives. First, the rules help to avoid the “bunching” of income in t he deceased’s 
terminal year.  W ithout these rules the deemed disposition of various properties that 
occurs on death of a taxpayer might result in a greater income for the deceased in the 
terminal year. That increase in incom e could m ove the taxpayer into a higher tax 
bracket, thereby increasing the deceased’s overall tax liability. The rules also recognize 
the economic mutuality that exists between spouses and af firm that if a taxpayer 
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bequeathes property to a spouse on deat h, that property should pass t o the spouse 
without any tax consequences. In reality, the spouse simply steps into the shoes of the 
deceased taxpayer and any tax that would otherwise be ex igible on deat h of the 
taxpayer is deferred until the spouse disposes of  the property. Most taxing jurisdictions 
have rules that exempt intra-spousal transactions on death from tax, whether that tax is 
income tax, estate tax or a succession duty.168  
 
It is perhaps easier to make a persuasive argument for the rollover rules that defer the 
tax consequences with respect to a deemed disposition on death of a taxpayer than it is 
in respect of the rules that apply to an inter vivos transfer to a spouse.  While, as 
discussed above, it is unclear  whether the inter vivos rollover rules actually encourage 
the redistribution of wealth from men to women in the spousal relationship, we do know 
that the rollover on deat h is a sig nificant incentive to taxpayers to bequeath capital 
property to their spouses. Unlike an inter vivos transfer which is at the discretion of the 
taxpayer, on death there is an automatic disposition of the property for tax purposes and 
the only issue is whether the taxpayer bequeathes the property to their spouse or  to 
someone else. Given the significant tax incentives related to the deferral of tax it is 
highly likely that the property will be left to the spouse. At the same time, this “defence” 
of the rollover on death is subject to my earlier comments about the importance of the 
state taking a role in ensuring that wealth is redistributed from men to women generally, 
and not just between those men and women in spousal relationships. 
 
                                                           
168 Canada does not levy estate taxes or succession duties. 
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I suggest that given the political realities of the situation, it is extremely unlikely that the 
rollover rules that apply on death of a taxpayer will be repealed. Death taxes, such as 
estate taxes and succession dut ies, are the most unpopular form of taxation. This point 
has not been lost on the federal or provincial governments, each of whom has, over the 
years, vacated the field of death taxes. The deemed disposition of capital property on 
death, while not a death tax per se, does share many characteristics with death taxes, 
including the tax liability that arises as a result of the deemed disposition.  The rollover 
rules are the only tax rules that allow a deferral of that tax liability on death and, for that 
reason alone, are likely here to stay. 
 
3. Transfer on a tax -free basis of farming property  to a child of 
the taxpayer 
 
Traditionally, the tax system has g iven preferential tax treatment to those engaged in 
farming activities.  For example, farmers are permitted to use cash basis accounting in 
the computation of their income or loss rather than inventory accounting. The impact of 
this concession is that expenses associated with earning income may be deducted when 
they are paid. If farmers were required to inventory account, they would be required to 
match expenses to the goods sold, thereby having to defer the deduction of those 
expenses in many instances until a future year. The rules that permit the transfer of the 
family farm by parents to their children on a t ax-free basis ar e in k eeping with the 
concept of providing incentives for those engaged in farming. The idea that the family 
farm should be able to be passed on from generation to generation without tax liability as 
a result of the transfer has been an int egral part of Canadian t ax policy since capit al 
gains became subject to tax in 1972. 
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Section 70(9) of the Act permits the transfer on deat h of a taxpayer of land or 
depreciable property used principally in the business of farming by the taxpayer (or the 
taxpayer’s spouse or  children) on a r egular and cont inuous basis to a child of the 
taxpayer on a tax-free basis. For the purposes of this section, the definition of child of a 
taxpayer includes a child, a grandchild and a great-grandchild, thus extending the ambit 
of the tax advantage to transfers to a broad range of individuals related to the taxpayer. 
Furthermore, a child can be a child of  any age. Section 70(9) allows the legal 
representative of the deceased taxpayer to elect that the proceeds of disposition of the 
property be any amount between cost and fair market value. This election means that if 
the deceased taxpayer has losses or any capital gains exemption available to apply to 
any gain, the legal representative can use up t hose losses or capital gains exemption 
and the child will take the property with a higher cost. The higher cost for the child is 
advantageous because it  means that on any subsequent disposition of the property by 
the child the taxable gain will be less than it would otherwise have been without the step-
up in t he cost of the property. Section 70(9.2) permits a similar rollover to a child (or 
grandchild or great-grandchild) if the family farm is incor porated or operated as a 
partnership. Farming property can also “rollout” of a spouse trust to a child of the trust’s 
settlor, with the result that if the taxpayer leaves the farm in trust for their spouse, on 
death of the spouse the property can be transferred on a tax-free basis to the taxpayer’s 
child.169 In addition, section 73(3) and (4) provides a rollover of farm property to a child of 
the taxpayer on an inter vivos basis. 
 
                                                           
169 Section 70(9.1) and (9.3) of the Act. 
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Obviously, the purpose of these tax provisions is to permit the family farm to be passed 
from generation to generation without the transferor being taxed on any gain that has 
accrued to the property.170  Without these rules any gain that arose on the transfer of the 
farm property to a child ( or spouse) would be t axed. I believe that these rules should 
remain in the Act. To date, there has been no call in any  of the tax literature for their 
repeal. The rules can be justified on many bases, including their role in preserving the 
“family” farm. In addition, because the transfer of the family farm to a child is often a non-
cash transaction, the tax liability that would arise in t he absence of  the rollover might 
have to be sat isfied by a sale of  some of the farm property to a t hird party or a loan 
secured by the farm property.  G iven the precarious state of the farming in Canada 
today, it would also be politically unfeasible to remove these rules. A r elated issue is 
whether the tax system is t he best way to deliver this subsidy in respect of the family 
farm or whether a direct grant is m ore appropriate. Given that the tax relief in t his 
situation is forgiveness of a pot ential tax liability, this expenditure is clear ly best 
delivered by the tax system. The deferral of the gain until the farming property is 
transferred to someone other than a spouse or child is a neat and simple way to provide 
some monetary relief in respect of the family farm. Establishing a system of direct grants 
in lieu of the tax expenditure would only complicate the issue. 
 
4. Tax provisions in respect of retirement savings and pensions 
 
The rules that are discussed in t his part relate to a v ariety of retirement and ot her 
deferred income plans. There are three types of rules. First, there are those rules that 
                                                           
170 While the pr ovisions discussed above only  apply to a transfer to a child of the taxpayer, 
section 70(6) and 73(1) of the Act would apply to provide a tax-free transfer of farm property 
that is capital property to a spouse either on death of the taxpayer or on an inter vivos basis. 
91 
provide for a rollover on death of a taxpayer to the taxpayer’s spouse of  contributions 
made by the taxpayer to a def erred income plan such as Deferred Profit Sharing 
Plans(DPSP), Registered Pension Plans (RPP) or Registered Retirement Savings Plans 
(RRSP). Other rules in the Act allow the spouse to “step into the shoes” of the taxpayer 
on death of the taxpayer and receive survivor benefits under the taxpayer’s RPP. Finally, 
there are those rules that permit contributions to be made by a taxpayer to a RRSP in 
their spouse’s name.  
 
There are several rules that permit contributions to various deferred income plans to be 
transferred on deat h of the contributor to a plan in their spouse’s name without tax 
consequences. Thus, for example, while any withdrawal from a DPSP of unmatured 
contributions would be taxed on withdrawal, there is no tax if the contributor has died 
and the contributions are transferred directly to a DPSP, a RPP or a RRSP in the name 
of the contributor’s spouse.171 Similarly, if a t axpayer dies and has unmatured 
contributions in a RRSP,  those contributions can be t ransferred to a spouse on a t ax-
free basis provided the spouse contributes them (or an equivalent amount) to their own 
RRSP.172 Other rules provide for spousal benefits to be paid from a taxpayer’s retirement 
savings plan. Regulation 8501 provides that RPPs may provide survivor benefits (either 
pre- or post-retirement) which ensure that pension payments made to an individual can, 
on death of the individual, be received by the individual’s spouse. Finally a t axpayer 
may, subject to limitations as to amount, contribute to a RRSP in t heir spouse’s name. 
The contribution may not exceed the taxpayer’s own contribution limit, less any amount 
                                                           
171 Section 147(19) of the Act.  
172 Section 146(8.1) of the Act. 
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contributed to their own plan. The advantage of contributing to a spousal plan (rather 
than one’s own plan) is that one is pr oviding future retirement income for one’s spouse 
and one is also splitting income with the spouse. In other words, income that would have 
accrued to the taxpayer and have been taxed in their hands on realization will be taxed 
in the hands of  the spouse, who may well pay tax at a low er rate than the taxpayer 
because they have less income.  
 
The general policy underlying the three types of rules discussed abov e is t o permit 
taxpayers to provide for retirement income for their spouses (primarily women) who are 
unable to contribute to a RPP or  a RRSP on t heir own behalf.  M any women are 
excluded from access to RPPs for a variety of reasons. One major reason relates to 
women’s participation, or lack thereof, in t he paid labour  force. Even though more 
women than ever are working outside the home, the employment rate for women aged 
25-54 was only 72 per cent in 1998.173  For aboriginal women or women with disabilities, 
the figures are significantly lower. The labour force participation rate for aboriginal 
women is 49.7% and DAWN Canada (Disabled Women’s Network) estimates that 65% 
of women with disabilities who wish to work are unemployed. 174 Women who are not in 
the paid labour force have no access on their own account to an RPP. 
 
It is not only women’s lack of participation in the paid labour force that limits their ability 
to benefit from tax subsidies for RPPs, but the kind of work that women do is also a 
                                                           
173 See Statis tics Canada, Labour Force Update: An O verview of the 1998 Labour Market, 
Catalogue 71-005-XPB (Winter 1999) at 17, Chart 5. 
174 See  Canadian  Advisory  Council  on  the  Status   of  Women,  Work  in  Progress:  Tracking 
Women’s Equality in Canada, (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status  of Women, 
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major factor. Only those who work for relatively large employers who are economically 
able to provide a pension plan w ill benefit; those who work part-time, in non-unionized 
jobs, or for small employers unable t o finance these plans, or those who are self-
employed or unemployed, do not benefit. Women are disproportionately represented in 
the group unable to take advantage of the tax benefits. For example, between 1976 and 
1991 women consistently represented at least 70% of  part time workers.175 In 1994 
women held 69 per  cent of all par t time jobs and 26 per  cent of employed women 
worked part time.176 While some women cite personal and family responsibilities as the 
reason for working part time177, over one-third of women working part time are seeking 
full time work.178 Furthermore, more women than men work in non-unionized jobs,179 and 
women generally work in sectors where pension coverage is the lowest, such as retail 
trade, and community, business and personal services.180  
 
Women who do not have access t o work related pension plans m ay contribute to 
RRSPs, but the ability to take advantage of the preferential tax treatment afforded to 
contributions to these plans is dependent  on having the funds with which to make the 
contribution. Given that women earn considerably less than men, they tend to have less 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1996) at 90 and Canadian Labour  Congress, Women’s Work: A Repor t, (Toronto: Canadian 
Labour Congress, 1997) at 5. 
175 Statistics  Canada,  Women  in  Canada:  A  Statis tical  Report, 3rd.ed.  (Ottawa: Minister of 
Industry, 1995) at 73. 
176  Statis tics Canada, The Daily <http://www.StatCan.ca/Daily/English/980317/d980317.htm> at 
9. 
177  Statistics Canada, supra note 175 at 74. 
178  Canadian Labour Congress, supra note 174 at 25. 
179  Ibid. at  22. 
180 Caledon Ins titute of Social Policy, Round Table on Canada Pens ion Plan Refor m: Gender 
Implications (Ottawa: The Caledon Institute of Social Policy, 1996) at 22. 
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discretionary income to contribute to a RRSP.  This is ev ident when one looks at the 
statistics on who contributes to a RRSP and how  much they contribute. In 1996 more 
men than women contributed to a RRSP,  and alt hough the disparity in t he relative 
numbers of men (3,344,310) and w omen (2,655,690) who contributed was not 
particularly great, there was a significant difference in the amounts contributed. In total 
men contributed over $15 billion t hat year while women contributed just over half that 
amount, at $8.5 billion.181 Therefore an argument can be made that spousal RRSPs are 
a partial solution to this problem of women’s lack of access to these plans in their own 
right. But as Maureen Maloney has noted, the spousal RRSP is pr oblematic for several 
reasons. As she says: 
In reality, the greatest benefit accrues to the high- income earner (the husband), 
who receives considerable tax savings; this benefit increases with his income 
since the tax benefit is given as a deduction rather than a credit. Moreover, …. It 
is unlikely that many wives will obtain dec ision-making power over assets 
transferred to them  legally, and I s uspect this is especially true when the 
transfers are made as a tax-planning device.182 
 
While, at first glance the policy of providing for RPP spousal sur vivor benefits and 
spousal RRSPs m ay appear to be laudable,  on closer examination the difficulties 
become apparent. These problems led the Canadian Advisory Council on t he Status of 
Women to lobby in the 1980s for an end t o this system and for pensions for women in 
their own right.183 One major problem is that state subsidized benefits are being provided 
to individuals solely on t he basis t hat they are in a particular defined relationship with 
another person. Single persons and those persons whose relationships have not, until 
very recently, been recognized by the tax system, such as lesbians and gay men, are 
                                                           
181 Government of Canada, Income Statistics, 1998 (Ottawa: Revenue Canada, 1998) at 103. 
182 Maloney, supra note 103 at 136-137. 
183 See Guest, supra note 114 at 197. 
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and have been discriminated against over the years. As we know, the number of people 
living in f amilies is declining  and m ore women than ever are living alone or with their 
children.184 Indeed a recent report shows a 19 per cent increase in the number of adults 
living without a partner between 1991 and 1996.185  
 
There is an ar gument to be made that all tax expenditures related to retirement saving 
be removed from the Act186 and that the funds be used to enhance the more “universal” 
state pensions such as t he Old Age Security (OAS) and Canada Pension Plan.  The 
Canadian pension sy stem is of ten described as a py ramid187 with the OAS, a f lat 
monthly amount paid to those over 65 at  its base, supplemented by the Guaranteed 
Income Supplement. The next level is t he Canada Pension Plan and the Quebec 
Pension Plan (CPP/QPP) both of which are intended to provide retirement income for 
those who have participated in t he paid labour  force. Because of  the inadequacies of 
these government “public” pensions, recourse to “private” pensions such as RPPs and 
RRSPs is frequently necessary. It is clear that reliance on these private pension plans is 
a policy favoured and encouraged by recent federal governments. And yet, as discussed 
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above, women have less access t o these private pension plans.  Consequently, some 
would argue that all tax preferences for retirement saving should be r emoved from the 
Act and that the public pensions be st rengthened and im proved. For example, some 
members of the Women and Tax Working Group of the Ontario Fair Tax Commission 
believed that “public subsidies f or retirement savings (both RRSPs and pension plan 
savings) delivered through the tax system should be r edirected toward expanding and 
enriching the public retirement security system (OAS, GIS and CPP/QPP).188 
 
Unfortunately, political reality appears to dictate that in the current climate it is unlikely 
that more resources will be devoted to bolstering the OAS, GIS and CPP/QPP. Indeed 
given the federal government’s proposed changes to the CPP t he importance of this 
plan as a pr imary provider of income in retirement will diminish.189 As Monica Townson 
says  
[B]enefits are being cut back and policies are now directed to reducing the role of 
government and inc reasing the r ole of the individual in pr oviding for his or her 
own retirement. In light of  this, it w ould appear futile to m ake proposals that 
would increase the benefits from government programs, even though it would be 
the best way to improve the financial future of women.190  
 
If this is t he case, the next question is whether there are improvements that could be 
made to the tax subsidies that might depart from the current policy of giving preferential 
tax treatment to those in spousal r elationships. In Australia, the emphasis has been on 
getting more employers to provide pension plans f or their employees. Thus the 
Superannuation Guarantee Charge Act, 1992 requires employers to make contributions 
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to a superannuation plan for each employee who earns more than $900 a month. Tax 
relief is given by way of a deduction to employers for their contributions, a low rate of tax 
(15 per cent) on earnings in the plan and a 15 per  cent tax rebate (credit) for income 
received from the plan by  superannuated employees. The result is t hat access to 
employment related pension plans is increased, thereby presumably reducing the need 
for special rules for spouses. But until measures to improve access to either the public or 
private pensions are introduced, the current rules in r espect of spouses should be 
retained. Even though they are flawed and inadeq uate, they do help som e women 
achieve income security in retirement.  
 
D.  Provisions based on economic mutuality that are 
disadvantageous to the taxpayer 
 
1.  Principal Residence 
 
One of the most important tax subsidies in r espect of home ownership is the principal 
residence exemption. Section 40(2) permits a hom e that qualifies as a principal 
residence to be designated as such and disposed of  without any capital gain in respect 
of the residence being subject to tax. A pr incipal residence qualifies for this exemption 
from tax if it is or dinarily inhabited for the period in q uestion by the taxpayer, the 
taxpayer’s spouse or former spouse or a child of  the taxpayer.191 Revenue Canada has 
taken a liberal interpretation about the meaning of “ordinarily inhabited”, permitting, for 
example, summer cottages occupied for a short period of time by the taxpayer to 
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qualify.192 The result is t hat spouses ow ning more than one pr operty may have two 
properties that each q ualify as a pr incipal residence. Up unt il 1982, both of these 
qualifying properties could be designated as pr incipal residences. This concession 
allowed families that owned more than one pr operty that qualified as pr incipal 
residences to “double up” on t he exemption and t hereby avoid taxation of accrued 
capital gains on two homes. But the principal residence exemption consists of a two-part 
test. First, the property must qualify in t he manner described above. Secondly, the 
property must be designated as a principal residence. The 1981 budg et introduced a 
new rule with respect to the designation which provides that only one home may be 
designated as a pr incipal residence in a g iven year by the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s 
spouse and any unmarried children of the taxpayer under 18. Therefore the opportunity 
to designate two homes in a year by one family no longer exists. This change means 
that spouses are at a disadvantage in comparison to other non-spousal couples because 
the latter are able to claim two principal residence exemptions in a given year.  
 
Given the tremendous tax savings that the principal residence exemption generates, the 
limit of one principal residence designation per family for each year is a sensible r ule. 
For the 2000 t axation year, the value of the exemption is est imated to be ov er $1.2 
billion. Moreover, if spouses were each allowed to use a pr incipal residence exemption 
to avoid tax on capital gains, the benefit would accrue to those couples that could afford 
to own two properties. It is very likely that such couples w ould tend to be r elatively 
wealthy and least in need of the tax subsidy. Furthermore, the principal residence 
exemption is not the only tax subsidy for home ownership. The non-taxation of imputed 
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income from home ownership is a significant benefit to homeowners and disadvantages 
those who pay rent. The argument is that the “free rent” received by the homeowner is a 
form of earned income in kind and that it should be taxed.193 Finally, while one can argue 
that provisions that are based on relationships of economic mutuality are problematic 
because they do not reflect the reality of relationships in w hich there may not be a 
sharing of wealth, this argument is not  as per suasive with respect to the principal 
residence exemption. Generally the family home tends to be enj oyed equally by both 
spouses, and more importantly it tends to be jointly owned (and thereby controlled) by 
both spouses, meaning that this critique is less apt in this case.  
 
 2. Provisions related to divorce and separation 
Perhaps no other rules that apply to spouses hav e been so heav ily criticized as t he 
inclusion/deduction rules with respect to spousal suppor t.194 Section 60(b) provides a 
deduction in t he computation of income for the payor of spousal support, provided 
certain conditions are met. Section 56(1)(b) requires that if spousal support is deductible 
by the payor, the recipient must include t he amount in her  income. These rules are 
highly gendered with the majority of those receiving spousal suppor t, and t herefore 
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required to include the amount in income, being women. Meanwhile, it is men who are 
the primary beneficiaries of the tax deduction. The inclusion/deduction system for 
spousal support applies in respect of periodic payments paid for the maintenance of the 
spouse pursuant to a divorce decree or written separation agreement. The reason that 
these rules are included as pr ovisions based on economic mutuality that disadvantage 
the spouses is because, while the overall intent of the rules is, as I  shall discuss,  to 
provide a t ax subsidy to the spouses, the rules are highly flawed in t his regard. The 
result is that while one spouse ( usually the man) may benefit from the tax deduction, 
many women are experiencing a plunge into poverty as a result of divorce or separation 
and the adverse impact on them of the requirement to include spousal suppor t in 
income. John Dur nford and St ephen Toope cite several studies that demonstrate that 
while divorced men tend to experience an incr ease in incom e post-divorce, divorced 
women experience a sig nificant decline in t heir income, a decline t hat often has the 
effect of taking them below the poverty line.195  
 
There are several rationales underlying the inclusion/deduction system. One justification 
is that the system delivers a subsidy to the recipient of spousal support in recognition of 
the extra costs associated with the move from one household t o two on separation or 
divorce. The subsidy arises where the payor is in a higher tax bracket than the recipient 
because the monetary value of the deduction to the payor exceeds the amount of tax 
payable by the recipient. In theory, this permits a hig her support award. It has been 
estimated that for 2000 the amount of the subsidy will be $250 million.196 But there are 
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many problems with this theory. In order that the recipient of spousal support not be at a 
disadvantage because of the tax liability, she must request an adjustment (the gross-up) 
to the amount of the spousal suppor t to take her tax liability into account. If she is not 
successful in obtaining this increase, then she suffers the financial penalty of the lost tax 
dollars. Even if the amount is g rossed-up to reflect the tax liability, the nature of the 
calculation makes it unlikely that she will be fully compensated. For example, in order to 
include the full tax liability of the recipient of spousal support, the amount of the award 
must be grossed up a second t ime so that the gross-up itself is then grossed up to take 
account of the tax liability. Without this further adjustment the tax payable on the gross-
up is not taken into account, resulting in a failure to fully compensate the recipient for her 
increased tax liability. Also, because ent itlement to credits such as the GST tax credit 
and the Canada Child T ax Benefit decreases as income increases, the inclusion in 
income of an award may have the adverse result of reducing the amount of those credits 
for the recipient of spousal suppor t. It should also be noted that none of these 
adjustments to the amount of spousal suppor t mean that the subsidy, if any, is in fact 
shared by the parties. The issue of  grossing up and shar ing the subsidy is not  just a 
mechanical matter. In many cases, judges base t he amount of the award on t heir 
perception of how much the payor can afford. In these cases women often receive less 
than required and at the same time bear the cost of the inclusion in their income of the 
amount. For those women who do not  go to court but negotiate with their ex-spouses, 
the tax rules also present a pr oblem. Negotiations about spousal suppor t do not  take 
place in isolation. Frequently they are part of ongoing negotiations about issues such as 
child custody and property division and t his may result in t rade-offs being made. 
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Perhaps even more disturbing is that one cannot assume that the parties are in an equal 
position with respect to bargaining power. 
 
Another justification given for the inclusion/deduction system is t hat giving a t ax 
deduction to men means that they are more likely to pay spousal support. In other 
words, the system is an enforcement measure. Given that it has been estimated that “up 
to 85 per cent of all orders for the support of women and children remain unpaid or in 
arrears”,197 this justification is inadequate. There are many reasons that spousal support 
orders are in def ault, including hostility towards one’s ex -spouse and t he desire for 
revenge. It is too simplistic a v iew to believe that a t ax deduction will result in bet ter 
compliance with spousal support orders. 
 
From a tax policy perspective the case for the inclusion/deduction system is very difficult 
to make. First, the income tax system operates on the basis of  source income, which 
means that only income with a sour ce, such as employment, business or property, is 
taxed. Windfall gains and other unearned amounts such as g ifts or inheritances are not 
taxed. Spousal support does not have a sour ce and indeed t he only reason that it is 
included in incom e is because it  is deduct ible to the payor. Secondly, as Neil Br ooks 
notes “the design of the subsidy makes no sense: the size of the subsidy depends upon 
the differential in tax rates between the spouses and changes as the marginal tax rates 
of the spouses change”.198 Such a v ariation means that there is almost no control over 
how and to whom the subsidy is allocated. What is especially perplexing is why the tax 
                                                           
197 Durnford and Toope, supra note 194 at 12. 
198 Brooks, supra note 82 at 75. 
103 
system should be used to deliver a subsidy to two individuals who are no longer spouses 
and yet who, for the purposes of the Act, are treated as one tax unit. This confusion was 
at the core of the decision in Thibaudeau v. Canada.199  In that case the Supreme Court 
of Canada r efused to hold t hat the inclusion/deduction system with respect to child 
support payments discriminated against separated custodial parents in contravention of 
section 15(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedom. The primary reason given by the 
majority of the court was that the relevant group for the purposes of their Charter 
analysis was separated or divorced couples or , as Cor y and I acobucci JJ. put it, the 
“post-divorce ‘family unit’”.200 With this “unit” as the starting point for the section 15(1) 
analysis, it was easy for the majority to conclude t hat there was no discr imination 
because the inclusion/deduction system benefited the group of separated or divorced 
parents by generating “substantial savings”.201 Overall the tax burden of the couple was 
reduced even though the tax burden of the recipient of child support was increased.  
 
Basing tax policy on the premise that the divorced or separated couple is a single unit is 
problematic for several reasons. First, such a policy is at odds with one of the objectives 
of family law, which is t o promote “clean break” or self-sufficiency of spouses af ter 
separation or divorce. While the Moge v. Moge202 decision of  the Supreme Court of 
Canada clarified that this objective was only one among others, including compensation 
for the economic consequence of family breakdown, the promotion of self-sufficiency 
remains a key component of support law. Treating the divorced couple as a single unit 
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flies in t he face of this development. Second, if one t akes the view to its logical 
conclusion, it appears that once you are spouses under  the Act, then you remain a 
spousal unit forever. Neither separation, divorce, or even remarriage by one or both of 
the parties, can dissolve the “family”, at least insofar as t he inclusion/deduction rules 
with respect to spousal support apply to them. 
 
It is not surprising that there have been several calls for reform of, and in som e cases, 
repeal of the inclusion/deduction system as it applies to spousal suppor t. In 1987, the 
Canadian Advisory Council on t he Status of Women recommended that the deduction 
be converted to a tax credit and that the inclusion requirement be repealed.203 Since that 
time both the Ontario Fair Tax Commission and Maureen Maloney have called for the 
outright repeal of the inclusion/deduction system.204 I endorse this latter recommendation 
on the basis that there is no tax policy or other compelling justification for the retention of 
the inclusion/deduction system. The current rules do not  accomplish their intended 
purpose, and they impose a significant hardship on many women who find themselves 
descending into poverty as a result of both their divorce or separation and the impact of 
the requirement to include spousal suppor t in incom e. There is a precedent for the 
repeal of these rules. Even though Suzanne Thibaudeau was unsuccessful in her  
attempt to have the inclusion/deduction system with respect to child suppor t payments 
struck down as being  in cont ravention of section 15(1) of the Charter, the federal 
government has since enact ed legislation that has abolished t he inclusion/deduction 
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system for all child support orders made or varied on or after May 1, 1997.205 Repeal of 
the inclusion/deduction system with respect to spousal support is a logical next step. 
 
VII. JOINT LIABILITY 
 
Section 160(1) is a br oad ranging provision that provides that where property is 
transferred to a spouse, a former spouse, a person under 18 or a person with whom the 
taxpayer does not deal at arm’s length, the transferor and the transferee are jointly liable 
for any tax owing by the transferor as a result of the transaction.  Given the breadth of its 
ambit, the provision would also apply to all t ransactions between, for example, parents 
and their adult children because they do not deal at  arm’s length with each other. The 
purpose of the provision is to ensure that tax owing as a result of intra-family transfers of 
property is paid.  It is important to note that because many transfers of capital property 
between spouses t ake place on a t ax-free basis by  virtue of one of the rollover 
provisions, this rule will only apply in respect of the transfer of non-capital property or 
capital property to which a r ollover does not  apply. But there are problems with this 
provision. First, it assumes that spouses, former spouses and other related persons are 
one person for the purposes of taxes owing by one of  them in respect of a transfer of 
property to the other. Given that most of the transfers between spouses and former 
spouses are probably transfers by men to women, this provision has a par ticularly 
negative impact on women. It undermines the autonomy of women by treating them as 
part of the spousal unit and not as individuals. It may also impose a financial hardship on 
women who may not have the funds with which to pay the taxes owed by their male 
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spouse. It affects the control that women have over the property that has been 
transferred to them because it  is possible t hat the property will have to be sold or  
mortgaged to pay the taxes owing as a result of the transfer. It is an especially harsh rule 
insofar as it applies to former spouses. To treat a woman as responsible for her former 
spouse’s tax liability is unacceptable. It means that even though the spousal relationship 
is over and t he separation has been r ecognized by way of a divorce or separation 
agreement, for tax purposes the former spouses remain a spousal unit. Such a provision 
flies in the face of any concept or former spouses becoming independent of each other. 
In light of these problems, section 160 should be repealed and Revenue Canada should 
rely on their existing tax collection practices. 
 
VIII. SPOUSAL TRUSTS 
 
The most important tax rules that apply to spousal t rusts are those which permit the 
transfer of capital property by a taxpayer to a trust of which the taxpayer’s spouse is a 
beneficiary on a r ollover basis. The rollover may occur on an inter vivos basis206 or on 
death of the taxpayer.207 In each case, however, the trust must meet strict requirements 
in order to qualify as a spousal trust for the purposes of the rollover. The capital property 
must vest indefeasibly in the trust, the spouse must be ent itled to receive all of  the 
income of the trust and no per son other than the spouse may, before the death of the 
spouse, receive or otherwise obtain the use of  the income or capital of the trust. The 
problem with the rule is that as Neil Brooks states: 
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[it] allows a husband to determine the ultim ate beneficiary of his legal property, 
while at the same time obtaining a def erral of the tax  on any accrued gain until 
his wife dies, so long as he leaves her a life interest. The fact that the wife does 
not have any say over who the ultimate beneficiary will be, or even in the details 
of the income interest to ensure that it provides her with a f air return on the 
capital of the trust, would appear to negate any  notion that the pr operty was 
‘marital’ property.208 
 
A case can be made that, even if the other rules that permit a rollover of capital property 
to a spouse r emain in the Act, the rollover to a spousal trust should be repealed. The 
reason is that tax incentives should not be g iven to taxpayers for transactions which 
ensure that women will be excluded from any legal ownership of property that was 
formerly owned by their spouse. 
 
IX. CONSEQUENTIAL 
 
The consequential provisions listed in Appendix  A r elate to the substantive rules that 
apply to spousal and familial relationships. Whether these rules should be r etained or 
repealed depends on t he fate of the substantive rules to which the consequential 
provisions relate. Nevertheless, it is important to include the consequential provisions in 
Appendix A in or der to present a comprehensive and complete list of all provisions that 
apply to spousal and familial relationships. 
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 CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The preceding analysis has considered the issue of the recognition by the tax system of 
spousal and familial relationships for a variety of purposes. The analysis has taken into 
account the underlying purposes of the tax system and t he basic t enets of tax policy 
analysis. In addition it has adopted an “equality” perspective by evaluating the impact of 
the respective tax provisions on different groups in society in order to determine whether 
these rules operate fairly. The background to the analysis has been t he changing 
demographics of the family in Canada today, including a decrease in marriage rates, an 
increase in the number of lone par ent families and an incr eased state recognition of 
lesbian and gay relationships. Taken together with changes in the labour force, including 
the increased participation of women, these social and econom ic factors form the 
backdrop to the analysis. 
 
The report tracks the legislative history of some of the key tax rules that take spousal 
and familial relationships into account. It classifies each r ule by reference to the tax 
policy rationales underlying the rules and t he critique of the rules is based on t his 
classification. The critique takes the most important rules in each category and reviews 
the operation and intent of each rule. The analysis of the rule draws on a r ich variety of 
primarily Canadian tax policy literature and discusses t he problems with each r ule. In 
some instances, suggestions are made for changes to a rule in order to make it fairer 
and in other cases, repeal of a particular rule is recommended. 
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Perhaps the most persuasive reason for moving away from rules that take spousal and 
familial relationships into account is t hat these rules complicate the tax system. If 
simplicity really is an under lying goal of the income tax system, then repeal of many of 
these rules would enhance that objective considerably. The integrity of the individual as 
the unit would be ensured and there would be other benefits. Writing about the rules that 
treat spouses as one unit, Jack London notes that they: 
[e]xacerbate the s chizophrenic and inc oherent focus of the tax  system on who 
should comprise the appr opriate human tax units. The federal income tax 
system, more than ever before, lacks an intellec tually or rationally defensible 
perspective on whether married persons are, or ought to be, c onsidered tax 
units… In the result, the system is less equitable, both horizontally and vertically, 
than it c ould be, or  than it w ould be, under  an ideal tax  system, when only tax 
equities are considered.209 
 
But repeal of all the rules that refer to “spouse” or “child” is not recommended. Some of 
the rules have an important objective and are effective in accomplishing that objective. In 
other instances it is difficult to determine if a r ule is achiev ing its intended objective. 
Therefore, in some cases the report recommends the collection of more empirical data in 
order to reach a conclusion about the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of a particular rule. 
 
Some of the major issues raised by the report include the following. While the attribution 
rules are intended to stop income splitting between spouses and bet ween adults and 
minor children, there is a dear th of information about whether, in the absence of the 
rules, there would be a pr oliferation of income splitting transactions with a consequent 
tax leakage. Repeal of the rules would be a positive move to the extent that it results in a 
removal of the disincentive for high-income taxpayers (primarily men) to transfer 
property to their low-income spouses (primarily women). The problem is that repeal of 
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the attribution rules would only benefit those who have high incomes and who own 
income-producing property. The report recommends more empirical research on t he 
issue of the cost in terms of tax dollars lost through income splitting in the absence of the 
rules before a decision is made about retention or repeal of the rules. 
 
The report recommends the repeal of rules that are based on dependency. These rules 
include the spousal tax credit and the ability to transfer unused tax credits to a spouse. 
The primary reasons for this recommendation are that these rules undermine women’s 
autonomy, they act as a disincent ive to women’s participation in t he paid labour  force 
and the tax subsidy is delivered to the economically dominant person in the relationship 
and not the person who needs it. Provisions based on economies of scale are subject to 
the critique that it is not only spouses who benefit from economies of scale. Any two or 
more persons living together benefit, but they are not penalized by the tax system. In this 
context the child-care expense deduction, the GST Tax Credit and the Canada Child Tax 
Benefit are discussed in detail and recommendations for improvement made. 
 
The provisions that are based on econom ic mutuality are discussed in some detail. 
These provisions are subdivided into those that are of advantage to the taxpayer 
because they result in less t ax payable and t hose that disadvantage the taxpayer 
because they increase the amount of taxes payable. These two main classifications are 
further subdivided into other classifications that look to the nature of the provision. The 
problem with rules that are based on an assumption of economic mutuality is that in 
many spousal relationships, this economic mutuality is not a reality. There is little or no 
sharing or pooling of income. Therefore, unless t he provision has an underlying other 
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rationale, it is difficult to argue that it should form part of the tax system. The conclusion 
is that some of the rules that advantage the taxpayer should be r etained because they 
do have valid other objectives. But rules such as t he inclusion/deduction system with 
respect to spousal support cannot be defended on any basis. 
 
In summary, there are many reasons why tax rules that take spousal and familial 
relationships into account should be r ethought. Perhaps the most compelling reason is 
that the nature of spousal and familial relationships has changed dramatically over the 
years. The percentage of Canadians who are married or living in heterosexual common-
law relationships is declining. Within those relationships, the role of spouses is changing. 
Other non-spousal relationships, such as m other and daug hter or two or more good 
friends, share many characteristics with spousal r elationships. Yet it is spousal 
relationships that the tax system treats differently. It is time that this policy was 
reconsidered and this report is intended to facilitate that reconsideration. 
 TABLE 1 
SUMMARY OF KEY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
 
 
I.     REPEAL (in whole or part) 
 
 
SECTION 
 
 
COMMENTS 
 
DEPENDENCY 
PROVISIONS: 
SS.118(1)(A), 
118.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
½ The dependency provisions affirm that a woman’s dependency on 
a man deserves tax relief. This undermines the autonomy of 
women and r esults in a cer tain privatisation of economic 
responsibility for dependent persons. 
½ In the case of the spousal tax credit, the tax subsidy is delivered to 
the economically dominant person in the relationship and not  the 
"dependent" person who needs it . This manner of delivery 
assumes that income is pooled and w ealth distributed equally 
within the relationship. However, studies show that this assumption 
is simply false. 
½ Provisions based on dependency  are a disincent ive to women’s 
participation in the paid labour force, which is exacerbated by other 
costs incurred by women who choose to work outside the home. 
½ There is no r eason to consider that an indiv idual supporting a 
dependent has a reduced ability to pay. Indeed their ability to pay 
may well be increased because there is no need t o have recourse 
to the private market in order to obtain the services provided in the 
home by the dependent person in the relationship.  
½ The provision of the credit to the economically dominant person in 
a relationship ignores the benefit that accrues to the individual from 
work performed in the home by the person whom they support.   
½ The living arrangements of taxpayers have changed considerably 
since the introduction of provisions such as the spousal tax credit.  
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CANADA CHILD 
TAX BENEFIT: 
SS.122.6 TO 
122.64 
 
½ The family allowance portion of the CCTB should be removed from 
the tax system and delivered by way of a direct grant.  
½ One of the major weaknesses of the CCTB is it s limited 
application. The benefit is t argeted at the working poor and does 
not address directly the needs of  those women with children who 
receive social assistance. Yet, in many  instances it is women on 
social assistance who are most in need of financial assistance. 
½ The targeting of the CCTB at the working poor has a 
disadvantageous impact on w omen with disabilities who have 
dependent children, due t o the additional barriers to paid 
employment that these women face.  
½ The reduction in the amount of the CCTB by 25% of any child care 
expenses deducted under section 63 of  the Act is an added and 
unfair burden for those women who need child care to participate 
in the paid labour force.  
½ Unfortunately many women are not claiming the benefits to which 
they are entitled. Because the CCTB is delivered as a refundable 
tax credit, payment depends on an individual filing a tax return and 
claiming the credit. In the case of an individual with a spouse, the 
spouse must also file a return because the amount of the CCTB is 
based on a calculation that takes "family" income into account.  
½ Low income women who need t he CCTB most are least likely to 
claim the credit. Because their income is so low  these women do 
not pay tax and therefore are less likely to complete a tax return. 
 
 
PROVISIONS 
RELATED TO 
DIVORCE AND 
SEPARATION: 
S.56(1)(B), 
60(B) 
 
½ The current rules impose a significant hardship on m any women 
who find themselves descending into poverty as a r esult of both 
their divorce or separation and t he impact of the requirement to 
include spousal support in income.  
½ Support awards, even when "grossed up," often do not  
compensate the recipient for her increased tax liability. 
½ Because entitlements to credits such as the GST tax credit and the 
CCTB decreases as income increases, the inclusion in incom e of 
an award may have the adverse result of reducing the amount of 
those credits for the recipient of spousal support.  
½ Although the inclusion/deduction system is of ten justified as an 
enforcement measure, by providing an incent ive for men to make 
support payments, this justification is inadequate. Up to 85% of all 
orders for the support of women and children remain unpaid or in 
arrears.  
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½ From a tax policy perspective, the system makes no sense.  The 
income tax system operates on the basis that only income with a 
source, such as em ployment, business or  property, is t axed. 
Windfall gains and ot her unearned income is not taxed. Spousal 
support does not  have a sour ce, and t he only reason that it is 
included in income is because it is deductible to the payor.   
½ The inclusion/deduction system delivers a subsidy  to two 
individuals who are no long er spouses and y et who, for the 
purposes of the Act, are treated as one t ax unit. This is at odds 
with one of the objectives of family law, which is to promote "clean 
break" or self-sufficiency of spouses after separation or divorce. 
 
 
JOINT 
LIABILITY: 
S.160(1) 
 
½ The rule assumes that spouses, former spouses and other related 
persons are one person for the purposes of taxes owing by one of 
them in respect of a transfer of property to the other. Given that 
most of the transfers between spouses and f ormer spouses ar e 
probably transfers by men to women, this provision has a 
particularly negative impact on women.  
½ Revenue Canada should rely on t heir existing tax collection 
practices to ensure that tax owing as a r esult of intra-family 
transfers of property is paid. 
 
 
SPOUSAL 
TRUSTS: 
SS.70(6) AND 
73(1) 
 
½ Even if the other rules that permit a rollover of capital property to a 
spouse remain in the Act, the rollover to a spousal t rust should be 
repealed. Tax incentives should not  be g iven to taxpayers for 
transactions which ensure that women will be excluded from any 
legal ownership of property that was formerly owned by their 
spouse.  
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II.     AMEND 
 
 
SECTION 
 
COMMENTS 
 
 
CHILD CARE 
EXPENSE 
DEDUCTION: 
S. 63 
 
½ To make the child car e expense deduction fairer, it should be 
converted to a r efundable tax credit, that does not take family 
income into account. This measure would mean that the income 
level of the recipient would be irrelevant in determining the amount 
of the subsidy.  
½ The amount of the deduction is inadeq uate. The monetary 
limitations on the amount that may be deduct ed are further 
exacerbated by the rule requiring the spouse with the lower income 
to take the deduction. Since t he deduction is applied t o reduce 
income that is taxed at a low er rate, the resulting tax savings is 
lower than it would be if taken by the high rate taxpayer. 
½ The limitation on who may take the deduction is ar bitrarily 
dependent on the marginal tax rates of the spouses, and does not  
take into account the cost or nature of the child-care received. 
½ Since s.63 provides a deduct ion from income, the value of the 
deduction is t ied to the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate. This means 
that an indiv idual paying tax at a hig h rate receives a lar ger tax 
subsidy than an individual paying at a lower rate. The deduction is 
worthless to those who have little or no income to which to apply 
the deduction. Such a system establishes a hierarchy of taxpayers 
that is in inverse relation to their ability to pay for child care. 
½ The issue of whether the tax system would be used t o fund child-
care or whether the government should m ove towards a sy stem 
that provides state funded child-care centres for young children is 
an important issue for further debate.  
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III.     LEAVE AS IS 
 
 
SECTION 
 
 
COMMENTS 
 
 
GST TAX 
CREDIT: 
S.122.5 AND 
CANADA CHILD 
TAX BENEFIT: 
SS. 122.6 TO 
122.64 
 
 
½ To remove the aggregation of income inherent in t he GST tax 
credit and t he CCTB would fly in t he face of the intent of the 
provisions which is to provide subsidies to those with low incomes. 
Therefore the subsidies should remain in the Act. 
 
 
 
ROLLOVER 
PROVISIONS 
(ON DEATH): 
S. 70(6) 
 
½ While it is unclear  whether the inter vivos rollover rules actually 
encourage the redistribution of wealth from men to women in the 
spousal relationship, we do k now that the rollover on death is a 
significant incentive to taxpayers to bequeath capital property to 
their spouses. Therefore the provision aids in t he redistribution of 
wealth from men to women. 
 
 
TAX FREE 
TRANSFERS OF 
FARMING 
PROPERTY TO A 
CHILD 
TAXPAYER: 
SS.70(9), 
70(9.2), 73(3) 
AND 73(4) 
 
 
½ These rules permit the family farm to be passed from generation to 
generation without the transferor being taxed on any gain that has 
accrued to the property, and t herefore serve an im portant role in 
preserving the "family" farm.  
½ Because the transfer of the family farm to a child is often a non-
cash transaction, the tax liability that would arise in the absence of 
the rollover might be difficult to satisfy.  
 
 
PROVISIONS IN 
RESPECT OF 
RETIREMENT 
SAVINGS AND 
PENSIONS: 
147(19), 
146(8.1) AND 
REGULATION 
8501. 
 
½ Until measures to improve access to pensions are introduced, the 
current rules in r espect of spouses should be r etained. Even 
though they are flawed and inadequate, they do assist  some 
women to secure income in retirement. 
½ The general policy underlying these rules is to permit taxpayers to 
provide for retirement income for their spouses (primarily women) 
who are unable to contribute to a RPP or  a RRSP on t heir own 
behalf.  
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½ Women’s ability to benefit from tax subsidies for RPPs is limited by 
their lack of participation in the paid labour force and by the kind of 
work that women do. Those women who work part-time, in non-
unionized jobs or for small employers unable t o finance these 
plans, or those who are self-employed or unemployed, do not  
benefit from these subsidies. 
½ Women who do not  have access t o work related pension plans 
may contribute to RRSPs, but given that women tend to earn 
considerably less t han men, they tend to have less discretionary 
income to contribute to an RRSP. 
½ Since women have less access t o private pension plans,  some 
would argue that all t ax preferences for retirement saving should 
be removed from the Act and t hat the public pensions be 
strengthened and improved. Unfortunately, political reality appears 
to suggest that in t he current climate it is unlik ely that more 
resources will be devoted to bolstering public pensions.  
½ Thought should be given to ways to improve these subsidies that 
might depart from the current policy of giving preferential tax 
treatment to those in spousal relationships. 
 
 
PRINCIPAL 
RESIDENCE 
EXEMPTION: 
S.40(2) 
 
½ Given the tremendous tax savings that the principal residence 
exemption generates, the limit of one pr incipal residence 
designation per family for each year is sensible. 
½ The argument that provisions that are based on relationships of 
economic mutuality are problematic because they do not reflect the 
reality of relationships in w hich there may not be a sharing of 
wealth is not as persuasive with respect to the principal residence 
exemption, given that the family home tends to be enjoyed equally 
by both spouses, and often is jointly owned.  
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IV.     MORE STUDY NEEDED 
 
 
SECTION 
 
 
COMMENTS 
 
 
ATTRIBUTION 
RULES: 
SS.74.1, 74.2, 
56(2) AND (4) 
 
½ Without any empirical data, it is difficult to determine whether there 
would be a significant increase in income splitting in the absence of 
these rules. 
½ A related question is w hether there would be a concom itant 
increase in t he transfer of property by men to women that would 
have the advantage of addressing women’s lack of income relative 
to men. 
 
 
ROLLOVER 
PROVISIONS 
(INTER VIVOS): 
73(1) 
 
½ These rules are intended to encourage the redistribution of capital 
property and wealth within a spousal relationship and, in particular, 
from men to women. The key question is how effective are the 
rules in accomplishing this end?  
½ Before consideration is given to a repeal of or amendment to these 
rules, empirical data must be collect ed in or der to determine 
whether these transfers of capital property by men to women are 
actually taking place. If not, more direct state intervention designed 
to encourage redistribution of wealth between men and w omen 
may be appropriate. 
  

 APPENDIX A 
REFERENCES TO SPOUSE, MARRIED 
PERSON AND CHILD IN THE  
INCOME TAX ACT 
 
 
The following material lists and describes the operation of every provision in the Act that 
refers to “spouse”, “married person” or “child”. Each provision has been classified in a 
manner that best reflects the intention of the provision. In some instances the same 
provision is listed in more than one category because it  has a dual pur pose. The 
classification is as follows: 
1. Anti-avoidance rules 
2. Administrative provisions 
3. Definitional provisions 
4. Dependency related provisions 
5. Provisions that recognize economies of scale and r educe the amount of the tax 
subsidy 
6. Provisions that are based on an assum ption of economic mutuality, that provide 
a tax preference and that are in respect of  
i) employment  
ii) the family farm or family corporation 
iii) corporations and business partnerships 
iv) the family home 
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v) the death of the taxpayer 
vi) inter vivos transfers of property 
vii) health and education 
viii) retirement and pensions 
ix) divorce or separation 
x) miscellaneous 
7. Provisions that are based on an assum ption of economic mutuality, that are to 
the disadvantage of the spouse because they result in an increase in tax liability 
and that are in respect of  
i) corporations and business activity 
ii) the family home 
iii) the disposition of capital property 
iv) divorce or separation 
v) retirement and pensions 
vi) miscellaneous 
8. Provisions that impose a joint  liability on spouses 
9. Provisions that relate to spousal trusts 
10. Consequential provisions 
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I. ANTI-AVOIDANCE RULES 
 
A. Spouse 
 
Section 74.1  
Section 74.1 provides detailed rules that attribute to the transferor or lender income or 
loss from property transferred at less than fair market value or property that is loaned to 
a spouse. The intention of the rules is t o eliminate income splitting between spouses.  
Income splitting occurs when the spouse w ith the higher income transfers income 
producing property to a spouse w ith less incom e who correspondingly pays tax at a 
lower rate on t hat income than the rate at which the spouse w ith the higher income 
would pay tax.  
 
Section 74.2(1)  
Section 74.2 provides detailed rules that attribute to the transferor or lender any capital 
gain or capital loss f rom the disposition of property transferred at less than fair market 
value or loaned to a spouse. The provision is intended to stop spouses split ting capital 
gains. 
 
Section 74.5(1)  
Section 74.5 contains detailed provisions that are part of the attribution rules. This 
section spells out the exceptions to the rules and includes m any anti-avoidance rules 
that are intended to ensure that the attribution rules cannot be av oided through 
inappropriate tax planning such as t he use of  back to back loans, guarantees and 
artificial transactions. 
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Section 104(5.4) (b) 
Section 104(5.3) provides for the deferral of the 21-year deemed disposition for some 
trusts. (All trusts are deemed to dispose of their capital property every 21 years in order 
that tax can be levied on any appreciation in the value of that property.) Subsection (5.4) 
defines an ex empt beneficiary for those purposes but will soon be irrelevant as 
subsection (5.3) is to be repealed. 
 
Section 104(5.8) (a)(i)(C), (b) 
Section 104(5.8) is an ant i-avoidance rule designed to prevent the avoidance of the 21 
year deemed disposition rules through the use of trust to trust transfers and it applies to 
spousal trusts as well as other non-spousal trusts. 
 
Section 104(6)(b)(i)(D), (b)(ii) and (iii)  
Section 104(6) provides for the deduction in t he computation of trust income of any 
amount payable to a benef iciary. There are special rules that affect spousal trusts and 
that prohibit the deduction of any amount that is a dist ribution of capital of the trust to 
anyone other than the spouse. 
 
Section 107(4)(b), (c) and (d) to (f) (proposed amendment) 
Section 107(4) applies to post 1971 spousal t rusts and provides that where such a trust 
distributes capital property, resource property or land t o a benef iciary other than the 
beneficiary spouse, the property is deemed to be disposed of a fair market value. 
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Section 146(8.3) 
Section 146(8.3) contains an ant i-avoidance attribution rule intended to stop spouses 
income splitting by having an indiv idual contribute to an RRSP from which the spouse 
withdraws the amount. The withdrawal will be taxed to the individual and not the spouse. 
 
Section 212.1(3)(b)(i) 
Section 212.1 is an anti-avoidance rule that prevents the removal of taxable corporate 
surplus as a tax-free return of capital through a non- arm’s length transfer by a non-
resident of shares from one Canadian corporation to another. Subsection (3) effectively 
treats the shares of one spouse as the shares of the other spouse. 
 
B.   Child 
 
Section 75.1(1)(a) and (2) definition of “child” 
Section 75.1 is an attribution rule that applies where farm property was transferred to a 
child pursuant to section 73 on a r ollover basis and t he child disposed of  the property 
before the child at tained 18 y ears of age. In those circumstances any capital gain is 
attributed to the transferor. 
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II. ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS 
 
A. Spouse 
 
Section 122.62(5), (6) and (7)  
Section 122.62 provides that in order to qualify for the Canada Child T ax Benefit, an 
eligible individual must file a notice with the Minister. Subsections (5), (6) and (7) deal 
with the situations where the cohabiting spouse of  the eligible individual dies, the 
individual separates from the cohabiting spouse and a per son becomes the cohabiting 
spouse respectively. 
 
Section 126(7)(g) definition of “non-business-income tax” 
Section 126(7)(g) defines non-business-income tax for the purposes of computing a 
taxpayer’s entitlement to the foreign tax credit. Non-business-income tax does not 
include a tax that can be at tributed to a t axable capital gain in r espect of which the 
taxpayer or the taxpayer’s spouse claimed the capital gains exemption. 
 
Section 150(1)(d)(ii)(B), (d)(iii) 
Section 150 provides the rules respecting the date for filing of tax returns. Subsection 
(1)(d) requires that individuals file their return by April 30 of  the year following the 
taxation year. In the case of  an indiv idual carrying on business in t he year, the return 
and that of a cohabit ing spouse m ust be f iled by June 15 of the year following the 
taxation year. 
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Section 221(1)(i) 
Section 221 permits the Governor in Council t o make regulations under the Act and 
subsection (1)(i) permit regulations to be made which define the classes of non-resident 
persons who may be regarded as spouses under the Act. 
 
Section 248(22)(a) and (b) 
Section 248(22) provides that where property could on dissolut ion of a m atrimonial 
regime be the subject of partition, the property shall be deem ed to be ow ned by the 
spouse who originally owned it and in any other case, shall be deemed to be owned by 
the spouse who had administration of the property. 
 
Section 248(23)  
Section 248(23) provides that where, after dissolution of a matrimonial regime the owner 
of property is not  the person deemed to have been t he owner under subsection (22), 
then the person is deem ed to have transferred the property to the person’s spouse 
immediately before the dissolution of the matrimonial regime. 
 
B.   Married Person 
 
Section 143(4)(b) definition of “family”  
Section 143 is int ended to provide a level of taxation for communal organizations such 
as Hutterite colonies t hat is r oughly comparable to the general tax treatment of other 
farming families. A formula is applied t o determine how much income of the communal 
organization is attributed to each member. The definition of family provides that a family 
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includes in t he case of  a m arried adult, that person and the person’s spouse and t he 
unmarried children of both of them who are not adults. 
 
 
III.  DEFINITIONAL PROVISIONS 
 
A.   Spouse 
 
Section 248(1) definitions of “death benefit”, “home relocation loan,” and 
“separation agreement”  
 
The definition of “death benefit” means that a sur viving spouse m ay receive up t o 
$10,000 of an amount that is considered to be a death benefit tax-free. The definition of 
“home relocation loan” means that a loan r eceived by the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s 
spouse for the purpose of acquiring a home is not taxable. The definition of “separation 
agreement” is relevant for the purposes of the rules that require the inclusion and permit 
the deduction of spousal support payments. 
 
Section 248(8)(a) and (b) 
Section 248(8) provides rules that expand the concept of “a transfer as a consequence 
of death” for the purposes of several rollover provisions that apply on death. Paragraphs 
(a) and (b) ensure that the rules apply to a t ransfer by a t axpayer or the taxpayer’s 
spouse. 
 
Section 252(1)(c), (e) and (2)(a)(iii), and (b) to (g).  
Section 251(1) provides the extended definition of “child” and that definition includes a 
child of the taxpayer’s spouse and a spouse of  the child of the taxpayer. Subsection (2) 
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extends the meaning of different relationships. A parent of a taxpayer includes a person 
who is the parent of the taxpayer’s spouse. A brother of a taxpayer includes a per son 
who is the brother of the taxpayer’s spouse or the spouse of a taxpayer’s sister. A sister 
of the taxpayer includes a per son who is t he sister of the taxpayer’s spouse and the 
spouse of the taxpayer’s brother. A grandparent of the taxpayer includes a grandparent 
of the taxpayer’s spouse and t he spouse of  the taxpayer’s grandparent. An aunt  or 
great-aunt of a taxpayer includes the spouse of the taxpayer’s uncle or great-uncle. An 
uncle or great-uncle of a taxpayer includes the spouse of  the taxpayer’s aunt or great-
aunt. A niece or  nephew of a taxpayer includes the niece or  nephew of the taxpayer’s 
spouse. All of these definitions are relevant any time the Act refers to related persons. 
 
Section 252(3) and (4)(a), (c), and (d) 
Section 252(3) extends the meaning of “spouse” and “former spouse” of an individual 
(for certain listed sections of the Act) to include another individual of the opposite sex 
who is a par ty to a voidable or void marriage with the individual. Subsection (4) is the 
definition of spouse which currently includes a person of the opposite sex cohabiting in a 
conjugal relationship with another person where they have so cohabited for a 12 month 
period or are the parents of a child.  Subsection (4) also pr ovides that references to 
marriage in the Act are to be read as if  the relationship between 2 spouses w ere a 
marriage and that provisions that apply to a m arried person apply to a spouse.  
Provisions that apply to an unmarried person do not apply to a spouse. 
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B.   Married Person 
 
Section 251(6)(b)  
Section 251 provides that related persons are individuals connected by blood, marriage 
or adoption. Subsection (6) provides that persons are connected by marriage if one is 
married to the other or to a per son who is so connected by blood relationship to the 
other. 
 
Section 252(4)(c) 
Section 252(4)(c)  provides that provisions that apply to a person who is married apply to 
a person who is the spouse of the taxpayer. 
 
C.   Child 
 
Section 122.5(1) (b) definitions of “eligible individual” and “qualified dependant” 
For the purposes of the GST tax credit, an eligible individual includes a parent of a child 
and a qualified dependant includes a child of the individual.  
 
 
IV. DEPENDENCY RELATED PROVISIONS 
 
A.   Spouse 
 
Section 8(1)(e)(ii) 
Section 8(1)(e) provides a deduction in the computation of employment income given to 
railway employees for expenses for meals and lodging while away from the municipality 
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where the employees home terminal is locat ed and w hile working at a location from 
which the employee could not  reasonably be ex pected to return daily to their own 
residence where they supported a spouse ( or person dependent on t he taxpayer for 
support and connected to the taxpayer by blood, marriage or adoption). 
 
Section 118 (1) (a), (1)B(a)(i) and (ii) 
Section 118(1)(a) provides for the marital (spousal) tax credit which gives a tax credit to 
an individual supporting their spouse. 
 
Section 118(1)(b) (Proposed amendment) 
Section 118(1)(b) provides for the equivalent to spouse tax credit that gives a tax credit 
to an indiv idual who supports a per son such as a child or other person who is wholly 
dependent on the individual. The equivalent to spouse credit may not be claimed by a 
person who claims the spousal tax credit. 
 
Section 118(1)(B)(b.1)(ii)(B)(II) (Proposed amendment)  
This provision provides a supplem ent of $500 t o various tax credits, including the 
spousal tax credit and the equivalent to spousal tax credit. 
 
Section 118(6) 
Section 118(6) defines a dependant for the purposes of the dependant tax credit and the 
infirm dependant tax credit as a per son dependant on the individual and who is one of 
several particular relations of the individual or of the individual’s spouse list ed in t he 
section.  
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Section 118.2(1)D(a), D(b) (Proposed amendment), (2)(a), (b), (b.1)(iii), (c)(ii), (l.8), 
(q), (2)(l.9), (l.10) proposed addition 
 
Section 118.2 provides the medical expense tax credit.  Any unused por tion of a 
taxpayer’s medical expense tax credit may be transferred to their spouse which means 
that either spouse m ay claim the tax credit for medical expenses incurred by the 
spouses. In addition proposed amendments provide that eligible medical expenses will 
include expenses for training courses relating to the care of a m entally or physically 
infirm person who is related to the taxpayer and is eit her a member of the taxpayer’s 
household or is dependent on the individual for support. 
 
Section 118.3(2) (a) 
Section 118.3(2)(a) provides criteria for determining the entitlement of a supporting 
individual of a disabled person to claim that person’s unused disability tax credit. Such a 
transfer is allow ed if the individual is allow ed the equivalent to spouse t ax credit in 
respect of the disabled person. 
 
Section 118.61(1)(E) 
Section 118.61 provides the formula to calculate the unused portion of a taxpayer’s 
tuition and education tax credits that may be t ransferred to a spouse,  parent or 
grandparent under section 118.8. 
 
Section 118.8 and section 118.8C(a) (Proposed amendment) 
Section 118.8 provides for the transfer of the unused portion of the tuition and education 
tax credits, and the age, pension and disability tax credits to a spouse. 
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Section 118.9  
Section 118.9 provides that if the individual’s spouse does not deduct any unused 
portion of the tuition or education tax credit, a parent or grandparent may deduct that 
amount. 
 
B.   Married Person 
 
Section 118 (1)(a), (1)B(a)(i) and (ii) 
Section 118(1)(a) provides for the marital (spousal) tax credit which gives a tax credit to 
an individual supporting their spouse. 
 
Section 118(1)(b) (Proposed amendment) 
Section 118(1)(b) provides for the equivalent to spouse tax credit that gives a tax credit 
to an indiv idual who supports a per son such as a child or other person who is wholly 
dependent on the individual. The equivalent to spouse credit may not be claimed by a 
person who claims the spousal tax credit. 
 
Section 118.8 and section 118.8C(a) (Proposed amendment) 
Section 118.8 provides for the transfer of the unused portion of the tuition and education 
tax credits, and the age, pension and disabilit y tax credits to a spouse and still retains 
the reference to “married person”. 
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C.   Child 
 
Section 6(1)(b)(ix) 
Section 6(1)(b) provides for the inclusion in employment income of amounts received as 
allowances. Subparagraph (ix) provides that an allowance received from the employer 
by an employee employed in a remote location which is in respect of expenses incurred 
by reason of the child of the employee having to live away from the employee’s home to 
attend school is an excluded allowance that is not required to be included in employment 
income. 
 
Section 60(I)(v)(B.1)(II) 
Section 60(I) permits the tax free rollover of a r efund of premiums from a registered 
retirement savings plan (RRSP) to an annuit y for a dependent  child on deat h of the 
RRSP contributor. 
 
Section 63(1), (2), (2.1), (2.2)(b), (2.3)(a),(c),(e), (3) and (b) (Proposed amendment to 
the definition of “eligible child”) and (4)  
 
Section 63 provides for the deduction of child care expenses in certain circumstances. 
An eligible child for the purposes of the deduction is a child of  the taxpayer or the 
taxpayer’s spouse or a child who is dependent on the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s spouse 
and has limited income or who is dependent  on t he taxpayer or taxpayer’s spouse 
because of a mental or physical infirmity. 
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Section 108(1)(b)(iii) definition of “preferred beneficiary”  
A trust may allocate income to a preferred beneficiary and even though the amount is 
not paid to that beneficiary, the amount is taxed in the hands of the preferred beneficiary. 
This rule allows for income splitting between a trust and preferred beneficiaries. A 
preferred beneficiary includes children of the settlor who suffer from a mental or physical 
infirmity. 
 
Section 118(1)(B)(b.1)(ii)(A),(B)(II) (Proposed amendment), (c.1)(ii), and (6)(a) 
Section 118(1)B provides the equivalent to spousal tax credit and this credit may be 
claimed in respect of a child who is dependent on the taxpayer for support provided that 
the spousal tax credit is not  claimed by the taxpayer. Section 118(1)(c.1) provides the 
caregiver tax credit  to a child or grandchild of a person over 65 who is infirm. 
 
Section 118.3(2)(a)(i)(B) 
Section 118.3(2)(a) provides criteria for determining the entitlement of a supporting 
individual of a disabled person to claim that person’s unused disability tax credit. Such a 
transfer is allowed if the individual is a child of  the disabled person who is allowed the 
caregiver tax credit in respect of the disabled person. 
 
Section 122.61(1)  
Section 122.61(1) provides the Canada Child T ax Benefit, a r efundable tax credit 
payable on a monthly basis to the parent who is the primary caregiver of the child. The 
amount of the payment is reduced and eventually eliminated as annual f amily income 
increases. 
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IV. ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND REDUCT ION IN 
THE AMOUNT OF THE TAX SUBSIDY 
 
A.   Spouse 
 
Section 56(1)(s)(i) and (ii) 
Section 56 (1) (s) requires the inclusion in income of certain grants made under federal 
government programs respecting home insulation or energy conservation. In the case of 
spouses who are living together in the year that such a grant is received by one of them 
the grant is to be included in t he income of the spouse with the higher income in that 
year.  
 
Section 56(1)(u)(i) and (ii) 
Section 56(1)(u) requires the inclusion in income of social assistance payments and, in 
the case of spouses living together, the amount is included in t he income of the spouse 
with the higher income in that year. 
 
Section 63(3), definition of “eligible child”, (a), (b) (including proposed 
amendment), (d), and definition of “supporting person” (b) 
 
Section 63 pr ovides a deduct ion for child car e expenses in cer tain circumstances. An 
eligible child for the purposes of the deduction is a child of the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s 
spouse or a child w ho is dependent on the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s spouse and has 
limited income or who is dependent on the taxpayer or taxpayer’s spouse because of  a 
mental or physical infirmity. The section also provides that the deduction must be taken 
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by the spouse (in two spouse families) with the lower income, although there are some 
exceptions to this rule. 
  
Section 122.5(1) definition of “qualified relation” 
For the purposes of the GST tax credit, a qualified relation is the spouse of an individual. 
Entitlement to the GST tax credit is based on “family” income meaning that the income of 
spouses is aggregated to determine their entitlement to the GST tax credit. The result is 
that each spouse m ay receive less t han they would if they did not  have a spouse. 
Furthermore, individuals under 19 years of age are eligible for the GST tax credit if they 
are married. 
 
Section 122.6 (c) definitions of “adjusted income”, “cohabiting spouse”, “eligible 
individual” and (e) “qualified dependant”  
 
These definitions are relevant for the purposes of combining the income of spouses for 
the purposes of entitlement to the Canada Child Tax Benefit, which is an income tested 
refundable tax credit based on family income comprising of two components, the CCTB 
basic benefit and the CCTB National Child Benefit Supplement. 
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VI. PROVISIONS THAT ARE BASED ON AN 
ASSUMPTION OF ECONOMIC MUTUALITY 
AND THAT ARE OF ADVANTAGE TO THE 
TAXPAYER 
 
A. Employment related 
 
1.   Spouse 
Section 15(2.4) (b) and (e) 
Section 15(2), which requires the inclusion in incom e of certain shareholder debt, does 
not apply to a “home relocation loan” in respect of an individual who is the spouse of an 
employee of the lender to enable t he individual to purchase a hom e where it is 
reasonable to conclude that the employee’s spouse r eceived the loan because of  the 
employee’s employment. 
 
PROPOSED section 20.01(1), (2)(c), and (3)(a), to apply to fiscal periods ending 
after 1997 
 
Section 20.01 permits an indiv idual to deduct in t he computation of business income 
premiums payable under a private health services plan for the coverage of the individual, 
the individual’s spouse and m embers of the individual’s household. Certain limits apply 
to the amount deductible and those limits also apply to contributions for the individual’s 
spouse. 
 
Section 54.1(1)   
Section 54.1 provides that a t axpayer who does not ordinarily inhabit their principal 
residence because eit her the taxpayer or their spouse has been t ransferred by their 
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employer may elect that the house remains their principal residence until the taxpayer 
re-occupies the house or  the taxpayer dies dur ing the term of the taxpayer’s or the 
spouse’s employment by the employer who required the relocation.  
 
Section 62(3)(f) 
Section 62 per mits the deduction of certain moving expenses. Subsection (3)(f) lists 
eligible moving expenses, one of  which is t he cost to the taxpayer of legal costs in 
respect of the purchase of a new residence where the old r esidence was sold by  the 
taxpayer or the taxpayer’s spouse as a result of the move. 
 
Section 248(1) definition of “home relocation loan” 
The definition of “home relocation loan” means that a loan r eceived by the taxpayer or 
the taxpayer’s spouse from the taxpayer’s employer to purchase a home is not taxable. 
 
Section 250(2)  
Section 250 pr ovides the circumstance under which members of the armed forces, 
ambassadors and ot her listed government officials shall be deem ed to be resident in 
Canada. Subsection (2) provides that where any of these individuals cease to hold that 
office that entitles them to resident status, the person and their spouse shall be deemed 
to have been resident in Canada throughout the part of the year preceding that time. 
 
 
 
 
140 
B.   In respect of the family farm or family corporation 
 
1. Spouse 
Section 40(1.1)(a)  
Section 40(1)(a)(iii) provides a r eserve for deferred payments in r espect of capital 
property.  The formula used to calculate the amount of the reserve gives the taxpayer a 
reserve equal to the lesser of a reasonable reserve or 4/5 of the gain in year one, 3/5 of 
the gain in year two, 2/5 of the gain in year three and 1/5 of the gain in year four, with no 
entitlement to a reserve in the fifth year after disposition of the property. Section 40(1.1) 
provides that where the property is f arming property used by  the taxpayer or the 
taxpayer’s spouse and it  is disposed of  to a child of the taxpayer, the formula described 
above is adjusted to 1/10 of the gain in year one (with a corresponding adjustment to the 
other years). It therefore increases the length of time that a reserve may be taken to 9 
years after the sale. 
  
Section 70(6.1), (9), (9.1), (9.3) and (9.8) 
Section 70(6.1) provides for the rollover of a net  income stabilization account from a 
deceased taxpayer to a spouse or spouse trust. Section 70(9) permits the transfer of 
certain farm properties to a child of the taxpayer at a value between cost and fair market 
value (thereby permitting a r ollover) provided that the property was used principally in 
the business of farming by the deceased taxpayer, the taxpayer’s spouse or any of the 
taxpayer’s children on a r egular and cont inuous basis pr ior to the taxpayer’s death. 
Section 70(9.1) permits the transfer of certain farming properties from a spouse t rust to 
the children of the settlor of the trust at a proceeds of disposition of an amount between 
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cost and fair market value, thereby permitting a rollout of the property from the spouse 
trust. The idea is t o ensure that if the taxpayer leaves farm property in trust for their 
spouse, that property can be transferred on death of the spouse on a t ax-free basis to 
the children of the deceased taxpayer. Section 70(9.3) permits the transfer of a family 
farm corporation or partnership from a spouse t rust to the children of the settlor of the 
trust on a tax-free basis. Section (9.8) provides that leased farm property is deemed to 
be used in the business of farming in certain circumstances.  
 
Section 73(1), (2), (3), and (5) 
Section 73 provides for the inter vivos transfer on a tax-free basis of different properties 
to a spouse. Subsection (1) permits the transfer of capital property to a spouse or former 
spouse on a rollover basis subject to certain conditions. Subsection (2) is an ancillar y 
provision dealing with the transfer of depreciable capital property. Subsection (3) 
provides for the inter vivos transfer of farm property used principally in the business of  
farming by the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s spouse or a child of the taxpayer to a child of the 
taxpayer. Subsection (5) provides for the rollover of a net  income stabilization account 
from a taxpayer to a spouse or former spouse of the taxpayer. 
 
Section 110.6 (1), definitions of “interest in a family farm partnership” (a)(i)(D) and 
(E), “qualified farm property” (a), (b), (c), “qualified small business corporation 
share” (a), and “share of the capital stock of a family farm corporation” (a)(i) 
 
These definitions are all relevant for the calculation of the capital gains exemption. An 
exemption in t he amount of $500,000 is av ailable during the lifetime of a taxpayer in 
respect of capital gains realized on the disposition of properties that are considered to 
constitute the family farm. There is also a capit al gains exemption for capital gains 
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realized on the disposition of shares of a small business corporation. The references to 
spouse in t he definitions relate to conditions that must be met in order for property to 
qualify as property eligible for the exemption. In the case of the family farm, the property 
must be used by the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s spouse in or der to be elig ible for the 
exemption and in t he case of  the shares of a small business corporation, the shares 
must be owned by the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s spouse in order to qualify. 
 
Section 143(1), (2), (3) (Proposed amendment), (4)(b) definition of “family”, and (5) 
(Proposed amendment) 
 
Section 143 is int ended to provide a level of taxation for communal organizations such 
as Hutterite colonies, that is roughly comparable to the general tax treatment of other 
farming families. A communal organization is t reated as an inter vivos trust and m ay 
elect to make a deemed distribution of its income to its members so that the income is 
taxed with the member. A formula is applied to determine how much income is allocated 
to each member. The proposed amendments will allocate one full share of the income to 
the designated spouse and a half  share of the income to the non-designated spouse 
instead of allocating twice the share of the income to the spouse designated by the 
congregation. 
 
2.   Married Person 
Section 143(4) 
See above entry under “spouse” 
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3.   Child 
Section 40 (1.1)  
Section 40(1)(a)(iii) provides a r eserve for deferred payments in r espect of capital 
property.  The formula used to calculate the amount of the reserve gives the taxpayer a 
reserve equal to the lesser of a reasonable reserve or 4/5 of the gain in year one, 3/5 of 
the gain in year two, 2/5 of the gain in year three and 1/5 of the gain in year four, with no 
entitlement to a reserve in the fifth year after disposition of the property. Section 40(1.1) 
provides that where the property is f arming property used by  the taxpayer or the 
taxpayer’s spouse and it  is disposed of  to a child of the taxpayer, the formula described 
above is adjusted to 1/10 of the gain in year one (with a corresponding adjustment to the 
other years). It therefore increases the length of time that a reserve may be taken to 9 
years after the sale.  
 
 
Section 70(9), (9.1), (9.2), (9.3), (9.6) and (10), definitions of “child, “interest in a 
family farm partnership,” and “share of the capital stock of a family farm 
corporation”  
 
Section 70(9) permits the transfer of certain farm properties to a child of the taxpayer at 
a value between cost and fair market value (thereby permitting a rollover) provided that 
the property was used principally in the business of farming by the deceased taxpayer, 
the taxpayer’s spouse or any of the taxpayer’s children on a r egular and cont inuous 
basis prior to the taxpayer’s death. Section 70(9.1) permits the transfer of certain farming 
properties from a spouse t rust to the children of the settlor of the trust at a proceeds of 
disposition of an amount between cost and fair market value, thereby permitting a rollout 
of the property from the spouse trust. The idea is t o ensure that if the taxpayer leaves 
farm property in trust for their spouse, that property can be transferred on death of the 
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spouse on a tax-free basis to the children of the deceased taxpayer. Section 70 (9.2) 
permits the transfer of family farm corporations and par tnerships to a child of  the 
taxpayer at a value between cost and fair market value (thereby permitting a rollover). 
Section 70(9.3) permits the transfer of a family farm corporation or partnership from a 
spouse trust to the children of the settlor of the trust on a tax-free basis. Section 70(9.6) 
provides for a “rollback” of the family farm from a child to a parent who was the spouse 
of the deceased on w hose death the original rollover to the child occurred. Section 
70(10) defines several terms relevant to these rules. 
 
Section 73(3) (d), (d.1), (e), (4) (d) 
Section 73(3) provides for the tax-free inter vivos transfer of farm property used 
principally in the business of farming by the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s spouse or a child of 
the taxpayer to a child of the taxpayer. Section 73(4) provides for the tax-free inter vivos 
transfer of family farm corporations and partnerships to a child of the taxpayer. 
 
Section 110.6(1) Definitions of “child,” (a)(i)(D), (E) “interest in a  
family farm partnership” (a)(iii), (vi) and (vii), “qualified farm property” (a)(i)(D), (E), 
and “share of the capital stock of a family farm corporation”  
 
These definitions are all relevant for the calculation of the capital gains exemption. An 
exemption in t he amount of $500,000 is av ailable during the lifetime of a taxpayer in 
respect of capital gains realized on the disposition of properties that are considered to 
constitute the family farm. The references to child in t he definitions relate to conditions 
that must be met in or der to qualify as pr operty in r espect of which the exemption 
applies. Generally these conditions relate to the use of the particular property. 
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C.   Related to corporations and business partnerships 
 
1.   Spouse 
 
Section 82(3)  
Section 82 provides that taxable dividends may be included in the income of the spouse 
of the taxpayer in order to preserve the entitlement of the spouse of the taxpayer to the 
spousal tax credit. But for this rule, a spouse of an individual with no other income might 
lose entitlement to the spousal tax credit because that individual’s income would be in 
excess of the amount permitted by section 118 by  reason of receipt of the dividend 
income. 
 
Section 96(1.1)(a) 
Section 96(1.1) provides rules respecting the allocation of a share of income to a person 
who has ceased to be a member of a partnership. If the allocation is to a spouse of  the 
partner, then the spouse is deemed to be a member of the partnership and therefore the 
partnership is not dissolved. 
 
Section 204.81(1)(c)(v)(A), (c)(vii) 
Section 294.81 provides the requirements to be met in order for a plan to be registered 
as a Labour  Sponsored Venture Capital Corporation. Subsection (1)(a)(v) places limits 
on redemption by a corporation of Class A shar es and pr ovides an ex ception to that 
limitation for shares held by the individual, a spouse or  former spouse of the individual 
where certain other conditions are met. 
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D.   In respect of the family home 
1. Spouse 
Section 40(4) 
Section 40(4) provides that where a taxpayer has transferred a principal residence to a 
spouse or a spouse trust and the transfer was either an int er vivos or post mortem 
rollover, then the spouse shall be deemed to own the residence for the period that it was 
owned by the taxpayer and the property shall be deemed to be the principal residence of 
the spouse for the period that it qualified as the principal residence of the taxpayer. In 
the case of  a t ransfer to a spouse t rust the trust shall be deemed to be resident in 
Canada during each year that the taxpayer was resident in Canada.  The result is that 
the spouse or spouse trust steps into the shoes of the taxpayer for the purposes of the 
principal residence exemption. 
 
Section 54.1(1)   
Section 54.1 provides that a t axpayer who does not ordinarily inhabit their principal 
residence because eit her the taxpayer or their spouse has been t ransferred by their 
employer may elect that the house remains their principal residence until the taxpayer 
re-occupies the house or  the taxpayer dies dur ing the term of the taxpayer’s or the 
spouse’s employment by the employer who required the relocation.  
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2.   Child 
Section 54 definition of “principal residence”  (c) and (c.1)(iv)  
This definition provides, among other rules, that only one home may be designated as a 
principal residence for the purposes of the principal residence exemption by the 
members of the same family. For these purposes, the “family” does not  include a 
married child under the age of 18. 
 
E. Related to the death of the taxpayer 
 
1.   Spouse 
Section 60(l) (ii)(A)(I) and (II), (v)(A) and (D)(I) and (v)(i)(A) 
Section 60 (l)  permits a deduction for amounts received by a spouse or dependant as a 
“refund of premiums” under an RRSP on t he death of the annuitant or for a lump sum 
payment out of an RPP. Paragraph (v) permits a deduction for contributions made to a 
prescribed provincial pension plan by a taxpayer on their own account or to the account 
of their spouse. 
 
Section 70(5.2)(b), (b)(ii), (d), and (d)(ii), (6)(a), (b)(i) and (ii), (d), (d.1)(ii) and (iii), 
(6.1) (a), (b)(i) and (ii), (7), (9), (9.1), (9.3)(b), (d), (e)(i) and (iii), (9.8)(a) and (b), (10) 
and (13)(b). 
 
Section 70 contains numerous rules that apply on death of a taxpayer. Many of these 
rules permit various properties of the taxpayer to pass on a tax-free basis to the spouse 
or a spouse trust of the deceased taxpayer. In each case there is a deferral of tax until 
the spouse ult imately disposes of  the property. Section 70(5.2)(b) permits certain 
resource properties to go on a t ax-free basis ( roll over) to a spouse or a spouse trust, 
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though the legal representative of the deceased may elect a proceeds of disposition up 
to the fair market value of the property, thereby triggering some of the gain in the 
deceased’s terminal year. The proceeds of disposition for the deceased is the cost of the 
property to the spouse or  spouse t rust. Land inv entory of a deceased r olls over to a 
spouse or spouse trust. Section 70(6) provides a series of rules that permit a rollover of 
all capital property to a spouse or  spouse t rust provided certain conditions are met. 
Section 70(6.1) provides for the rollover of a net  income stabilization account from a 
deceased taxpayer to a spouse or  spouse t rust. Section 70(7) provides a complicated 
method of untainting a t estamentary spouse t rust that is t ainted by reason of a 
requirement to pay testamentary debts so that capital property can roll into the trust. This 
provision is often used by tax lawyers to realize part of a gain on the deemed disposition 
of capital property. This action permits any net capital losses of the deceased to be used 
up and the spouse or spouse trust receives a corresponding step up in the cost of the 
capital property. The effect is t o split income between the deceased taxpayer and the 
spouse or spouse trust. Section 70(9) permits the transfer of certain farm properties to a 
child of the taxpayer at a value between cost and fair market value (thereby permitting a 
rollover) provided that the property was used principally in the business of farming by the 
deceased taxpayer, the taxpayer’s spouse or any of the taxpayer’s children on a regular 
and continuous basis prior to the taxpayer’s death. Section 70(9.1) permits the transfer 
of certain farming properties from a spouse trust to the children of the settlor of the trust 
at a proceeds of disposition of an amount between cost and fair market value, thereby 
permitting a rollout of the property from the spouse trust. The idea is to ensure that if the 
taxpayer leaves farm property in trust for their spouse, that property can be transferred 
on death of the spouse on a t ax-free basis t o the children of the deceased taxpayer. 
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Section 70(9.3) permits the transfer of a family farm corporation or partnership from a 
spouse trust to the children of the settlor of the trust on a tax-free basis. Section (9.8) 
provides that leased farm property is deemed to be used in t he business of  farming in 
certain circumstances. Subsection (10) includes def initions related to the above noted 
provisions and subsection (13) is a consequential rule. 
 
Section 72(2)  
Section 72(2) applies where a deceased t axpayer was eligible to take a reserve under 
the Act and where the property in respect of which a reserve is taken is t ransferred to 
the taxpayer’s spouse or a spouse t rust. The provision permits the legal representative 
of the deceased taxpayer and the spouse to jointly elect that the spouse will step into the 
shoes of the deceased with respect to any future reserves. 
 
Section 104(27.1)(e) 
Section 104(27.1) provides that amounts paid t o a t estamentary trust from a deferred 
profit sharing plan as a conseq uence of the death of the settlor are eligible for the 
rollover to an RRSP under section 60(j), provided the amount can be consider ed to be 
part of the amount included in the income of the spouse of  the settlor under section 
104(13). 
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Section 146(1) definitions of “annuitant,” “qualified investment,” and “refund of 
premiums” and proposed amendment “refund of premiums”, “retirement income,” 
“retirement savings plan,” and “spousal plan”, subsections (3)(b)(i), (5.1)(a)(iii) 
and (iv), (8.1), (8.2)(a), (b) and (c), (8.21), (8.6), (8.7), (8.8), (8.91), (16)(b) and (c), 
(21)(a)(i), (ii) and (iii), and (b)(i) 
 
Section 146 provides for the tax deduction for contributions to a RRSP and t he 
sheltering of income in that plan. Many of the rules apply to spouses. In particular, an 
individual may contribute to an RRSP f or their spouse ( a spousal RRSP) , within their 
own contribution limits. On death of a contributor to an unmatured  RRSP, the  funds in 
the plan can be transferred to a spouse as a r efund of premiums and if  the spouse 
contributes an equal amount to their RRSP, the funds pass on a tax-free basis. RRSP 
funds can be transferred on a tax-free basis to a spouse on marriage breakdown. 
 
Section 146.01(1) definitions of “regular eligible amount”, “replacement property” 
and “supplemental eligible amount” and (7)(b), (c)(i), and (d) 
 
Section 146.01 permits the tax-free withdrawal of RRSP funds provided those funds are 
used to purchase a qualifying home. Certain restrictions apply and the funds must be 
repaid to the RRSP within a 15 y ear period. In order to qualify for the plan, neither the 
individual nor their spouse may have purchased the home more than 30 days before the 
funds are withdrawn and the spouse may not own a home in which the individual has 
resided since t hey became spouses. In the event of the death of the individual, the 
spouse may elect to assume the responsibilities of the individual to repay the amounts 
withdrawn by the deceased. 
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Section 146.3(1) Definitions of “annuitant”, “minimum amount”, “qualified 
investment” and “retirement income fund”,  (2)(d), (f)(iv), (5.1), (5.4), (6.11) and 
(14)(b) 
 
Registered Retirement Income Funds m ay provide spousal benef its similar to those 
provided by Registered Retirement Savings Plans and on death may be transferred to a 
spouse’s RRIF on a tax-free basis. 
 
Section 147(19)(b)(ii)  
Tax-free transfers may be made from a deceased spouse’s Deferred Profit Sharing Plan 
to a surviving spouse’s Registered Retirement Savings Plan, Registered Pension Plan or 
Deferred Profit Sharing Plan. 
 
Section 147.3(7)(b) 
Section 147(7) provides that on death of an indiv idual, an amount may be transferred 
from their Registered Pension Plan t o the Registered Pension Plan,  Registered 
Retirement Savings Plan or Registered Retirement Income Plan of  their spouse on a 
tax-free basis. The regulations also pr ovide for spousal sur vivor benefits under a 
Registered Pension Plan. 
 
Section 148(8.1) and (8.2)  
Section 148 (8.1) and (8.2) provide that an int erest in a lif e insurance policy may be 
transferred by the holder to a spouse either inter vivos or on death on a tax-free basis. 
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Section 248(1) definition of “death benefit”  
The definition of “death benefit” means that a sur viving spouse m ay receive up t o 
$10,000 of the death benefit tax-free. 
 
Section 248(8)(a) and (b) 
Section 248(8) provides rules that expand the concept of “a transfer as a consequence 
of death” for the purposes of several rollover provisions that apply on death. Paragraphs 
(a) and (b) ensure that the rules apply to a t ransfer by a t axpayer or the taxpayer’s 
spouse. 
 
Section 248(9.2)(a) 
In order for capital property to qualify for a r ollover to a spouse or  a spouse trust on 
death of the taxpayer, the property must vest indefeasibly in the spouse or the spouse 
trust. Section 248(9) provides that the property will not vest indefeasibly in a 
testamentary spouse trust unless the property vested indefeasibly in the trust before the 
death of the spouse and, in the case of an transfer to a spouse directly that the property 
vested indefeasibly in the spouse before the spouse’s death. 
 
Section 248(23.1) 
Section 248(23.1)(a) provides that property transferred after the death of a taxpayer to a 
spouse under provincial laws relating to a taxpayer’s interest in property is deemed 
transferred as a consequence of the death of the taxpayer, thereby ensuring that the 
property is eligible for the rollover to the spouse under section 70(6). 
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F.   In respect of an inter vivos transfer of property 
 
1. Spouse 
Section 73(1), (2), (3), and (5) 
Section 73 provides for the inter vivos transfer on a tax-free basis of different properties 
to a spouse. Subsection (1) permits the transfer of capital property to a spouse or former 
spouse on a rollover basis subject to certain conditions. Subsection (2) is an ancillar y 
provision dealing with the transfer of depreciable capital property. Subsection (3) 
provides for the inter vivos transfer of farm property used principally in the business of  
farming by the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s spouse or a child of the taxpayer to a child of the 
taxpayer. Subsection (5) provides for the rollover of a net  income stabilization account 
from a taxpayer to a spouse or former spouse of the taxpayer. 
 
Section 148(8.1) and (8.2)  
Section 148(8.1) and (8.2) provide that an int erest in a lif e insurance policy may be 
transferred by the holder to a spouse either inter vivos or on death on a tax-free basis. 
 
G. Related to health and education 
 
1. Spouse 
Section 118.2(1)D(a), D(b) proposed amendment, (2) (a), (b), (b.1)(iii), (c)(ii), (l.8), 
(q), (2)(l.9), (l.10) proposed addition 
 
Section 118.2 provides the medical expense tax credit.  Any unused por tion of a 
taxpayer’s medical expense tax credit may be transferred to their spouse which means 
that either spouse may claim the credit for medical expenses incurred by the spouses. In 
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addition proposed amendments provide that eligible medical expenses will include 
expenses for training courses relating to the care of a m entally or physically infirm 
person who is related to the taxpayer and is eit her a m ember of the taxpayer’s 
household or is dependent on the individual for support. 
 
Section 146.02(1) definition of “eligible amount”, (2)(c)(ii), and (7)  
Section 146.02 provides the Lifelong Learning Plan w hich provides for a tax-free 
withdrawal from a RRSP by  the individual or the individuals spouse in or der to pay for 
the individual’s education. 
 
Section 146.1(1) definition of “education savings plan”, (7.2)(c) 
Section 146.1 provides for the establishment of Registered Education Savings Plans in 
which money contributed will accumulate on a t ax-free basis. Funds contributed to the 
RESP may subsequently be used to pay for post secondary education. The promoter of 
the RESP may enter into a contract with either the individual or the individual and their 
spouse. Provision is made for the tax-free transfer of any contribution to a spouse on 
breakdown of the marriage provided certain requirements are met.  
 
H. Related to retirement and pensions 
 
1. Spouse 
Section 60(j)(i) and (j.2)(ii)(c), (l) (ii)(A)(I) and (II), (v)(A) and (D)(I) and (v)(i)(A) 
Section 60 (j) to (l) permit the tax free rollover of retirement allowances and withdrawals 
from registered pension plans, deferred profit sharing plans, registered retirement 
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savings plans and registered retirement income funds when paid into certain other plans. 
Paragraph 60(j) permits certain lump sum amounts to be t ransferred to a r egistered 
pension plan or registered retirement pension plan and paragraph 60(j.2) permits certain 
payments made on a periodic basis f rom a r egistered pension plan or  deferred profit 
sharing plan to be transferred tax-free to a spousal r egistered retirement savings plan, 
up to a maximum of $6,000 each year.  
  
Section 60.01(b)  
Certain contributions made by a t axpayer or their spouse or  a f ormer spouse t o a 
“foreign retirement arrangement” may be transferred on a tax-free basis to an RPP or an 
RRSP for the taxpayer’s benefit. 
 
Section 104(27)(c)(ii) and (d)(i) 
Section 104(27) permits a t estamentary trust to flow pension benef its through to a 
beneficiary so that the income qualifies for the pension credit and is elig ible to be rolled 
into a registered retirement savings plan. The reference to spouse ensures that where 
the amount is an annuity out of the pension plan paid t o a spouse of  the settlor, the 
amount qualifies for the flow through. 
 
Section 104(27.1)(e) 
Section 104(27.1) provides that amounts paid t o a t estamentary trust from a deferred 
profit sharing plan as a conseq uence of the death of the settlor are eligible for the 
rollover to a registered retirement savings plan under section 60(j), provided the amount 
can be considered to be part of the amount included in the income of the spouse of the 
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settlor under section 104(13) which requires that the amount be an am ount payable to 
the beneficiary. 
 
Section 118(7)(b) 
Section 118(7) defines qualified pension income for the purposes of the pension credit 
as including certain amounts received by the individual on the death of the individual’s 
spouse. This rule means that a deceased spouse’s pension received by a surviving 
spouse qualifies for the pension tax credit. 
 
Section 146(1) definitions of “annuitant,” “qualified investment,” and “refund of 
premiums” and proposed amendment “refund of premiums”, “retirement income,” 
“retirement savings plan,” and “spousal plan”, subsections (3)(b)(i), (5.1)(a)(iii) 
and (iv), (8.1), (8.2)(a), (b) and (c), (8.21), (8.3), (8.6), (8.7), (8.8), (8.91), (16)(b) and 
(c), (21)(a)(i), (ii) and (iii), and (b)(i) 
 
Section 146 provides for the tax deduction for contributions to a RRSP and t he 
sheltering of income in that plan. Many of the rules apply to spouses. In particular, an 
individual may contribute to an RRSP f or their spouse ( a spousal RRSP) , within their 
own contribution limits. On death of a contributor to an unmatured  RRSP, the  funds in 
the plan can be transferred to a spouse as a r efund of premiums and if  the spouse 
contributes an equal amount to their RRSP, the funds pass on a tax-free basis. RRSP 
funds can be t ransferred on a t ax-free basis t o a spouse on marriage breakdown. 
Subsection (8.3) contains an anti-avoidance attribution rule intended to stop spouses 
income splitting by having an indiv idual contribute to an RRSP from which the spouse 
withdraws the amount. The withdrawal will be taxed to the individual and not the spouse. 
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Section 146.3(1) Definitions of “annuitant”, “minimum amount”, “qualified 
investment” and “retirement income fund”,  (2)(d), (f)(iv), (5.1), (5.4), (6.11) and 
(14)(b) 
 
Registered Retirement Income Funds m ay provide spousal benef its similar to those 
provided by RRSPs (see section 146 above). 
 
Section 147(19) (b)(ii)  
Tax-free transfers may be m ade from a deceased spouse’s DPSP to a surviving 
spouse’s RRSP, RPP or DPSP. 
 
Section 147.3(5)(b) and  (7)(b) 
Subsection (5) provides that an amount may be transferred on marriage breakdown from 
the RPP of an individual to the RPP, RRSP or RRIF of their spouse on a tax-free basis. 
Subsection (7) provides that on death of an indiv idual, an amount may be t ransferred 
from their RPP to the RPP, RRSP or  RRIF of their spouse on a t ax-free basis. The 
regulations also provide for spousal survivor benefits under an RPP. 
 
Section 210(c)(ii) 
Section 210 im poses a t ax of 36% on t rusts that have one or  more non-resident 
beneficiaries or persons exempt from tax under section 149(1). The reference to spouse 
provides an ex ception where the person exempt from tax was a trust governed by a 
RRSP or a RRIF and acquired the interest from an indiv idual or the spouse or  former 
spouse of the individual who was immediately after the interest was acquired a 
beneficiary under the trust governed by the RRSP or RRIF. 
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2. Child 
Section 104(27) 
Section 104(27) permits a t estamentary trust to flow pension benef its through to a 
beneficiary so that the income qualifies for the pension credit and is elig ible to be rolled 
into an RRSP. The reference to child ensures that where the benefit is an amount paid 
to a child of the settlor, the amount qualifies for the flow through. 
 
I. Related to divorce or separation 
 
1. Spouse 
Section 60(b)B 
Section 60(b) provides for the deduction of spousal support payments. 
 
Section 60.1(2)(a)  
Section 60.1 is reciprocal to section 56.1 and provides a deduction for support payments 
made to a third party. 
 
Section 146(8.8) 
Section 146(8.8) provides that RRSP funds may be transferred on a tax-free basis to a 
spouse on marriage breakdown. 
 
Section 146.1(1) definition of “education savings plan”, (7.2)© 
Section 146.1 provides for the establishment of RESPs in which money contributed will 
accumulate on a t ax-free basis. Funds cont ributed to the RESP may subsequently be 
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used to pay for post secondary education. The promoter of the RESP may enter into a 
contract with either the individual or the individual and their spouse. Provision is made 
for the tax-free transfer of any contribution to a spouse on br eakdown of the marriage 
provided certain requirements are met.  
 
Section 146.3 
Section 146.3 provides that funds in a RRIF may be transferred on a tax-free basis to a 
spouse on marriage breakdown. 
 
Section 147.3 
Section 147.3 provides that funds in a Registered Pension Plan may be transferred on a 
tax-free basis to a spouse on marriage breakdown. 
 
2. Child 
Section 60(b)B 
Section 60(b) provides for the deduction of child support payments made pursuant to an 
order made before May 1, 1997 and not varied after that time. 
 
J. Miscellaneous provisions 
 
1. Spouse 
Section 58(5) 
Section 58 provides the rules to be applied in det ermining the amount to be included in 
income in respect of certain government annuities issued before 1940. Subsection (5) 
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provides that where section 58 permits the deduction of certain amounts in t he 
computation of the portion of the annuity to be included in income, and both the taxpayer 
and their spouse receive annuity amounts, the taxpayer and their spouse may apportion 
the deduction in any manner they choose between themselves. 
 
 
VII. PROVISIONS THAT ARE BASED ON AN 
ASSUMPTION OF ECONOMIC MUTUALITY 
AND THAT ARE DISADVANTAGEOUS FOR 
THE TAXPAYER 
 
A. Corporations and business activity 
 
1. Spouse 
Section 24(2) (b), (c), and (d)(ii) 
Certain rules apply when an individual ceases t o carry on business.  Section 24(2) 
provides that where the individual’s spouse takes over the business, the cumulative 
eligible capital balance (in respect of the goodwill of the business) rolls over to a spouse. 
The consequence is that there is no deduction for the goodwill of the business, although 
there would have been such a deduct ion if the business had been disposed of  to any 
other person. 
 
Section 39(1)(c)(vi)(B) & (C) and (c)(vii) 
Section 39(1) defines capital gain, capital loss and business inv estment loss. The 
reference to spouse pr ovides that in t he case of  a shar e issued bef ore 1972 or  a 
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substituted share, a business inv estment loss is r educed by any taxable dividend 
received by the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s spouse or a trust of which the taxpayer or the 
taxpayer’s spouse is a beneficiary. 
 
Section 84.1 (2.2) (rules for paragraph 84.1(2)(b)) 
For the purposes of determining if a cor poration is cont rolled by an indiv idual, shares 
owned by the spouse of the individual are taken into account and effectively treated as if 
they were shares owned by the individual. 
 
Section 130(3)(a)(vii)D 
Section 130 provides for a low rate of tax on the income of investment corporations. In 
order to qualify as an inv estment corporation, certain requirements must be m et, 
including the requirement that no shareholder (including a related person) can own more 
than 25% of  the issued shar es of the corporation at any time in t he year. Subsection 
(3)(a)(vii)D provides that for the purpose of this ownership test an individual, the 
individual’s child and the spouse of the individual are related persons. 
 
Section 130.1(6)(d)(iv) 
Income of a mortgage investment corporation can flow though the corporation and be 
taxed in the hands of the shareholder as int erest income. In order to qualify as an 
investment corporation,  no shareholder (including a r elated person) can ow n more 
than25% of the issued shar es of the corporation at any time in the year. Subsection 
(6)(d)(iv) provides that for the purpose of this ownership test an indiv idual, the 
individual’s child and the spouse of the individual are related persons. 
162 
Section 212.1(3)(b)(i) 
Section 212.1 is an anti-avoidance rule that prevents the removal of taxable corporate 
surplus as a tax-free return of capital through a non- arm’s length transfer by a non-
resident of shares from one Canadian corporation to another. Subsection (3) effectively 
treats the shares of one spouse as the shares of the other spouse. 
 
Section 251.1(1)(a) and (b)(iii) 
Section 251 defines affiliated persons for the purposes of the Act. The definition includes 
an individual and their spouse and a corporation and a spouse of  a person by whom the 
corporation is controlled, as well as a cor poration and a spouse of  a person who is a 
member of an af filiated group of persons by whom the corporation is cont rolled. The 
definition primarily applies with respect to the rules that apply to the acquisition of capital 
property and denies losses on the disposition of the property in certain circumstances. 
 
2. Child 
Section 84.1 (2.2) (rules for paragraph 84.1(2)(b)) 
For the purposes of determining if a cor poration is cont rolled by an indiv idual, shares 
owned by the child of the individual are taken into account. 
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B. Family home 
 
1. Spouse 
Section 40(2)(b)D(i), (b)D(i)(A), (b)D(i)(B) 
Section 40(2) establishes the principal residence exemption which allows the disposition 
of the family home on a tax free basis for the period that it qualifies as a pr incipal 
residence. These rules apply to a pr incipal residence acquired prior to February 23, 
1994 and in r espect of which an elect ion under 110.6(19) was made to crystallize an 
exempt capital gain. The rules provide an amendment to the calculation of the amount 
that is eligible for tax-free treatment that takes into account any capital gains exemption 
claimed by the taxpayer or their spouse. The result is an integration of the principal 
residence rules and the special election under section 110.6(19) in respect of the capital 
gains exemption. 
 
Section 54 definition of “principal residence” (a), (a.1), (c), (c.1)(ii)(B), and (c.1)(iv) 
Section 54 includes sev eral rules that relate to spouse and the principal residence 
exemption. First, a home qualifies as a principal residence if it is inhabited for the period 
in question by the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s spouse or  former spouse or  a child of the 
taxpayer. Secondly, if the taxpayer is a personal trust then the home must be inhabited 
by the specified beneficiary of the trust, the spouse or former spouse of the beneficiary 
or by the child of the beneficiary. Thirdly, only one home may be designated in a g iven 
year as a principal residence by members of one family which is considered to be the 
taxpayer, the taxpayer’s spouse and any  unmarried children of the taxpayer under 18. 
Similar rules apply where the taxpayer is a personal trust. 
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Section 146.01(1) definitions of “regular eligible amount”, “replacement property” 
and “supplemental eligible amount” and (7)(b), (c)(i), and (d) 
 
Section 146.01 permits the tax-free withdrawal of RRSP funds provided those funds are 
used to purchase a qualifying home. Certain restrictions apply and the funds must be 
repaid to the RRSP within a 15 y ear period. In order to qualify for the plan, neither the 
individual nor their spouse may have purchased the home more than 30 days before the 
funds are withdrawn and the spouse may not own a home in which the individual has 
resided since t hey became spouses. In the event of the death of the individual, the 
spouse may elect to assume the responsibilities of the individual to repay the amounts 
withdrawn by the deceased. 
 
2. Child 
Section 54 definition of “principal residence” (a), (a.1), (c), (c.1)(ii)(B), and (c.1)(iv) 
Section 54 includes sev eral rules that relate to spouse and the principal residence 
exemption. First, a home qualifies as a principal residence if it is inhabited for the period 
in question by the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s spouse or  former spouse or  a child of the 
taxpayer. Secondly, if the taxpayer is a personal trust then the home must be inhabited 
by the specified beneficiary of the trust, the spouse or former spouse of the beneficiary 
or by the child of the beneficiary. Thirdly, only one home may be designated in a g iven 
year as a principal residence by members of one family which is considered to be the 
taxpayer, the taxpayer’s spouse and any unmarried children of the taxpayer under 18. 
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C. Disposition of capital property 
 
1. Spouse 
Section 54 definition of “superficial loss” 
This section provides that if one spouse acq uires property of another spouse within 30 
days of disposition of the property by the other spouse, the spouse who originally 
disposed of the property may not take a capital loss. 
 
D. Related to divorce or separation 
 
1. Spouse 
Section 56(1)(b)  
Section 56(1)(b) requires the inclusion in incom e of child support (in certain 
circumstances) and spousal support.  
 
Section 56.1(2)(a) and (4) 
Section 56.1(2) extends the basic support provision in section 56(1)(b) to include certain 
support payments made to the third parties which are required to be included in the 
income of the person in r espect of whom the payments are made. Subsection (4) 
defines “support amount” and “child support amount”. 
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Section 118(5) 
Section 118(5) precludes a sing le parent from claiming the equivalent to spouse tax 
credit for a child in respect of whom the parent is r equired to make child suppor t 
payments. 
 
E. Related to retirement and pensions 
 
1. Spouse 
Section 40(2)(g)(iv)(B) 
This section provides that losses from a spousal RRSP are deemed to be nil. 
 
F.  Miscellaneous 
 
1. Spouse 
Section 64(a)A(i) 
Section 64 pr ovides a deduct ion for attendant care expenses which may be taken by 
individuals eligible for the disability tax credit. No deduction may be taken for attendant 
care expenses provided by a spouse. 
 
Section 81(1) (h) 
Section 81(1) provides that social assistance payments received by a taxpayer for the 
benefit of another person are, in certain circumstances, not included in the income of the 
taxpayer. Paragraph (h)  provides that this rule does not  apply in respect of payments 
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made for the benefit of the taxpayer’s spouse or a person who is related to the taxpayer 
or the taxpayer’s spouse. 
 
Section 122.61 (1) E 
This section provides a m echanism for the Minister to recover an overpayment of the 
Canada Child Tax Benefit and the calculation of the amount of the overpayment takes 
into account, among other factors, 25% of  the child care expenses deduction taken by 
either the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s spouse. 
 
Section 163(2)(c)(i) 
Section 163(2) prescribes the penalty for false statements and omissions in respect of 
tax returns and other forms. In the case of the Child Tax Benefit, the calculation of the 
penalty takes into account the fact that the spousal income is relevant to the calculation 
of entitlement to the Canada Child Tax Benefit. 
 
 
VIII. JOINT LIABILITY 
 
Section 160(1)(a) and (4)  
Section 160(1) provides that both spouses are jointly and severally liable for tax arising 
in respect of property transferred between them. 
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Section 160.1(2.1) 
Section 160.1(2.1) provides that both spouses ar e jointly and sev erally liable f or any 
repayment of an overpayment of the Canada Child Tax Benefit. 
 
 
IX. PROVISIONS THAT RELATE TO SPOUSAL 
TRUSTS 
 
A. Spouse 
 
Section 104(4) (a)(iii), (iv), (a.1) and (5.1) 
Section 104 (4) to (5.2) provides for the deemed disposition at fair market value every 21 
years by a trust, of certain of its properties.  Paragraph (a)(iii) provides that if the trust is 
a spousal trust, the deemed disposition occurs on the date of the death of the spouse. 
Where the trust is a pre-72 spousal trust the deemed disposition occurs on the day that 
is the later of the day on which the spouse dies and January 1, 1993. 
 
Section 104(15)(a) 
Section 104(15) provides for the preferred beneficiary election and establishes limits for 
pre-72 spousal trusts on the amount that is eligible for the election.  
 
Section 108(1)(d) and (e) definition of “accumulating income”  
Section 108(1) defines accumulating income for spousal trusts. 
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Section 108(1) definition of “pre-1972 spousal trust” 
Section 108(1) defines a pre-72 spousal trust. 
 
Section 108(1) definition of “preferred beneficiary”  
A preferred beneficiary includes the spouse or former spouse of  the settlor of the trust 
and the child, grandchild or great grandchild or the spouse of any such person. 
 
Section 108(4)  
A pre-72 spousal t rust is not  tainted by reason of the payment of estate taxes, 
succession duties or any income tax payable by the trust in respect of the income of the 
trust. The result is that the trust will qualify for the preferential treatment given to pre-72 
spousal trusts. 
 
Section 110.6(12)(a)(i) and (ii), (c)(i) and (ii)  
Section 110.6(12) provides for use of the capital gains exemption by a spousal trust. 
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IX. CONSEQUENTIAL PROVISIONS 
 
A. Spouse 
 
Section 40(3.18) (a)(ii), (a)(iv), (c)(iii) 
Section 40(3.1) provides for a deemed gain at the end of  the fiscal period of the 
partnership in respect of the disposition of the partnership interest for a m ember of a 
partnership who is a limited partner if the adjusted cost base of  the partnership is 
negative at the end of that fiscal period. There are certain exclusions to the deemed gain 
rule in subsect ion (3.1). Subsection (3.18) provides that a par tner who acquired a 
partnership interest after February 22, 1994 will be deemed to have held the interest on 
February 22, 1994 for the purposes of the exclusion within (3.1) if the partnership 
interest rolled to the partner from a spouse or  spouse t rust and was an “excluded” 
interest immediately before the death of the partner or partner’s spouse.  
 
Section 45(4)  
Section 45(3) provides that where there would be a deem ed disposition of income 
producing property by reason of a chang e in use of  that property to a non-income 
producing purpose and the property use is changed to that of a principal residence, the 
taxpayer may elect not to have the deemed disposition occur. Section 45(4) provides 
that the 45(3) election may not be made where capital cost allowance has been claimed 
in respect of the property by the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s spouse or a trust under which 
the taxpayer’s spouse is a beneficiary. 
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Section 110.6(20) (a)(i) and (29) 
Section 110.6 (19) and (20) provides for the crystallization of capital gains effective 
February 22, 1999 (the date of repeal of the capital gains exemption for capital property 
other than the family farm and shares of a small business corporation). The references 
to spouse in paragraph (a)(i) and (29) are consequential provisions. 
 
Section 204.2(1)(b)(i) and (ii) 
Section 204.2 defines the excess amount for a year prior to 1991 in respect of an RRSP 
and the reference to spouse is intended to include the spousal RRSP in the ambit of the 
definition. 
 
Section 204.2(1.2), (2) and (3)  
Section 204.2 provides for the calculation of the amount of undeducted RRSP premiums 
and the references to spouse bring spousal RRSPs within the ambit of the section. 
 
Section 212(1)(h)(iii.2)  
Section 212 imposes a tax of 25% on certain Canadian source income of non-residents. 
Subsection (1)(h) imposes the tax on pension benef its other than certain benefits that 
would, if the non-resident had been resident in Canada, be deductible in computing the 
income of the individual or the individual’s spouse.  
 
Section 118(7)(b) 
Section 118(7) defines qualified pension income for the purposes of the pension credit 
as including certain amounts received by the individual on the death of the individual’s 
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spouse. This rule means that a deceased spouse’s pension received by a surviving 
spouse qualifies for the pension tax credit. 
 
B. Married Person 
 
Section 118(4)(a.1), proposed amendment 
Section 118(4) provides limiting rules with respect to the equivalent to married (spouse) 
tax credit and the proposed amendment provides that if a marital (spousal) tax credit is 
claimed for a tax year in respect of a person by an individual and the individual and that 
person are married to each other and are not separated, neither the individual nor any 
other individual may claim the equivalent to spouse tax credit in respect of that person 
for the year. 
 
C. Child 
 
Section 56(1)(b)B 
 Paragraph 56(1)(b) requires the inclusion of child suppor t payments in incom e with 
respect to child support orders made pursuant to an order made before May 1, 1997 and 
not varied after that time.  
 
Section 56.1(2)(b), (3)(b), (4) definitions of “child support amount,” (b)(ii) and (iii), 
“commencement day”, and (b) “support amount” 
 
Section 56.1 (2) and (3) provide some of the detailed rules that apply to the inclusion in 
income of child support payments in certain circumstances. Subsection (4) defines terms 
related to those rules. 
 173 
Section 64.1 (a), and (c) 
Section 64.1 includes special rules that apply when the taxpayer claiming the child care 
expenses deduction is resident in Canada but absent therefrom for a period of time. 
 
Section 104(5.4)(b)(ii)  
Section 104 (5.3) provided for the deferral of the 21 year deemed disposition for some 
trusts. Subsection (5.4) defined an exempt beneficiary for those purposes, but is now 
irrelevant as subsection (5.3) is being repealed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 APPENDIX B 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PRIMARY 
PROVISIONS OF THE INCOME TAX ACT 
THAT REFER TO MARRIED PERSONS AND 
SPOUSAL RELATIONSHIPS 
 
 
The following material relates to the legislative history discussed in Chapter Two. It 
includes material on the attribution rules, the spousal t ax credit, the definition of 
“spouse”, the inclusion/deduction system for spousal support (alimony) and the rollover 
of capital property to a spouse or child. 
 
Income War Tax Act 1917, 7-8 Geo. V, c. 28 
 
s.4 (1)  There shall be assessed, levied and paid, upon the income during the preceding 
year … the following taxes:  
 
(a) 4 per centum upon all incom e exceeding fifteen hundred dollars in t he case of  
unmarried persons and widows or widowers without dependent children, and exceeding 
three thousand dollars in the case of all other persons 
 
* this provision was repealed and r eplaced with a similar provision using identical 
terminology by S.C. 1918, c.25, s.3 
 
* the 1918, c.25 provision was repealed by S.C. 1919, c.55, s.3 and replaced with the 
following:  
 
4(1) There shall be assessed, levied and paid upon t he income … the following 
taxes:  
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(a) four per centum 
 
upon all income exceeding one thousand dollars but not exceeding six thousand 
dollars in t he case of  unmarried persons and w idows or widowers without 
dependent children, and persons who are not supporting dependent brothers or 
sisters under the age of eighteen years, or a dependent  parent or parents, 
grandparent or grandparents, and exceeding two thousand dollars but not 
exceeding six thousand dollars in the case of all other persons…  
 
* the 1919, c.55 provision above was repealed by S.C. 1922, c.25 and replaced with the 
following: 
 
4(1)(a) four per centum upon all income exceeding two thousand dollars but not 
exceeding six thousand dollars in t he case of  a m arried person, or any other 
person who has dependent upon him any of the following persons:  
 
 (i) a parent or grandparent;  
 (ii) a daughter or sister;  
(iii) a son or brother under twenty-one years of age or incapable of  self-
support on account of mental or physical infirmity;  
 
and four per centum upon all incom e exceeding one thousand dollars but not 
exceeding six thousand dollars in the case of all other persons… 
 
* s.4 (4) is a general attribution rule that provides that if a transfer of property is made to 
a "wife or husband" [terms not defined] and the purpose is to evade tax, the transferor is 
liable to be taxed as if transfer had not been made. 
 
 
 
An Act to amend the Income War Tax Act 1917, S.C. 1926, c.10. 
 
s.1 of this Act, adds and def ines the following terms to s.2 [definition section] of the 
Income War Tax Act, 1917:  
 
(n) "householder" means 
(i) an individual who at his own and sole ex pense maintains a self-
contained domestic establishment employing therein on full time a 
housekeeper or servant, or 
(ii) an individual who maintains a self -contained domestic 
establishment and who actually supports and m aintains therein 
one or more individuals connected with him by blood relationship, 
marriage or adoption; 
 
(o) "self contained domestic establishment" means a dwelling house, apartment 
or other similar place of residence, containing at least two bedrooms, in which 
residence amongst other things the taxpayer as a general sleeps and has his 
meals prepared and served. 
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* these definitions appear as 2(f) and 2(j) respectively in the IWTA R.S.C. 1927, c.28 
 
s.4 of this Act amends the "rates of tax" found in s.4(1) of the IWTA 1917, as amended, 
and adds the following subsection to s.4 of the IWTA, 1917:  
 
1(A) Taxpayers shall be entitled to the following exemptions:   
 
(a)  Three thousand dollars in the case of  a m arried person or 
householder or any other person who has dependent upon him any of 
the following persons:  
(i) A parent or grandparent, 
(ii) A daughter or sister, 
(iii) A son or brother under twenty-one years of age or incapable of 
self-support on account of mental or physical infirmity; 
(b)  Fifteen hundred dollars in the case of other persons, and  
(c)  Five hundred dollars for each child under  twenty-one years of age 
who is dependent upon the taxpayer for support…  
 
*the amount of this exemption was reduced by S.C. 1932, c.43, s.4 
 
1(B) Where a husband and w ife have each a separ ate income in excess of 
fifteen hundred dollars, each shall r eceive an ex emption of fifteen hundred 
dollars in lieu of  the exemption set forth in par agraph (c) of the immediately 
preceding subsection… 
 
1(C) The exemption for each dependent child m ay be t aken by either parent 
under arrangement between themselves. In the event of any dispute arising 
between them, then the said ex emption or exemptions shall be allot ted to the 
father of the said child or children. 
 
* the immediately above provisions appear as s.5(1)(c), 5(2) and 5(3) respectively in the 
Revised Statutes, 1927, c.28 
 
 
 
The Income War Tax Act, 1917, R.S.C. 1927, c.28 
 
The structure of the IWTA is as follows in the Revised Statutes, 1927:  
  
s.2 - definitions 
s.3 - taxable income defined 
s.4 - excepted incomes 
s.5 - deductions and exemptions allowed 
s.6 - deductions from income not allowed 
s.7 and 8 - deductions from taxes allowed 
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s.9 - persons taxable:  
There shall be assessed,  levied and paid upon the income during 
the preceding year of every person  
[paragraphs (a) - (e) resident in Canada etc] 
a tax at the rates applicable […] set forth in the First Schedule of 
this Act upon the amount of income in excess of the exemptions 
provided in this Act […]  
 
First Schedule -  "Rates of Tax Applicable t o Persons other than 
Corporations and Joint Stock Companies"  
 
 
 
An Act to amend the Income War Tax Act 1917, S.C. 1932-33, c.41  
 
s.2 of this Act repeals the definition of "householder" - see above  
 
s.4 of this Act repeals paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of s.5 of the RSC, 1927 and substitutes 
the following :  
 
[5(1) "Income" as hereinbefore defined shall f or the purposes of this Act be 
subject to the following exemptions and deductions:]  
 
  (c) Two thousand dollars in the case of 
(i) A married person;  
(ii) A widow or widower with a son or  daughter under twenty-one 
years of age who is dependent upon such parent for support, 
or if twenty-one years of age or over is likewise dependent on 
account of mental or physical infirmity; 
(iii) An individual who maintains a self -contained domestic 
establishment and who actually supports therein one or more 
individuals connected with him by blood relationship, marriage 
or adoption […] 
(d) One thousand dollars in the case of all other persons […]  
(e) Four hundred dollars for each child or grandchild […]  
 
* This provision was repealed by S.C. 1940, c.34 and replaced with a similar provision, 
which included the following addition:  
 
5(1)(c)(iv) A minister or clergyman in charge of a diocese, congregation or parish, 
whose duties required him to maintain at his ow n and sole ex pense a self -
contained domestic establishment and w ho employs therein on f ull time a 
housekeeper or servant… 
 
* This provision was further amended by S.C. 1940-41, c.18, s.11 which added the 
following subsection:  
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5(5) A taxpayer shall not be allowed the exemptions provided in paragraphs (c), 
(e) and ( i) [dependent relatives] of s.5(1) unless the spouse, child, grandchild 
parent, grandparent, brother or sister […] is resident in Canada […] 
 
 
 
An Act to amend the Income War Tax Act 1917, S.C. 1942-43, c.28 
 
s.1 of this Act repeals paragraph A [ "Rates of Tax Applicable t o Persons other than 
Corporations and Joint  Stock Companies"] of the First Schedule of  the IWTA R.S.C., 
1927 and replaces them with the following:  
 
 A. Rules for Computation of Income Tax under subsection 1 of section 9:  
 
 Section 1. Normal Tax 
 
Rule 1.  A normal tax equal to 7 per centum of the income shall be paid 
by every person whose income during the year exceeded $1,200 and 
who was during that year: 
 
(a) a married person […] 
(b) a widow or widower with a son or  daughter wholly dependent 
upon such person for support, if such son or daughter was […] 
(i) under eighteen years of age; or 
(ii) eighteen years of age or older and dependent by reason of 
mental or physical infirmity; or  
(iii) under twenty-one years of age and a student […] 
(c) an unmarried person who maintained a self-contained 
domestic establishment and act ually supported therein a 
person wholly dependent upon him and connected with him by 
blood relationship, marriage or adoption; or  
(d) an unmarried minister or clergyman […] who maintained a 
self-contained domestic establishment and em ployed therein 
on full-time a housekeeper or servant.  
 
* note that the margin note next to this rule reads: "Married persons and persons given 
equivalent status" 
 
Rule 2. If, during any taxation year, a husband and his w ife each had a 
separate income in excess of $660, each shall be taxed under Rule three 
of this section, provided, however, that a husband shall not  lose his r ight 
to be taxed under Rule one of  this section by reason of his w ife being 
employed and receiving any earned income.  
 
Rule 3. Every person not liable to taxation under Rule one or Rule two of 
this section shall pay a normal tax equal to […]  
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  Rule 5. [tax credit for dependents] 
(a) child, grandchild, brother or sister […] 
(b) parent or grandparent […] 
 
Section 2. Graduated Tax 
 
  Rule 1. [provides for $660 deduction from income for every person] 
 
  Rule 2. [rates, which are linked to the amount of income of the taxpayer] 
 
Rule 3. [tax credit of $150 f or married persons and t hose persons 
receiving equivalent status - same as Rule 1 in section 1 above] 
 
  Rule 4. [tax credit for dependents - child or grandchild] 
 
  Rule 5. [tax credit for dependents - parent or grandparent] 
 
Rule 6. If, during any taxation year, a husband and his w ife each had a 
separate income in excess of $660 before making the deduction for which 
provision is made in Rule one of  this section, neither of them shall be 
entitled to the deduction from graduated tax for which provision is made in 
Rule three of this section, provided, however, that notwithstanding the 
foregoing a husband shall not  lose his r ight to the deduction provided in 
Rule three of this section by reason of his w ife being employed and 
receiving any earned income but his w ife shall f or the purposes of this 
section be treated as an unmarried person.  
 
Rule 7. The deduction in r espect of any dependent child, for which 
provision is made in Rule f our of this section may […] be made from the 
tax payable by such of his parents as may be determined by agreement 
between them, but if there is no such agreement, such deduction shall be 
made from the father's tax unless the Minister otherwise determines.  
 
 
 Section 3. General […] 
 
This Act contains three provisions re: alimony: 
 
s.3(2) provides that alimony received shall be included in income; s.7(1) 
provides that alimony paid cannot be deducted from income; and s.11 adds the 
following to the IWTA, R.S.C. 1927: 
 
s.11 The said Act is … am ended by inserting the following section [after s.8 of 
the IWTA, 1927]: 
 
8A. Any person who is required […] to make and does make any payment 
as alimony or other allowance for the maintenance of the recipient thereof 
and the children of the marriage if any, may, if he is liv ing apart from the 
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spouse or former spouse to whom he is required to make such payments, 
deduct from the taxes otherwise payable by him […] the amount of the tax 
which such spouse or former spouse would pay upon […] such payments 
[…] if such pay ments were the only income of such spouse or former 
spouse and such spouse or  former spouse w ere an unm arried person 
resident in Canada w ith no dependent s except the children, if any, for 
whose maintenance such payments were, in part, made. 
 
* s.7(1) and s.11 of this Act [6(1)(g) and 8A r espectively of the IWTA] are repealed by 
S.C. 1944-45, s.43 - see below 
 
 
 
An Act to amend the Income War Tax Act 1917, S.C. 1944-45, c.43 
 
s. 1(2) of this Act adds the following subsections to s.2 [definition section] of the IWTA: 
 
 2(2) "child of a taxpayer" defined 
 2(3) definitions […]   
(a) "parent"  
(b) "grandparent" 
(c) "brother"  
(d) "sister" 
(e) "son"  
(f) "daughter" 
 
s.4 of this Act amends section 5 [ deductions and ex emptions allowed] of the IWTA, 
R.S.C. 1927, c.97, including the addition of the following paragraph:  
 
(8)(t) an amount paid by  the taxpayer […] as alimony […] if he is liv ing 
apart from the spouse or former spouse to whom he is required to make 
the payment. 
 
* note that this provision no longer requires that the alimony payment must be the only 
income received by the recipient - [see above]  
 
s.5 of this Act repeals s.7 of SC 1942-43, c.28 [re alimony - see above] 
 
s.7 of this Act repeals s.8A enacted by s.11 of SC 1942- 43, c.28 [re: alimony - see 
above] 
 
s.21 of this Act repeals subparagraphs (a), (b) and ( c) of Rule 1 of  section 1 of 
paragraph A ["Rules for Computation of Income Tax under subsection 1 of section 9"] of 
the First Schedule and substitutes:  
  
 (a)  a married person who supported his spouse […]  
 (b)  [substitutes "a person" for "a widow or widower"] 
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(c)  an unmarried person or a married person separated from his spouse who 
maintained a self-contained domestic establishment and act ually 
supported therein a person wholly dependent upon him  and connect ed 
with him by blood relationship, marriage or adoption. 
  
*s.25 makes similar amendments to Rule 3 of  section 2 of  paragraph A of the First 
Schedule. 
 
s.22 of this Act repeals Rule 2 of  section 1 of  paragraph A of  the First Schedule [see 
above] and replaces it with the following:  
 
Rule 2. If … a m arried person described by subparagraph (a) of Rule 1 [ie. as 
amended by this Act] of this section and his spouse each had a separate income 
in excess of $660, each shall be taxed under Rule 3 of this section: Provided that 
a husband does not  lose his r ight to be t axed under Rule 1 of this section by 
reason of his wife being employed and receiving any earned income.  
 
*s.28 similarly amends Rule 6 of s.2 of paragraph A of the First Schedule. 
 
s.24 adds Rule 7 to section 1 of para A of the First Schedule:  
 
Rule 7: Where a taxpayer is entitled to make a deduction from his income for the 
taxation year under par. (t) of 5(1) IWTA […] [alimony] […] the spouse or  child 
shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed not to be the spouse or child of 
the taxpayer. 
 
*s.28(2) adds a similar provision for the purposes of s.2 of paragraph A of  the First 
Schedule as Rule 9. 
 
 
 
An Act to amend the Income War Tax Act 1917, S.C. 1945, c.23. 
 
s.9 of this Act adds Section 4 to paragraph A of the First Schedule:  
 
Section 4. Tax payable by persons benefiting from both family allowances under 
The Family Allowances Act, 1944 and allowances under this Act for children.  
  
 Rule 3 of this section [4] provides: 
 
"For the purpose of this section a t axpayer shall be deem ed to be a 
married person if he is entitled to a deduction from tax under Rule 3 of s.2 
of this paragraph A” (see above).  
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An Act to amend the Income War Tax Act 1917, S.C. 1946, c.55. 
 
s.1(1) of this Act amends 2(1) [definitions] of the IWTA, R.S.C. 1927, c.97 by adding: 
 (x) words importing the masculine include the neuter [sic]. 
 
 
 
The Income Tax Act, S.C. 1947-48, c.52 
 
** Replaces the Income War Tax Act 
 
s.6(d) - Alimony received must be included in recipient’s income 
 
s.11(j) - Alimony paid may be deducted from payor’s income 
 
 
 
Division C - Computation of Taxable Income 
 
s.25 (1) For the purpose of computing the taxable income of an individual for a taxation 
year, there may be deducted from his income for the year such of the following amounts 
as are applicable:  
 
(a) $1500 in the case of a taxpayer who […] was  
 
(i) a married person who supported his spouse, 
(ii) a person who had a child w holly dependent upon him for support, if 
the child was […], 
(iii) an unmarried person or a married person not supporting his spouse 
who maintained a self contained domestic establishment and actually 
supported therein a per son wholly dependent upon him and 
connected with him by blood relationship, marriage or adoption, or 
(iv) an unmarried minister or clergyman […] who maintained a self-
contained domestic establishment and em ployed therein a full-time 
servant; 
 
   (b) $750 in the case of an individual not entitled to a deduction under par. (a); 
 
  (c) for each child or grandchild […], 
 
  (d) other dependents […]. 
 
(2) [Limitations on s.1 deductions for spouse - ie. where spouse has income] […] 
 
(5) Where a taxpayer is entitled to a deduction […] under para.(j) of 11(1) in respect of a 
payment for the maintenance of a spouse or child, the spouse or child, for the purposes 
of this section, be deemed not to be the spouse or child of the taxpayer.  
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Part VI - Interpretation 
 
s.127(1) In this Act,  
 
(ak) "self-contained domestic establishment" means a dwelling-house, apartment or 
other similar place of  residence in which place a per son as a general rule sleeps and 
eats.  
 
* note that the original definition said "has his meals prepared and served" 
 
* this definition remains in s.248(1) of the 1970-71-72 Act, as amended to the present. 
 
 
* no significant changes to the ITA, S.C. 1948, c.52 [ITA, R.S.C. 1952, c.148] until   
its repeal by S.C. 1970-71-72, c.63 
 
 
 
An Act to Amend the Income Tax Act, 1970-71-72, c.63 
 
s. 1 of this Act:  
 
ITA, R.S.C. 1952, as amended, repealed (except s.1 and Parts IV and VIII) 
ITA, R.S.C. 1970 declared not in force by 1970-71-72, c. 43, s.1; 
   
 
 
Section 70 [rollover on death of taxpayer of capital property to a spouse]  
 
70(6) Where any property of a t axpayer to which paragraphs (5)(a) and (c) or 
paragraphs 5(b) and (d), as the case may be, would otherwise apply has, on or 
after the death of the taxpayer and as a conseq uence thereof, been transferred 
or distributed to 
(a) his spouse, or 
(b) a trust created by the taxpayer’s will under which 
(i) his spouse is ent itled to receive all of  the income of the trust that arises 
before the spouse’s death, and 
(ii) no person except the spouse may, before the spouse’s death, receive or 
otherwise obtain the use of any of the income or capital of the trust,  
and both the taxpayer and the spouse or trust, as the case may be, were resident 
in Canada immediately before the death of the taxpayer, the following rules 
apply: 
(c) paragraphs (5)(a) to (d) are not applicable to the property; 
(d) the taxpayer shall be deem ed to have disposed of  the property immediately 
before his death and to have received proceeds of disposition therefor equal 
to, 
(i) where the property was depreciable property of the taxpayer of a 
prescribed class, that proportion of the undepreciated capital cost to him 
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of the property immediately before his death that the fair market value at 
that time of all of  the depreciable property of the taxpayer of that class, 
and 
(ii) in any other case, the adjusted cost base to the taxpayer of the property 
immediately before his death,  
and the spouse or  trust, as the case may be, shall be deem ed to have 
acquired the property at the same amount; and  
(e) where the property was depreciable property of the taxpayer of a prescribed 
class, paragraph (5)(e) is applicable as if  the reference therein to "paragraph 
(b)" and to "paragraph (d)" were read as references to "paragraph (6)(d)".  
 
* subsection 70(6) is repealed and replaced by S.C. 1973-74, c.14, s.19(2) 
 
 
 
Section 73(1) [inter vivos rollover of capital property to a spouse] 
 
73(1) For the purposes of this Part, where at any time after 1971 any particular capital 
property has been transferred by a taxpayer to his spouse, or to a trust created 
by him under which  
(a) his spouse is ent itled to receive all of  the income of the trust that arises 
before the spouse’s death, and 
(b) no person except that spouse may, before the spouse’s death, receive or 
otherwise obtain the use of any of the income or capital of the trust,  
and both the taxpayer and the spouse or trust, as the case may be, were resident 
in Canada at  that time, the particular property shall be deem ed to have been 
disposed of at that time by the taxpayer for proceeds equal to,  
(c) where the particular property is depr eciable property of a prescribed 
class, that proportion of the undepreciated capital cost to the taxpayer 
immediately before that time of all property of that class that fair market 
value immediately before that time of the particular property is of the fair 
market value immediately before that time of all of that property of that 
class, and 
(d) in any other case, the adjusted cost base to the taxpayer of the particular 
property immediately before that time,  
and to have been acquired at that time by the spouse or trust, as the case may 
be, for an amount equal to those proceeds.  
 
* subsections 73(1) and (2) are repealed and replaced by S.C. 1977-78, c.32, s.15. 
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Principal Residence 
 
54(g) "principal residence" of a taxpayer for a taxation year means a housing unit, or a 
share of the capital stock of a co-operative housing corporation, owned, whether 
jointly with another person or otherwise, in t he year by the taxpayer, if the 
housing unit was, or if the share was acquired for the sole purpose of acquiring 
the right to inhabit a housing unity owned by the corporation that was,  
(i) ordinarily inhabited by the taxpayer in the year, or  
(ii) property in r espect of which the taxpayer has m ade an elect ion for the 
year in accordance with subsection 45(2),  
except that in no case shall any such housing unit or share, as the case may be, 
be considered to be a taxpayer’s principal residence for a year 
(iii) unless it has been desig nated by him in prescribed manner to be his 
principal residence for that year and no ot her property has been so 
designated by him for that year, or  
(iv) by virtue of subparagraph (ii), if by virtue of that subparagraph the 
property would, but for this subparagraph, have been his principal 
residence for 4 or more of the previous taxation years,   
and for the purposes of this paragraph the "principal residence" of a taxpayer for 
a taxation year shall be deemed to include, except where the property consists of 
a share of the capital stock of a co- operative housing corporation, the land 
subjacent to the housing unit and such por tion of any immediately contiguous 
land as may reasonably be regarded as cont ributing to the taxpayer’s use and 
enjoyment of the housing unit as a residence […]  
 
* S.C. 1973-74, c.14, s.14(1) repeals and r eplaces all t hat portion of paragraph 54(g) 
preceding subparagraph (iii) 
 
 
1974-75-76, c.26 
 
s.26(1) The Income Tax Act  is f urther amended by adding thereto, immediately after 
section 54 thereof, the following subsection: 
 
54.1(1) A taxation year in which a taxpayer does not ordinarily inhabit his property as a 
consequence of the relocation of his place of  employment while he is em ployed 
by an employer who is not a person to whom he is related shall be deemed not to 
be a previous taxation year referred to in subparagraph 54(g)(iv) if  
(a) the property subsequently becomes ordinarily inhabited by him during the 
term of his em ployment by that employer or before the end of the taxation 
year immediately following the taxation year in which his employment by that 
employer terminates, or  
(b) he dies during the term of his employment by that employer. 
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1976-76, c.4  *** ss.14 and 15 add spouse to 54(g) and 54.1 respectively ***  
 
14(1) Subparagraph 54(g)(i) of the Income Tax Act  is r epealed and t he following 
substituted therefor: 
 
(i)  ordinarily inhabited in the year by the taxpayer, his spouse or former spouse, 
or a child of  the taxpayer who, during the year, was wholly dependent upon 
him for support and was a person described in subparagraph 109(1)(d)(i), (ii) 
or (iii), or  
 
 
 
An Act to amend the Income Tax Act, S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c.140 
 
s.130(1) of this Act - applicable after 1981 - adds: 
 
s.252(3) For the purposes of [list several paragraphs […], "spouse" and "former 
spouse" include a party to a voidable marriage.  
 
 
 
An Act to amend the Income Tax Act, S.C. 1988, c.55 
 
s.92(1) of this Act adds s.118(1) [conversion of exemptions to tax credits]: 
 
(a) Married status -- in the case of an individual who at any time in the year is a 
married person who supports the individual's spouse, an amount […]  
 
(b) Wholly dependent person ["equivalent to spouse" credit] -- in the case of an 
individual who does not claim a deduct ion for the year because of  par. 
118(1)(a) and who, at any time in the year, 
 
(i) is an unmarried person or a m arried person who neither supported nor 
lived with the married person's spouse and is not supported by the 
spouse; and  
(ii) whether alone or jointly with one or more other persons, maintains a self-
contained domestic establishment (in which the individual lives) and 
actually supports in that establishment a person who, at that time, is 
 
(A) except in the case of a child of the individual, resident in Canada 
(B) wholly dependent for support on the individual, or the individual and 
the other person or persons, as the case may be, 
(C) related to the individual, and 
(D) except in the case of a parent or grandparent of the individual, either 
under 18 y ears of age or so dependent  by reason of mental or 
physical infirmity, an amount […] 
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An Act to amend the Income Tax Act, S.C. 1990, c.35 
 
s.13(6) of this Act adds:  
 
146(1.1) For the purposes of the definitions "annuitant," "refund of premiums" 
and "retirement income" in subsection (1), para.(3)(b) and subsect ions 
(8.8), (8.91) and (16),  
 
  "spouse" of an individual means a person of the opposite sex 
(a) who is married to the individual; or 
(b) who is cohabiting with the individual in a conjugal relationships and 
(i) has so cohabited for a period of at least one year, or 
(ii) is a parent of a child of whom the individual is a parent. 
 
s.16(1) of this Act adds s.147.1(1):  
 
 "spouse" of an individual has the meaning assigned by subsection 146(1.1)  
 
 
 
An Act to amend the Income Tax Act, S.C. 1994, c.7, Schedule VIII  
 
s.82(5) of this Act repeals s. 146(1.1) [definition of spouse - see above] 
 
s.85(2) of this Act repeals s.147.1(1) [see above] 
 
s.140(2) of this Act amends s.252(3) [see above] - applicable to the 1991 and 
subsequent taxation years - to read:  
"for the purposes of [paragraphs …], "spouse" and " former spouse" of a 
particular individual include another individual of the opposite sex who is a par ty 
to a voidable or void marriage with the particular individual.  
 
s.140(3) of this Act enacts s.252(4):   
 
In this Act,  
 
(a) words referring to a spouse at any time of a taxpayer include the person of 
the opposite sex who cohabits at that time with the taxpayer in a conj ugal 
relationship and 
(i) has so cohabited with the taxpayer throughout a 12-month period ending 
before that time, or 
(ii) would be a par ent of a child of  whom the taxpayer would be a parent, if 
this Act were read […] (as amended in 1994 and 1998) 
 
and, for the purposes of this paragraph, where at any time the taxpayer and the 
person cohabit in a conjugal relationship, they shall, at any particular time after 
that time, be deemed to be cohabiting in a conjugal relationship unless they were 
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not cohabiting at the particular time for a period of at least 90 days that includes 
the particular time because of a breakdown of their conjugal relationship; 
 
(b) references to marriage shall be r ead as if  a conjugal relationship between 2 
individuals who are, because of para 252(4)(a), spouses of each other were a 
marriage; 
 
(c) provisions that apply to a per son who is m arried apply to a person who is, 
because of para 252(4)(a), a spouse of a taxpayer; and  
 
(d) provisions that apply to a person who is unmarried do not apply to a person 
who is, because of para 252(4)(a), a spouse of a taxpayer.  
 
 
 
An Act to amend the Income Tax Act, S.C. 1997, c.25 
 
s.25(2) of this Act amends s.118(1)(a) as follows:  
 
Married status -- in the case of an individual who at any time in t he year is a 
married person who supports the individual’s spouse and is not  living separate 
and apart from the spouse by  reason of a br eakdown of their marriage, an 
amount […]  
 
 
 
Bill C-23, The Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act 
 
Section 139(2) of this Act amends section 248 of the Act by adding the following: 
 
“common-law partner”, with respect to a t axpayer at any time, means a per son who 
cohabits at that time in a conjugal relationship with the taxpayer and  
(a) has so cohabit ed with the taxpayer for a cont inuous period of at least one 
year and 
(b) would be t he parent of a child of  whom the taxpayer is a parent if this Act 
were read without reference to paragraphs 252(1)(c) and (e) and 
subparagraph 252(a)(iii), 
and for the purposes of this definition, where at any time the taxpayer and the 
person cohabit in a conj ugal relationship, they are, at any particular time after 
that time, deemed to be cohabit ing in a conj ugal relationship unless they were 
not cohabiting at the particular time for a period of at least 90 days that includes 
the particular time because of a breakdown of their conjugal relationship; 
 
“common-law partnership” means the relationship between two persons who are 
common-law partners of each other. 
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Section 142 am ends the Act by replacing “spouse” and “ spouses” with “spouse or 
common-law partner” and “ spouses and com mon-law partners” in ev ery provision in 
which the former terms are to be found. 
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